

# On the Welfare Implications of Automation

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**Abstract:** We document that the decline in the labor income share since the 1950s has been countered by a rise in the income share of capital goods that embody information and communication technology (ICT). In parallel, there has been substantial reallocation of labor income from occupations relatively substitutable with ICT (routine) to ones relatively complementary (non-routine). These trends are consistent with the view that ICT allows for the mechanization of tasks that traditionally required labor, a process known as automation. Our calibration suggests that automation can account for half of the decline in the labor share, but that it is unlikely to be the sole driver of the decline in the routine labor income share. A representative agent framework suggests welfare gains of 4%.

JEL: E25, E22, J24, J31, O33

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**Maya Eden<sup>1</sup>**

Brandeis University

Department of Economics

415 South Street

Waltham, MA 02453

Email: [meden@brandeis.edu](mailto:meden@brandeis.edu)

**Paul Gaggl<sup>1</sup>**

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Belk College of Business

Department of Economics

9201 University City Blvd

Charlotte, NC 28223-0001

Email: [pgaggl@uncc.edu](mailto:pgaggl@uncc.edu)

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# 1. Introduction

The advent of information and communication technology (ICT) is widely viewed to have had transformational effects on the distribution of income across factors of production. The discussion has centered around two mechanisms: first, ICT may have lowered the demand for tasks that can easily be automated relative to those that cannot, thus leading to a reallocation of labor income across occupations (e.g., [Autor and Dorn, 2013](#)).<sup>1</sup> Second, automation—the process of mechanizing certain tasks that traditionally required labor—may have led to the reallocation of income from labor to capital, thus lowering the labor income share (e.g., [Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014](#)).<sup>2</sup> While these distributional implications are broadly considered adverse, ICT has also been celebrated as an important engine of growth over the last few decades. Thus, the policy discussion surrounding automation has often focused on striking a balance between the growth gains from ICT and its potential distributional implications.

In this paper, we hope to further this discussion by providing some measurements of the potential distributional implications of ICT and of its potential growth benefits. We begin by documenting the evolution of income shares for different capital and labor inputs, disaggregated based on their relationship with ICT (see [Figure 1](#) and [Table 1](#)). We find a substantial reallocation of income from routine labor, which is relatively more substitutable with ICT, to non-routine labor, which is relatively less substitutable with ICT, driven both by changes in employment and by changes in average wages. In addition, we document a steep increase in the income share of ICT capital, while the income shares of other capital types have remained trendless.

We then offer a structural interpretation of the observed trends, which allows us to comment on the effects of automation. In particular, our quantitative analysis suggests that, in recent decades, ICT has been responsible for about a third of output growth and about half of the decline in the labor income share. These findings inform the policy debate on the welfare effects of automation by providing some estimates both of the growth gains from ICT and of its implications for the distribution of income between capital and labor.


Our analysis further suggests that it is unlikely that automation is the sole driver of the decline in the routine labor income share. We illustrate this by considering a model in which changes in the income share

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<sup>1</sup>While many older contributions provide mostly conditional correlations, [Akerman, Gaarder and Mogstad \(2015\)](#) as well as [Gaggl and Wright \(2017\)](#) are two recent examples providing estimates for the causal effects of ICT investments on the employment and wage distribution. Their estimates confirm many of the earlier results (based mostly on conditional correlations) surveyed by [Acemoglu and Autor \(2011\)](#).

<sup>2</sup>Further examples are [Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin \(2013\)](#) as well as [Bridgman \(2014\)](#).

Figure 1: The Division of Income in the US



Notes: Occupation specific income shares are based on CPS earnings data from the annual march supplement (1968 and after) and rescaled to match the aggregate income share in the Non-Farm Business Sector (BLS). Non-routine workers are those employed in “management, business, and financial operations occupations”, “professional, technical, and related occupations”, and “service occupations”. Routine workers are those in “sales and related occupations”, “office and administrative support occupations”, “production occupations”, “transportation and material moving occupations”, “construction and extraction occupations”, and “installation, maintenance, and repair occupations” (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). For details see Section 3. The construction of capital-type specific income shares is described in Section 2. The underlying data are nominal gross capital stocks and depreciation rates, drawn from the BEA’s detailed fixed asset accounts.

Table 1: The Division of Income in the US

	Labor Share (%)	Capital Share (%)	Labor Share		Capital Share		
			Routine (%)	Non-Routine (%)	ICT (%)	Non-ICT (%)	
<i>A. Raw Data</i>							
1950	63.56	36.44			0.63	35.80	
1967	63.04	36.96	37.25	25.78	1.20	35.77	
2013	57.05	42.95	20.68	36.37	4.10	38.85	
<i>Percentage Point Change</i>							
1967-2013	-5.99	5.99	-16.57	10.58	2.90	3.08	
1950-2013	-6.52	6.52			3.47	3.05	
<i>B. Hodrick-Prescott Trend</i>							
1950	64.80	35.19			0.51	35.03	
1967	63.85	36.13	37.93	26.07	1.18	34.89	
2013	58.04	41.95	20.82	37.15	4.04	38.24	
<i>Percentage Point Change</i>							
1967-2013	-5.81	5.82	-17.11	11.08	2.86	3.36	
1950-2013	-6.76	6.76			3.53	3.21	

Notes: The table summarizes the long run trends in labor and capital shares as depicted in Figure 1. See the notes to Figure 1 for details on the data construction. Since our earnings data based on the CPS start in 1967 we report the disaggregated labor shares only for the period 1967-2013. Panel A is based on raw data values while panel B uses a Hodrick-Prescott trend to remove cyclical.

of routine labor are driven solely by changes in relative factor supplies, in particular the increase in the ICT capital stock. We find that this model is difficult to reconcile with the data given a standard nested CES production framework. While, under some measurement assumptions, it is possible to match the observed trends, doing so requires a very high elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor, which is arguably unrealistic. This suggests that other sources may be contributing to the trend in routine labor income. For example, [Autor, Dorn and Hanson \(2013\)](#) emphasize the potential roles of offshoring and international trade.

This paper is most closely related to the literature on the general equilibrium effects of declining capital prices (e.g., [Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante, 2000](#); [Autor and Dorn, 2013](#); [Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014](#)). Our main departure from this literature is an explicit focus on the distinction between ICT and non-ICT (NICT) capital. [Karabarbounis and Neiman \(2014\)](#) and [Autor and Dorn \(2013\)](#) consider an aggregate capital input. Closer to our decomposition, [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#) and [vom Lehn \(2015\)](#) distinguish between equipment and structures. The ICT capital class considered in this paper is a subset of the broader class of equipment. Our focus on this narrower category is motivated by the rich literature emphasizing that ICT features unique interactions with different types of labor ([Acemoglu and Autor, 2011](#); [Akerman et al., 2015](#); [Gaggl and Wright, 2017](#)). While the analysis in [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#) does not find an effect on the labor income share, our model suggests that ICT changes the distribution of income between capital and labor, consistent with [Karabarbounis and Neiman \(2014\)](#).

## 2. Decomposing The Capital Income Share

Our approach for disaggregating the capital income share follows [Hall and Jorgenson \(1967\)](#) and [Christensen and Jorgenson \(1969\)](#).<sup>3</sup> Suppose that there are several types of capital, denoted  $K_i$ , with  $i = 1, \dots, I$ . If aggregate income is divided between capital and labor, then the share of payments to capital must satisfy the following relation:

$$s_{K,t} = \sum_i \frac{R_{i,t}K_{i,t}}{P_t Y_t} = 1 - s_{L,t}, \quad (1)$$

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<sup>3</sup>For a few more recent contributions that use the same basic strategy to compute the return to specific types of capital in various contexts see for example [Jorgenson \(1995\)](#), [O'Mahony and Van Ark \(2003\)](#), and [Caselli and Feyrer \(2007\)](#). We outline the basic idea of our implementation to measure capital type specific income shares here and provide detailed derivations in [Appendix B](#).

where  $s_{K,t}$  and  $s_{L,t}$  denote the aggregate capital and labor income shares, respectively,  $P_t Y_t$  denotes nominal output, and  $R_{i,t}$  denotes the nominal rental rate of capital type  $i$ .

A no-arbitrage condition between different assets implies that, for every capital type  $i$ ,

$$\frac{R_{i,t} + P_{i,t+1}(1 - \delta_{i,t})}{P_{i,t}} = 1 + r_t, \quad (2)$$

where  $r_t$  is the market interest rate,  $\delta_{i,t}$  is the depreciation rate and  $P_{i,t}$  is its nominal price of a unit of capital. The left hand side is the rate of return on a unit of capital of type  $i$ , which is purchased at the price  $P_{i,t}$ , rented out for a period and resold. The right hand side is the market return on investment. We show in [Appendix B](#) how equations (1) and (2) allow us to compute an income share for each type of capital, defined as  $s_{i,t} = R_{i,t} K_{i,t} / (P_t Y_t)$ , using the labor income share, nominal current cost values for each type of capital, capital-specific depreciation rates, and capital-specific price indexes.


To measure the current cost values of different types of assets, we use the BEA’s detailed fixed asset accounts.<sup>4</sup> We aggregate the BEA’s detailed industry-level estimates into three types of capital, classified according to the BEA’s definition: residential assets, consumer durables and non-residential assets. Within the non-residential and consumer durables categories, we distinguish between ICT and non-ICT (NICT) assets. Within non-residential assets, we consider an asset to be ICT if the BEA classifies it as software (classification codes starting with RD2 and RD4) or as equipment related to computers (classification codes starting with EP and EN). See [Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A](#) for complete lists of the detailed assets grouped into the two types of non-residential capital. Within consumer durables, we classify the following assets as ICT: PCs and peripherals (1RGPC); software and accessories (1RGCS); calculators, typewriters, other information equipment (1RGCA); telephone and fax machines (1OD50).<sup>5</sup> Our definition of ICT capital is

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<sup>4</sup>Official documentation for the BEA’s methodology to construct these estimates is available at [http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/Fixed\\_Assets.1925\\_97.pdf](http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/Fixed_Assets.1925_97.pdf). Most macroeconomic studies using capital stocks utilize a simpler version of the perpetual inventory method than the BEA’s estimates, usually based on linear constant depreciation and aggregate real investment rates. We prefer the BEA’s estimates for several reasons: first, they are provided at the detailed asset level; second, they allow for time varying non-linear depreciation patterns; finally, these estimates allow us to directly use nominal stocks at current cost, rather than chain-weighted quantity indexes.

<sup>5</sup>We note that it is difficult to identify robots in the BEA classification. Industrial robots are perhaps the most relevant type of robot within our context, especially in the earlier part of our sample. The International Robot Association defines this type of capital as “automatically controlled reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator with at least three programmable axes which may be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications” (as defined in the standard ISO 8373: 1994). Given the BEA’s asset classification these robots are most likely classified as “industrial machinery”, which we classify as NICT. However, the software components of the robots are classified in the software category, which we identify as ICT. Thus, within our

Figure 2: Relative Prices & Depreciation



Notes: Panel A graphs implicit price deflators by capital type expressed as a fraction of the GDP deflator, which were constructed directly from the BEA's detailed fixed-asst accounts. The BEA GDP deflator is taken from FRED. Panel B depicts asset-specific depreciation rates constructed directly from the BEA's fixed asset accounts. See Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A and the text for our grouping of assets.

in line with other available estimates of ICT, which we briefly discuss in Appendix E.

We measure the price indexes,  $P_{i,t}$ , and the depreciation rates,  $\delta_{i,t}$ , directly from the BEA's fixed asset accounts.<sup>6</sup> Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the path of prices for ICT and NICT assets relative to the GDP deflator. This figure reveals that while the price of NICT capital relative to output remained essentially constant throughout the entire sample, the relative price of ICT capital has fallen substantially. Panel B of Figure 2 graphs the respective depreciation rates for each type of capital. The depreciation rate of ICT capital is substantially higher than the depreciation rate of NICT capital and increases over time.


Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the resulting estimates of the different capital income shares (also see Table 1). The income share of NICT capital does not show any significant trend over the period 1950-2013. In contrast, the income share of ICT capital has increased roughly seven-fold, from 0.63% in 1950 to 4.1%

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framework, robots will show up both as ICT capital goods and as NICT capital goods that are complementary to ICT capital, which we comment on in Section 5.1.

<sup>6</sup>We employ implicit price deflators that we construct for each type of capital based on chain type price indices provided by the BEA to obtain a series for  $P_{i,t}$ . Notice that this involves constructing appropriate chain type quantity aggregates and associated implicit price deflators for each capital type, derived from the BEA's estimates of stocks and prices for the detailed assets listed in Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A. We use Fisher's "ideal" formula to compute these chained aggregates. We measure depreciation rates based on the BEA's nominal values for depreciation and net capital stocks. That is, we compute  $\delta_{i,t} = (P_{i,t}Dep_{i,t}) / (P_{i,t}NetStock_{i,t} + P_{i,t}Dep_{i,t})$ . Since both measures are reported in year-end nominal values, the price terms cancel.

Figure 3: Capital and its Rental Rate



Notes: Panel A graphs the stock of ICT and NICT capital relative to its 1968 level. Panel B depicts asset-specific real rental rates ( $R_{i,t}/P_t$ ) in % of final output, derived from expressions (B.5)-(B.6) in Appendix B. The underlying data are the BEA's detailed fixed-asset accounts. The dashed vertical lines indicate the year 1968.

by 2013.<sup>7</sup>

This accounting exercise suggests that roughly half of the decline in the labor income share is attributable to the rise in the ICT income share. The remainder is due to a rapid rise in the NICT income share, particularly after 2001. Consistent with the findings of Rognlie (2015), a further decomposition of the increase in the NICT capital income share in the post-2001 period reveals that this rise is accounted for entirely by a rise in the income share of structures and residential capital (see Appendix C). After removing structures and residential capital income, the NICT capital income share is stationary. If one assumes that trends in real estate income are unrelated to automation, this measurement exercise suggests that about half of the decline in the labor income share is potentially attributable to ICT.

We further document that the trends in the ICT and NICT income shares are primarily within-industry phenomena. In particular, results presented in Appendix D show that the aggregate trends in ICT and NICT income illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1 are robust to the inclusion of industry fixed-effects. This suggests that the disaggregated trends in the capital income shares are not merely a result of changes in industrial composition.

<sup>7</sup>Our estimated trends are consistent with those reported in the Conference Board's Total Economy Database (TED), covering the period 1990-2016, as well as the Groningen Growth and Development Centre's (GGDC) industry growth accounts, covering 1979-2003 (see Figure E.14 in Appendix E).

Finally, it is instructive to decompose the payments to capital,  $(R_{i,t}/P_t)K_{i,t}$ , into a price component and a quantity component. To this end, we construct chained quantity indexes for the stocks of ICT and NICT capital based on Fisher’s “ideal” formula and the BEA’s fixed asset accounts. Figure 3 shows that while the stock of ICT has increased, its rental rate has declined.

### 3. Decomposing The Labor Income Share

An extensive literature in labor economics distinguishes between two types of labor based on their interactions with ICT (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). The first type of labor executes primarily “routine” tasks, that require following exact, pre-specified decision trees (or routines). By their very nature, these tasks are prone to automation. The second type of labor is intensive in non-routine tasks that require judgement, creativity or interpersonal skills, deeming them less readily prone to automation.

We measure the income shares of several occupation groups, using two alternative measures of earnings at the occupation level from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS): annual earnings from the March supplements (MARCH) starting in 1967 (provided by IPUMS, Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder and Sobek, 2010); and weekly earnings from the CPS outgoing rotation groups (ORG) starting in 1979 (drawn from the basic monthly CPS files provided by the NBER). Panel A of Figure 4 illustrates that the two alternative measurements result in very similar estimates of the aggregate labor share, which are both highly correlated with the BLS’s labor share within the total non-farm business sector (which includes benefits, pensions, etc.).


For each occupation, we divide the aggregate annual wage bill by nominal GDP to obtain the occupation’s share of wage and salary earnings in aggregate income.<sup>8</sup> We categorize occupations as “routine” or “non-routine” based on the classification in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). That is, we consider workers employed in “management, business, and financial operations occupations”, “professional, technical,

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<sup>8</sup>We use CPS sampling weights to estimate the aggregate wage bill at the detailed occupation level. For the ORGs, which are drawn from the raw CPS basic files, this requires several non-trivial adjustments to the raw data. First, since the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL) classification of occupations changes several times during our sample period, we aggregate individuals into a panel of 330 consistent occupations, designed by Dorn (2009). We thank Nir Jaimovich for providing a crosswalk between Dorn’s (2009) occupation codes and the latest Census classification that is used in the CPS since 2011. This crosswalk is the same as in Cortes, Jaimovich, Nekarda and Siu (2014). Second, we follow Champagne, Kurmann and Stewart (2017) and adjust top coded earnings based on Piketty and Saez’s (2003) updated estimates of the cross-sectional income distribution. While top-coded earnings values may pose less of a problem in many microeconomic analyses, they potentially introduce substantial bias when estimating the aggregate wage bill for high-wage occupations.



Figure 4: Labor's Share in Income: CPS-ORG and CPS-MARCH




Notes: Panel A contrasts aggregate income shares (as a fraction of GDP) based on the CPS outgoing rotation groups (ORG) as well as annual earnings from the CPS March supplement (MARCH), aggregates reported in the NIPA tables, as well as the BLS's estimate for the total non-farm business sector that includes benefits, self employed, proprietors income, and other non-salary labor income. The aggregate series are drawn from FRED. The series labeled "CPS-ORG (R+NR)" and "CPS-MARCH (R+NR)" are constructed from our occupation specific earnings based on CPS ORG and MARCH earnings. Panel B contrasts our estimates for the routine and non-routine income shares based on ORG and MARCH data, respectively.

and related occupations", and "service occupations" as non-routine; and we define routine workers as ones employed in "sales and related occupations", "office, clerical, and administrative support occupations", "production occupations", "transportation and material moving occupations", "construction and extraction occupations", and "installation, maintenance, and repair occupations". This classification emerges out of an extensive literature, surveyed by [Acemoglu and Autor \(2011\)](#), that originated from the seminal work by [Autor, Levy and Murnane \(2003\)](#). They and many other contributions in this line of research use detailed information on the task content of at least 300 detailed occupations (depending on the study) obtained from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and its successor O\*Net. The classification used here is the "consensus aggregation" suggested by [Acemoglu and Autor \(2011\)](#), that captures the key insights from the more detailed micro analyses. We drop farm workers from all our analyses for comparability with the BLS measure of the labor income share.

Finally, we proportionately rescale group-specific income shares (which originally add up to the series labeled "CPS-ORG(R+NR)" and "CPS-MARCH(R+NR)" in panel A of Figure 4) so that they match the share of non-farm business labor income in GDP, as estimated by the BLS. Panel B of Figure 4 presents the resulting estimates of the routine and non-routine labor income shares. Consistent with the labor economics

Figure 5: Income Shares of Major Occupations



Notes: Panel A plots income shares for five major occupation groups. Panel B shows percent deviations from 1983 to illustrate trend growth. Occupation specific income shares are based on CPS earnings data from the annual march supplement (MARCH, 1967 and after) and rescaled to match the aggregate income share in the Non-Farm Business Sector (BLS).


literature, we find that, in the U.S., the decline in the aggregate labor share is entirely accounted for by routine occupations, while the income share of non-routine labor has been rising.

To illustrate that these trends are not an artifact of aggregation, Figure 5 plots the income shares of the five major occupations that are used for the routine/non-routine classification. The income shares of both non-routine occupation groups are increasing at similar rates throughout the sample. In the routine category, the income shares of the three major occupation groups have exhibited somewhat different trends before the 1990s, but very similar trends since.

In analogy to our decomposition of capital income shares, we would like to decompose these trends in income shares into trends in wages and trends in labor inputs. However, in the case of labor, such a decomposition is less straightforward: while the BEA provides quality-adjusted quantity indexes for different capital types, quality-adjusted measures of routine and non-routine labor inputs are not readily available.

Constructing quality-adjusted measures of labor inputs requires making some assumptions about the economic environment. To illustrate, consider two alternatives: first, imagine a frictionless economy in which labor is a homogeneous input and workers can transition freely between routine and non-routine occupations. In this case, observed differences in wages must reflect (possibly unobserved) differences in quality, such as differences in ability, experience or education. As wages per unit of quality are equalized across occupations, the different income shares of routine and non-routine occupations must reflect differences in quality-adjusted labor inputs, rather than differences in wages.

Figure 6: Routine & Non-routine Labor (Relative Quantities & Prices)



Notes: Panel A plots relative employment (expressed as percent of routine workers) based on two alternative measurement assumptions: the raw data and “effective” employment under the assumption of a homogeneous labor input. Panel B plots the non-routine wage premium (NRP), defined as  $100 \times (w_{nr}/w_r - 1)$ , where  $w_{nr}$  and  $w_r$  represent non-routine and routine wages, for the two alternative measurement approaches: raw CPS average wages; zero NRP by assumption.

Second, consider the opposite extreme, in which routine and non-routine labor are completely differentiated inputs, and it is impossible to convert routine labor into non-routine labor (or vice versa). Given that routine workers cannot become non-routine workers, there are no limits on the size of the premium paid to non-routine work. In this economy, the increase in the income share of non-routine work relative to routine work may reflect an increase in the relative quantity of non-routine labor, an increase in the relative payment to non-routine labor, or both.

Figure 6 presents a comparison of these two alternatives. Under the assumption of homogenous labor inputs, the wage per unit of quality-adjusted labor is equalized across occupations, and hence the rising relative income share of non-routine labor is attributed entirely to a rise in the quality-adjusted quantity of non-routine labor. In contrast, under the assumption of differentiated labor inputs, the rise in the relative income share of non-routine labor is attributed both to a rise in relative labor inputs and to a rise in relative pay. For this scenario, the measurement in Figure 6 is based on simple employment counts and average wages, which do not take into account any changes in the composition of labor inputs. Appendix F presents alternative ways to account for changes in *observed* labor composition; however, it turns out that these alternative measurements do not affect our main results, and we therefore relegate their detailed discussion to Appendix F.

## 4. A Calibrated Production Function

The relative stability of the NICT capital income share suggests a production function that is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of NICT capital ( $K_n$ ) and a composite input,  $X$ , which is produced by ICT ( $K_c$ ), routine labor ( $L_r$ ) and non-routine labor ( $L_{nr}$ ). Specifically, using lower case letters to denote variables normalized by aggregate labor (e.g.,  $\ell_r = L_r/L$  and  $\ell_{nr} = L_{nr}/L$ , with  $L \equiv L_r + L_{nr}$ ), we write the aggregate production function as

$$y = k_n^\alpha x^{1-\alpha} \quad (3)$$

In the spirit of [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#), we specify the composite  $x$  as the following nested CES aggregator:

$$x = \left[ \eta \ell_r^\theta + (1 - \eta) z^\theta \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \quad (4)$$

$$z = \left[ \gamma k_c^\sigma + (1 - \gamma) \ell_{nr}^\sigma \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \quad (5)$$

where  $\eta, \gamma \in [0, 1]$  and  $\theta, \sigma \leq 1$ .<sup>9</sup>

To calibrate the parameters of this production function, we use the first order conditions of a competitive firm. Taking wages and rental rates as given, the firm's optimality conditions imply the following relationships between relative quantities and relative income shares:

$$\ln \left( \frac{s_c}{s_{nr}} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma} \right) + \sigma \ln \left( \frac{k_c}{\ell_{nr}} \right) \quad (6)$$

$$\ln \left( \frac{s_r}{s_z} \right) = \ln \left( \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) + \theta \ln \left( \frac{\ell_r}{z} \right) \quad (7)$$

where  $s_c, s_{nr}, s_r$  and  $s_z$  are the income shares of  $k_c, \ell_{nr}, \ell_r$ , and  $z$ , respectively. Our baseline approach uses measured trends in income shares and quantities from the previous sections to calibrate the four parameters  $\gamma, \sigma, \eta$ , and  $\theta$  using the following two steps:<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup>We note that, in principle, there are three ways to nest the CES composite  $x$ . We illustrate in [Appendix G](#) that, for the alternatives, our calibration strategy delivers parameter values that are either inconsistent with the CES assumptions or require the unrealistic assumption that routine and non-routine labor are perfect substitutes.

<sup>10</sup>As an alternative to this two step approach we also fit equations (6) and (7) jointly using GMM. The results are almost identical and are shown in [Appendix H](#). The GMM specification also allows us to consider trends in birth rates 15 years ago, as a possible instrument for trends in labor supply, following [Jaimovich, Pruitt and Siu \(2013\)](#). The results are virtually identical, which is not surprising given that our strategy targets long-run trends.

1. Estimate  $\gamma$  and  $\sigma$  using OLS and compute the implied quantities for  $z$
2. Estimate  $\eta$  and  $\theta$  using OLS, based on the implied series for  $z$  from step 1

Note that this calibration strategy targets the trends in the *relative* income shares of ICT capital and both routine and non-routine labor. By focusing on relative rather than absolute income shares and excluding NICT capital, our calibration attributes only the rise in the ICT capital income share to automation, allowing for part of the decline in the aggregate labor income share to reflect other factors.

This calibration strategy requires taking a stance on the quantities of routine and non-routine labor. Table 2 shows the calibration results for the two alternative approaches for measuring  $\ell_r$  and  $\ell_{nr}$  detailed in Section 3.<sup>11</sup> Given our focus on long run trends, we eliminate short run fluctuations by using a fitted log linear trend rather than the raw data series for all regressions shown in Table 2.<sup>12</sup>

Panel A of Table 2 reports the results under the assumption of homogeneous labor inputs, while panel B reports the results under the assumption of differentiated labor inputs. While the first approach (panel A) suggests an estimate of  $\theta = 0.876 < 1$ , the second approach (panel B) results in a point estimate of  $\theta > 1$ , which is inconsistent with our CES production framework.

To develop intuition for these results, it is useful to observe that ICT capital income is small relative to the income of non-routine labor. If we ignore ICT capital income, the production function of  $x$  is approximately a two-factor CES aggregate of routine and non-routine labor ( $x \approx (\eta \ell_r^\theta + (1 - \eta) \ell_{nr}^\theta)^{1/\theta}$ ). If we treat routine and non-routine labor as differentiated inputs, we are faced with a situation in which both the relative quantity of non-routine labor and the relative wage of non-routine labor are increasing over time. This is inconsistent with a fixed two-factor CES demand system, which requires an increase in relative factor supplies to be met with a decrease in their relative marginal products. When, instead, we treat routine and non-routine labor as homogeneous labor inputs, the relative wages of routine and non-routine labor are equalized by assumption; this is consistent with the two-factor approximation  $x \approx \ell_r + \ell_{nr}$  (or  $\theta \approx 1$ ), in which the marginal products of routine and non-routine labor are always 1. By incorporating the contribution of ICT capital, we are able to obtain an estimate of  $\theta < 1$ .

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<sup>11</sup>In Appendix H we illustrate that additional alternatives, including chained quantity indexes for labor, yield results that mirror those based on raw employment counts and average wages. We therefore omit these results in the main text.

<sup>12</sup>We note that the results are virtually identical when we do not de-trend the data series or if we use the first and last observation only. For transparency and in the interest of space we only report the results based on log linear trends here.

Table 2: Calibration of production parameters

	A. Homogeneous Labor		B. Differentiated Labor	
	(A.1)	(A.2)	(B.1)	(B.2)
	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_{nr}}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_r}{s_z}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_{nr}}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_r}{s_z}\right)$
$\ln(k_c/\ell_{nr})$	0.299*** (0.006)		0.275*** (0.005)	
$\ln(\ell_r/z)$		0.876*** (0.003)		1.071*** (0.004)
Constant	-5.201*** (0.053)	0.138*** (0.001)	-5.037*** (0.046)	-0.100*** (0.001)
Obs.	47	47	47	47
<i>Estimated Parameters &amp; Implied Elasticities</i>				
$\gamma$	0.005		0.006	
$\sigma$	0.299		0.275	
$\text{EOS}(k_c, \ell_{nr})$	1.427		1.379	
$\eta$		0.535		0.475
$\theta$		0.876		1.071
$\text{EOS}(z, \ell_r)$		8.039		

*Notes:* The table shows OLS estimates for the parameters in equations (6) and (7) based on the two-step procedure described in the text: in step one, we estimate (6); in step two, we estimate (7) conditional on the results from step one. All regressions use fitted log-linear trends as data inputs, in order to eliminate the influence of cyclical fluctuations. Panel A assumes labor inputs are homogeneous and relative labor inputs therefore equal relative labor income shares; panel B directly uses employment counts and average wages from the CPS MARCH data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Significance levels are indicated by \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 5. Counterfactual Analysis

To comment on the potential benefits of automation, we consider a representative agent model, in which an infinitely lived household solves the following optimization problem:

$$\max_{c_t, k_{n,t+1}, k_{c,t+1}, \ell_{r,t}, \ell_{nr,t}, x_t, z_t, y_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$$

subject to  $\ell_{r,t} + \ell_{nr,t} = 1$ ,  $y_t = k_n^\alpha x_t^{1-\alpha}$ , equations (4)-(5), and the budget constraint

$$c_t + (1+g) \sum_i p_{i,t} k_{i,t+1} = y_t + \sum_{i=n,c} p_{i,t} (1 - \delta_{i,t}) k_{i,t} \quad (8)$$

where  $c_t$  is consumption per-worker and  $g$  is the growth rate of aggregate labor,  $L_t$ .

Note that, in this model, labor is a homogeneous input that is allocated optimally across routine and non-routine occupations. We specify the model in this way for two reasons: first, because alternative specifications with differentiated labor inputs result in calibrations of the aggregate production function that are inconsistent with the assumption of a time-invariant CES production framework (see Table 2). Second, assuming a homogenous labor input that can be costlessly reallocated between routine and non-routine occupations is a useful benchmark for providing an upper bound on the welfare effects of automation. Since we are simulating a representative agent framework which ignores potential distributional implications, it is natural to focus on obtaining an upper bound.

We consider two sources of exogenous variation. The first and most relevant is the decline in the relative price of ICT capital,  $p_{c,t}$ . While prices are conceptually endogenous variables, in this context the price of ICT capital can be interpreted as the real transformation rate of output into ICT capital (see also Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The second source of exogenous variation is time variation in the depreciation rate of ICT capital, which, as we document, is quite substantial (see Figure 2). Taken together, these two sources of variation capture changes in the “effective” price of ICT capital from the viewpoint of an investor.

Starting from an initial steady state, we simulate the transition to a final steady state, given the paths of the ICT capital price and its depreciation rate between 1950-2013. Along this transition, we assume a perfect foresight equilibrium.<sup>13</sup>

We compare this baseline simulation with two sets of counterfactuals: first, we hold both the price of ICT capital and its depreciation rate fixed at the initial steady state level. Second, we compute a counterfactual transition in which we keep the price of ICT capital fixed but let its depreciation rate vary. This second counterfactual allows us to disentangle the effects of the fall in the ICT capital price from the effects of the rise in the ICT capital depreciation rate.

Our simulations are based on the calibration of the core production parameters from Section 4 (panel A of Table 2) and the values reported in Table 3. The value of  $\beta$ , the discount factor, is calibrated based

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<sup>13</sup>While identifying 1950 and 2013 with initial and final steady states is perhaps an oversimplification, it is worth noting that the relative price of ICT is essentially flat in the early 1950s, falls rapidly starting in the early 1960s and starts to flatten out in the mid 2000s. Similarly, the rate of ICT depreciation is essentially flat at the beginning and end of our sample, but rises rapidly over the period 1980-2000 (see Figure 2).

Table 3: Calibration of Remaining Parameters

Parameter	Calibration	
$\beta$	0.9737	
$u(c)$	$\ln(c)$	
$\delta_n$	0.0733	(mean of NICT depreciation, BEA data)
$\alpha$	0.3505	(mean of NICT share, BEA data)
$g$	0.0192	(trend growth in aggregate labor index; see Figure F.18)
$p_{c,t}$	$\in [0.254, 1.727]$	(BEA data, 1950-2013)
$\delta_{c,t}$	$\in [.137, 0.206]$	(BEA data, 1950-2013)

*Notes:* The ICT price and depreciation rates are measured directly based on the BEA's fixed asset accounts.

on our estimates of the returns to capital.<sup>14</sup> Given our focus on long run trends, we assume log utility, or a unitary inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, which is consistent with the wide range of empirical estimates (see, for example, the discussion and references listed by Guvenen, 2006). For the depreciation rate of NICT capital we take the average value of our BEA-based estimates. Likewise, we calibrate the NICT capital intensity,  $\alpha$ , using the average of our estimated NICT capital income share, ignoring any short term fluctuations around this average.

Figure 7 presents a comparison of the baseline simulations and the counterfactuals, alongside the relevant empirical counterparts.<sup>15</sup> Table 4 summarizes the steady state comparisons. The analysis suggests that the changes in the price and depreciation rate of ICT led to a 3.46 percentage point decline in the aggregate labor share (panel C of Table 4), approximately half of the observed decline of 6.52 percentage points over the period 1950-2013 (Table 1).


Our simulated transition paths further allow us to comment on the sources of the decline in the routine labor income share. Over the period 1967-2013, our baseline simulation predicts a 13.37 percentage point decline in the routine labor income share and a 10.45 percentage point increase in the non-routine share. This decomposition suggests that 10.45 percentage points of the 13.37 percentage point decline in the routine share (78%) are reallocated to non-routine labor, and the remaining 2.92 percentage points (22%) are reallo-

<sup>14</sup>The steady state Euler equation implies that  $\beta(1+r) = 1$ , where  $r$  is the return to capital. We assume that the returns to capital before 1980 are roughly at their steady state level and calibrate  $\beta$  based on this relation.

<sup>15</sup>The empirical counterparts for output and capital inputs are normalized to match the average level of output per (composition adjusted) worker during the first 15 years of our calibration sample, starting in 1967.



Figure 7: Counterfactual Simulations



Notes: Each figure shows our baseline simulation (solid red and blue), data (thin black), and counterfactual simulations (dotted red and blue). All Simulations are initialized in a steady state consistent with the ICT price and depreciation in 1950.

Table 4: The Effects of the Declining ICT Price

*A. Output & Consumption*

	Log. Output			Log. Consumption		
	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.
Initial SS	10.20	10.20	0.00	9.79	9.79	0.00
Final SS	10.34	10.19	0.15	9.87	9.78	0.09
100 × Change	13.77	-1.49	15.26	8.47	-0.99	9.46

*B. ICT and NICT Capital*

	Log. ICT			Log. Non-ICT		
	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.
Initial SS	7.46	7.46	0.00	11.45	11.45	0.00
Final SS	10.22	6.86	3.37	11.59	11.44	0.15
100 × Change	276.66	-60.02	336.68	13.65	-1.49	15.14

*C. Labor Share*

	Agg. Labor Share (%)			Routine Share (%)			Non-Routine Share (%)		
	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.
Initial SS	63.14	63.14	0.00	35.58	35.58	0.00	27.55	27.55	0.00
Final SS	59.68	63.51	-3.83	19.98	37.93	-17.95	39.71	25.58	14.13
Change	-3.46	0.37	-3.83	-15.61	2.35	-17.95	12.15	-1.98	14.13

*D. Capital Share*


	ICT Share (%)		
	Baseline	Counterf.	Diff.
Initial SS	1.81	1.81	0.00
Final SS	5.27	1.44	3.83
Change	3.46	-0.37	3.83

*Notes:* The table shows steady state changes for the baseline and counterfactual (constant ICT price) simulations. To gauge the impact of falling ICT prices on output, consumption, the stocks of ICT and NICT capital, labor and capital shares we compute the difference between the initial and final steady state for both simulations, along with the difference in differences.

cated to ICT capital.

The model further suggests that the declining price of ICT capital has led to steady state consumption and output gains of 8.47% and 13.77%, respectively. We compute a measure of welfare gains,  $\lambda$ , as the permanent increase in consumption necessary to compensate the representative household for remaining in

Figure 8: Welfare and Consumption Gains by Cohort



Notes: Panel A shows equivalent permanent consumption gains ( $\lambda$ ) for different evaluation years  $t_0$  and panel B graphs contemporaneous consumption gains ( $100 \times [c_t/c_{1950} - 1]$ ).

the counterfactual (in which the price and depreciation rate of ICT remain constant). Formally,

$$\frac{1}{1 - \beta} \ln \left( \left[ 1 + \frac{\lambda}{100} \right] c_{1950} \right) = \sum_{t=t_0}^{\infty} \beta^{t-t_0} \ln(c_t) \quad (9)$$

Figure 8 illustrates this measure for different evaluation periods ( $t_0$ ), alongside the underlying contemporaneous consumption differences, defined as  $100 \times (c_t/c_{1950} - 1)$ . The welfare gains are substantially smaller for generations optimizing in the 1950s compared to those optimizing in the 2000s and later. These differences are driven by two forces: the cost of foregone consumption in order to finance capital accumulation, and time discounting. Since contemporaneous consumption differences are negligible until 1980 (panel B of Figure 8), the differences in welfare gains over the period 1950-1980 are primarily driven by discounting. Our simulations suggest that the welfare gains for generations optimizing in 1980 are approximately 4%.

## 5.1. Growth Accounting

Economists have long sought to gauge the overall contribution of ICT to output growth. Most existing estimates are based on growth accounting exercises in the spirit of Solow (1957)—a decomposition of the growth in output into the marginal contributions of each production input. However, due to the low

income share of ICT capital, this technique tends to attribute only a small portion of output growth to the accumulation of ICT capital (e.g., [Colecchia and Schreyer, 2002](#); [Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan, 2003](#); [Jorgenson and Vu, 2007](#); [Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price, 2014](#)).

Using steady state comparative statics, we illustrate how traditional growth accounting exercises understate the long-run aggregate output gains from ICT by about 50%, in large part because they fail to account for an important general equilibrium (GE) effect: investments in ICT capital tend to trigger complementary NICT investments.<sup>16</sup> It is worth pointing out that the general equilibrium amplification that we emphasize is not unique to this model, and illustrates a more general issue with interpreting growth accounting exercises.

A growth accounting exercise is an accounting framework that attributes changes in output to changes in inputs. The growth accounted for by a marginal unit of ICT capital is:

$$\frac{\partial \ln y}{\partial \ln k_c} = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\partial \ln x}{\partial \ln k_c} \quad (10)$$

To assess the indirect effect of ICT on NICT capital accumulation, recall that, in our neoclassical growth model, the steady state condition for NICT capital is given by:

$$\alpha k_n^{\alpha-1} x^{1-\alpha} = \text{const} \Rightarrow \ln k_n = \text{const} + \ln x \quad (11)$$

Using the above, we can quantify the general equilibrium (GE) effect of the growth in  $k_c$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \ln y}{\partial \ln k_c} + \frac{\partial \ln y}{\partial \ln k_n} \frac{\partial \ln k_n}{\partial \ln k_c} &= (1 - \alpha) \frac{\partial \ln x}{\partial \ln k_c} + \alpha \frac{\partial \ln x}{\partial \ln k_c} \\ &= \frac{\partial \ln x}{\partial \ln k_c} \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

This expression suggests the following simple relationship between the direct accounting effect and the

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<sup>16</sup>Note that the work by [Stiroh \(2002\)](#) as well as [Brynjolfsson and Hitt \(2003\)](#) has found comparatively large gains from ICT by resorting to growth accounting exercises at the firm or industry level. However, the discrepancies between micro and macro estimates based on traditional growth accounting exercises are not surprising and possibly have a different interpretation. Intuitively, a growth accounting exercise at the industry (or firm) level will attribute a larger growth contribution of ICT to more ICT intensive industries, even if all industries had the same amount of ICT investment. The implied aggregate effects will then depend on the cross-sectional distribution of the output share of industries (or firms) with various ICT intensities. The argument we make in this paper is that even in industries with a low ICT intensity, the growth contribution of ICT may be substantial if there are sufficient complementarities with NICT.

Table 5: Contribution of ICT to Output Growth

Decade	USA % growth (1)	Growth Contribution of ICT		
		perc. points (2)	% of USA	
			total (3)	pp. due to NICT (4)
1950s	2.08	0.04	1.72	0.38
1960s	3.41	0.04	1.10	0.18
1970s	1.26	0.07	5.90	1.49
1980s	2.54	0.11	4.37	1.79
1990s	2.40	0.24	10.13	2.63
2000s	0.86	0.47	54.26	12.05
2010s	0.97	0.35	35.64	12.86
1950-2016	1.73	0.17	9.81	2.66

*Notes:* Column 1 shows the implied, constant, annual growth rate of real GDP per capita for various time periods in the US. Real GDP (GDPC1) and the civilian non-institutionalized population of age 16 and older (CNP16OV) are taken from FRED. Column 2 shows model predicted growth in GDP per capita due to the falling price of ICT. Column 3 expresses ICT's contribution (column 2) as a percent of USA (column 1). Column 4 shows the portion of column 3 that is due to NICT investments and is based on an alternative counterfactual simulation in which the stock of NICT capital is fixed at its initial steady state value. The difference in the growth contribution between the baseline simulation and this counterfactual can be attributed to complementary NICT investments.

general equilibrium effect:

$$\text{GE growth contribution of } k_c = \frac{\text{Direct growth contribution of } k_c}{1 - \alpha} \quad (13)$$

As the NICT capital income share is  $\alpha \approx 0.35$ , the general equilibrium contribution of ICT will be roughly 1.5 times its direct accounting contribution. In our simulation, the income share of ICT is roughly 0.03, and the growth in ICT capital is close to 300%. The direct effect is therefore approximately  $0.03 \cdot 300\% = 9\%$ . The contribution of NICT capital accumulation is  $0.35 \cdot 13\% \approx 4.5\%$ . The GE contribution of ICT to growth is the sum of the two contributions, amounting to approximately 13.5%.

Table 5 compares the growth rate of output per capita in our simulations with the growth in real GDP per-capita in the United States. Our simulation suggests that ICT accounted for less than 5% of US growth until the 1980s, around 10% of US growth during the 1990s, and more than 30% of US growth since 2000.

Our structural framework also allows us to assess what portion of this growth contribution is due to the indirect accumulation of NICT capital. We accomplish this by simulating another counterfactual, in which we exogenously keep the NICT stock at its initial (1950) steady state level. The difference between this

counterfactual and our baseline simulation illustrates the portion of ICT-induced growth that is strictly due to complementary NICT investments. Column 4 of Table 5 shows that this contribution was relatively minor prior to the 1990s, but larger in recent decades.

## 5.2. The Elasticity of Substitution Between Capital and Labor

A large literature, going back at least to [Blanchard \(1997\)](#) and [Caballero and Hammour \(1998\)](#), has discussed the central role of capital-labor substitutability for the division of income between capital and labor. However, the elasticity of substitution between these two factors is hard to estimate, and the values reported in the literature range anywhere between 0.5 and 1.5.<sup>17</sup> In light of this debate, we find it useful to discuss this elasticity within the context of our model.

Like in the work by [Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou \(2007\)](#) and [Oberfield and Raval \(2014\)](#), the aggregate elasticity of substitution in our framework is an endogenous, time-varying object. Moreover, as [Blackorby and Russell \(1989\)](#) discuss, Hicks' original notion of the elasticity of substitution was developed for production functions with two inputs and there is some ambiguity of this concept within production structures with additional inputs. However, we show below that we can avoid this ambiguity by constructing a two-factor production function for any pair of inputs, or aggregation of inputs, which gives rise to the same factor demand system as our original four-factor production function. Hicks' original notion of a two-factor elasticity of substitution can then be applied, and all its properties (e.g., symmetry) are preserved.

To compute the aggregate elasticity of substitution (EOS) between capital and labor in our model, we specify the following time varying production function in aggregate capital,  $K$ , and aggregate labor,  $L$ :

$$F_t(K, L) = y(\ell_r^*, \ell_{nr}^*, k_i^*, k_n^*) \quad (14)$$

$$\text{where } (\ell_r^*, \ell_{nr}^*, k_i^*, k_n^*) = \arg \max_{\ell_r, \ell_{nr}, k_c, k_n} y + (1 - \delta_n)k_n + (1 - \delta_i)p_{c,t}k_c$$


$$\text{s.t. } L = \ell_r + \ell_{nr}$$

$$\text{and } K = p_{c,t-1}k_c + k_n$$

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<sup>17</sup>See for example, [Berndt \(1976\)](#), [Antràs \(2004\)](#), [Klump, McAdam and Willman \(2007\)](#), [Karabarbounis and Neiman \(2014\)](#), [Piketty \(2014\)](#), [Oberfield and Raval \(2014\)](#), [Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long and Poschke \(2015\)](#), [Herrendorf, Herrington and Valentinyi \(2015\)](#), or [Glover and Short \(2017\)](#).

Figure 9: Calibrated Elasticities of Substitution Between Capital and Labor



Notes: The figure plots calibrated elasticities of substitution based on two-factor production functions like (14) and (15). Numerical values for these elasticities are computed for each point along our baseline simulation.

Note that  $\ell_r^*$ ,  $\ell_{nr}^*$ ,  $k_n^*$  and  $k_c^*$  must satisfy the first order conditions in our original model from Section 5. Using this two-factor production function, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor can then be obtained by numerically solving for the change in relative income shares,  $[MPL(K, L) \times L] / [MPK(K, L) \times K]$ , induced by a change in relative quantities,  $L/K$ .<sup>18</sup>

Our findings suggest an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor that is very close to unity, not far from the most reliable estimates in the literature. As Figure 9 illustrates, the average elasticity of substitution between 1950-2013 is 1.046. In a model with a single capital input and using steady state comparative statics, Karabarounis and Neiman (2014) show that an elasticity of about 1.25 generates approximately half of the observed fall in the aggregate labor share in response to a 25% drop in the relative price of capital.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup>It is straightforward to verify that  $F_t(K, L)$  is a constant returns to scale production function, and thus the relative income shares of capital and labor depend only on the capital-labor ratio.

<sup>19</sup>We note that, while similar, the two exercises can't be compared directly. For example, Karabarounis and Neiman (2014) measure investment prices (i.e., an investment share weighted aggregate price index) while we measure the price of the ICT and NICT stocks. Investment weighted price indexes produce a much larger drop in the aggregate price index than stock weighted indexes. Thus, a direct, stock-weighted aggregation of our prices would require an even larger elasticity of substitution in order to

Our model generates roughly the same decline in the aggregate labor income share with a significantly lower elasticity of substitution. The key to this result is that, in our model, the decline in the price of capital is concentrated in the type of capital which is relatively more substitutable with labor.

To illustrate this, we use a similar approach to compute the elasticities of substitution between ICT capital and different labor inputs. For example, to compute the elasticity of substitution between ICT capital and routine labor, we specify the following two-factor production function with ICT capital and routine labor inputs:

$$F_t(\ell_{nr}, k_c) = y(\ell_r^*, \ell_{nr}, k_c, k_n^*) \quad (15)$$

where  $(\ell_r^*, k_n^*) = \arg \max_{\ell_r, k_n} y(\ell_r, \ell_{nr}, k_c, k_n) - w_{r,t}\ell_r - (r_t + \delta_n)k_n$

We find that the elasticity of substitution between routine labor and ICT capital ranges between 2.14 in 1950 to 3.27 in 2013, while the elasticity of substitution between ICT and non-routine labor is constant at  $1/(1 - \sigma) = 1.427$ .

### 5.3. The Elasticity of Substitution Between Routine and Non-Routine Labor

Another elasticity that is key for our results is the elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor, which we can compute based on the following two-factor production framework:<sup>20</sup>

$$F_t(\ell_r, \ell_{nr}) = y(\ell_r, \ell_{nr}, k_c^*, k_n^*) \quad (16)$$

where  $(k_n^*, k_c^*) = \arg \max_{k_n, k_c} y(\ell_r, \ell_{nr}, k_c, k_n) - (r_t + \delta_n)k_n - (1 + r_t)p_{c,t-1}k_c + (1 - \delta_{c,t})p_{c,t}k_c$

Our model implies an elasticity of 7.8 over the period 1950-2013 (Figure 10). While there are no good estimates for this particular elasticity, we note that our estimate falls on the high-end of available empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor. For example, [Hamermesh and](#)


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rationalize half of the fall in the labor share in a model with aggregate capital and labor as the only production inputs. However, given the structure of our neo-classical growth model, the price of the ICT stock is the relevant price measure to conduct steady state comparative statics.

<sup>20</sup>Similar to equation (14), it is easily verified that  $F_t$  is a constant returns to scale production function, and hence the elasticity of substitution can be computed based on changes in the relative income shares of routine and non-routine labor induced by changes in their relative quantities.



Figure 10: Calibrated Elasticity of Substitution Between Routine and Non-Routine Labor



Notes: The figure plots calibrated elasticities of substitution. The EOS between R and NR workers is based on the two-factor production function (16). Numerical values for this elasticity are computed for each point along our our baseline simulation.

Grant (1979) survey an older literature that estimates the EOS between various “types” of workers (including production vs. non-production, educated vs. non-educated, etc.) which range from marginally negative to as large as 12. Two recent papers estimate elasticity parameters that are conceptually very close to ours and fall at the lower end of this range: Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) estimate an EOS between a continuum of tasks with differing “routine intensity” of 0.9, while Lee and Shin (2017) find an EOS between “workers” and “managers” of 0.341.

Our calibration of a high EOS is a result of attributing the entire decline in the routine labor income share to changes in relative factor supplies. To illustrate this point, consider an alternative specification of the production structure, in which the production parameter  $\eta$ , which governs the demand for routine labor, evolves exogenously according to:

$$\frac{\eta_t}{1 - \eta_t} = a \exp(\rho t) \quad (17)$$

for some  $\rho$  and  $a > 0$ . In our baseline calibration,  $\rho = 0$  and  $\eta$  is time invariant. An alternative parameteri-

zation of  $\rho < 0$  implies an exogenous decrease in the relative demand for routine labor, which is unrelated to the increase in the ICT capital stock. Under these assumptions, equation (7) can then be rewritten as

$$\ln \left( \frac{s_{r,t}}{s_{z,t}} \right) = a + \rho t + \theta \ln \left( \frac{\ell_{r,t}}{z_t} \right) \quad (18)$$

Equation (18) implies that any given trend in relative income shares can be accounted for by different combinations of  $\theta$  and  $\rho$ . Moreover, a lower  $\theta$  (and hence a lower elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor) can be made consistent with observed trends when combined with a lower  $\rho$ .

As an illustration, Figure 11 presents the simulation results obtained from a calibration that targets  $EOS(\ell_r, \ell_{nr}) = 1/3$ , very close to the estimate of Lee and Shin (2017).<sup>21</sup> Here, the counterfactual simulation is one in which both the price of ICT capital and its depreciation rate are held fixed, but  $\eta$  evolves exogenously according to the law of motion (17). This alternative calibration attributes a smaller share of the declining labor income share to the declining price of ICT capital. While the baseline simulation continues to imply a 3.5pp decline in the labor income share between steady states, part of this decline is attributed to the exogenous decline in  $\eta$ . Note that a decline in the demand for routine labor is equivalent to an increase in the demand for  $z$ , and hence for ICT capital. In this environment, automation is driven both by cheaper ICT capital and by an exogenous process that increases the demand for  $z$ .


A less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor implies that the fall in the ICT price *increases* the income share of routine labor, while *reducing* the income share of non-routine labor (Panel C of Figure 11). This is due to complementarity: an increase in the quantity of  $z$  relative to  $\ell_r$  increases the relative income share of  $\ell_r$ . Of course, other specifications of the aggregate production function may alter these comparative statics while maintaining the elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor.

Given the wide range of estimates for the EOS discussed above, Table 6 illustrates the implications for the aggregate labor share over the period 1950-2013 under alternative assumptions about the EOS. For all calibrations, the model accounts for approximately half of the measured 6.5pp decline in the aggregate labor share over this period. The table shows that ICT accounts for as much as 60% of this decline, even with an

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<sup>21</sup>To match an average elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor of 1/3, we calibrate  $\theta = -2.0303$ ,  $a = 0.8775$  and  $\rho = -0.075$ .

Figure 11: Counterfactuals: Exogenous Path of Routine Intensity



Notes: The figures illustrate the alternative specification in which the routine intensity ( $\eta_t$ ) evolves exogenously. Each graph shows our baseline simulation (solid red and blue), data (thin black), and counterfactual simulations (dashed red and blue). The counterfactuals assume that *both* the price of ICT and the depreciation rate of ICT are held constant. All Simulations are initialized in a steady state consistent with the ICT price and depreciation in 1950. The model is calibrated to match an average elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor of 1/3.

Table 6: Model Predicted Decline in the Labor Share (1950-2013)

(1) $EOS(\ell_r, \ell_{nr})$	Calibrated Parameters			Perc. Point Decline in the Labor Share (1950-2013)			
	(2) $\theta$	(3) $a$	(4) $\rho$	(5) $\Delta s_L$	(6) due to trend in $\eta$	due to ICT	
						(7) pp	(8) % of total
0.25	-3.000	1.1240	-0.0999	-3.47	-1.43	-2.05	58.91
0.33	-2.030	0.8775	-0.0750	-3.43	-1.40	-2.03	59.26
0.70	-0.429	0.4704	-0.0339	-3.31	-1.30	-2.01	60.68
0.90	-0.111	0.3898	-0.0258	-3.28	-1.27	-2.02	61.40
1.50	0.333	0.2768	-0.0144	-3.21	-1.17	-2.04	63.62
3.00	0.667	0.1921	-0.0058	-3.10	-0.95	-2.15	69.47
5.00	0.800	0.1582	-0.0024	-2.98	-0.65	-2.33	78.10
7.00	0.857	0.1437	-0.0009	-2.86	-0.35	-2.51	87.65
8.00	0.875	0.1391	-0.0005	-2.81	-0.20	-2.61	92.74

*Notes:* The table reports the percentage point decline in the aggregate labor share over the period 1950-2013. Column 1 reports alternative targets for  $EOS(\ell_r, \ell_{nr})$  and Columns 2-4 report the corresponding calibrated parameter values. Column 5 reports the predicted, percentage point decline in the labor share due to the combined impact of an exogenous trend in  $\eta$  as well as a changing ICT price and depreciation. Columns 6-8 decompose the overall decline from Column 5 into the portion due to the exogenous trend in  $\eta$  and the portion due to ICT accumulation. The final decomposition is derived from the counterfactual paths as displayed in Figure 11 for the case of  $EOS(\ell_r, \ell_{nr})=1/3$ .

elasticity of substitution that is as low as 1/4.

This exercise illustrates that a lower elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor can be made consistent with observed trends if there is an exogenous decline in the demand for routine work. Given that attributing the entire transformation in labor income to changes in factor supplies necessitates a very high elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor, we conclude that additional factors are likely contributing to the decline in the routine labor income share.

## 6. Concluding Remarks

The discussion on the social costs and benefits of automation can roughly be divided into two issues: its effects on aggregate consumption and its distributional implications. The general consensus is that, while there is likely a positive effect on aggregate consumption, there are some adverse distributional implications.

This paper sets out to inform this discussion in two ways. First, we document changes in the income shares of different factors of production in order to comment on the potential distributional implications of ICT. Our analysis suggests that the income share of ICT capital has increased by about 3pp and that this increase has come at the expense of labor income. Within labor, we document a large shift in the distribution

of income between routine and non-routine occupations. However, our analysis suggests that it is unlikely that the accumulation of ICT capital is the sole driver of this shift. In particular, given the small income share of ICT capital, the large simultaneous increases in the relative employment in non-routine occupations and the relative pay for non-routine work are difficult to reconcile with a standard production function with time invariant parameters. Doing so requires a very high elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor, which is likely unrealistic.

Second, our analysis informs the discussion by providing an upper bound on the aggregate welfare gains from automation. We find that, in a representative agent model, the declining price of ICT capital generates an aggregate welfare gain of about 4%. By construction, this estimate ignores any potential adverse distributional implications, as well as any costs associated with reallocating labor from routine to non-routine occupations. Hence, a 4% welfare gain should be interpreted as an upper bound.

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## Appendix A. Classification of ICT and Non-ICT Assets

Table A.7: ICT Assets

ICT Assets	Share of Aggregate Capital (%)			Average Growth in Share (%)		
	1960-1980	1980-2000	2000-2013	1960-1980	1980-2000	2000-2013
EP20: Communications	2.73	3.91	3.39	2.87	1.78	-2.63
ENS3: Own account software	0.24	0.75	1.56	27.26	6.68	2.58
ENS2: Custom software	0.11	0.61	1.40	34.82	8.49	2.06
EP34: Nonelectro medical instruments	0.35	0.76	1.08	4.87	2.97	2.30
EP36: Nonmedical instruments	0.51	0.92	0.92	0.62	2.41	-1.08
ENS1: Prepackaged software	0.02	0.33	0.83	32.28	14.63	-1.04
EP35: Electro medical instruments	0.11	0.36	0.66	7.25	3.43	4.28
EP1B: PCs	0.00	0.31	0.45		12.12	0.96
RD23: Semiconductor and other component manufacturing	0.05	0.23	0.43	6.58	8.21	2.75
RD22: Communications equipment manufacturing	0.26	0.21	0.27	3.27	0.89	0.24
EP31: Photocopy and related equipment	0.53	0.75	0.26	6.75	-2.11	-7.70
EP1A: Mainframes	0.19	0.36	0.24	24.00	1.91	-4.97
EP1H: System integrators	0.00	0.03	0.23		42.85	3.45
RD24: Navigational and other instruments manufacturing	0.05	0.19	0.22	3.20	5.78	-1.59
EP1D: Printers	0.07	0.22	0.19	20.75	7.20	-9.76
EP1E: Terminals	0.02	0.14	0.16	71.14	5.48	-4.62
EP1G: Storage devices	0.00	0.17	0.12		7.55	-9.55
EP12: Office and accounting equipment	0.48	0.32	0.12	-3.09	-5.00	-6.13
RD40: Software publishers	0.00	0.05	0.09		16.91	-1.13
RD21: Computers and peripheral equipment manufacturing	0.16	0.09	0.07	3.68	-3.07	-0.60
RD25: Other computer and electronic manufacturing, n.e.c.	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.91	3.24	-0.34
EP1C: DASDs	0.09	0.13	0.00	30.38	-36.26	-78.36
EP1F: Tape drives	0.06	0.03	0.00	22.77	-40.33	-186.06

*Notes:* The data are drawn from the BEA's detailed fixed asset accounts. ICT assets are defined as BEA asset codes starting with EP, EN, RD2, or RD4. Notice that the EP category incorporates two assets that are strictly speaking likely not ICT: EP34 and EP36. Our results do not critically hinge on these two assets and we therefore stick with the more standard BEA aggregation of EP. Assets are ranked by their average share in aggregate capital during 2000-2013. The share of aggregate capital is the value of each individual asset, as estimated by the BEA at current cost, as a fraction of the value of all assets in Tables A.7 and A.8. Panel A reports averages of these shares for three time periods. Panel B reports the average annual growth in these shares over same three time periods.

Table A.8: Non-ICT Assets

Non-ICT Assets	A. Average Share of Aggregate Capital (%)			B. Average Growth in Share (%)		
	1960-1980	1980-2000	2000-2013	1960-1980	1980-2000	2000-2013
SOO1: Office	4.75	6.99	8.28	1.59	2.14	0.12
SI00: Manufacturing	8.27	8.07	6.96	0.22	-0.44	-1.39
SM01: Petroleum and natural gas	3.91	3.63	5.20	0.12	-2.30	6.54
SU30: Electric	6.44	5.48	4.73	-0.18	-1.79	0.89
SC03: Multimerchandise shopping	2.21	2.77	3.05	1.46	0.69	0.59
EI50: General industrial equipment	3.42	3.40	2.95	0.32	-0.60	-0.75
SB31: Hospitals	1.70	2.52	2.86	3.69	1.06	0.51
SU20: Communication	2.80	2.51	2.66	0.70	-1.09	1.79
SC02: Other commercial	1.55	2.00	2.47	1.43	1.41	0.38
SB41: Lodging	1.58	1.83	2.32	1.40	1.76	0.47
EI60: Electric transmission and distribution	2.87	2.50	2.16	-0.79	-0.64	-0.21
EI40: Special industrial machinery	2.63	2.52	1.95	-0.36	-0.07	-3.33
SB20: Educational and vocational	1.56	1.36	1.92	-0.26	0.68	2.78
SC01: Warehouses	1.18	1.40	1.89	0.54	1.57	1.03
ET30: Aircraft	1.17	1.59	1.79	5.36	0.94	0.37
EO80: Other	1.09	1.44	1.75	2.30	1.18	0.71
EO12: Other furniture	1.37	1.67	1.74	-0.45	1.68	-1.35
SB42: Amusement and recreation	1.84	1.67	1.70	-0.46	0.54	-1.44
SN00: Farm	3.48	2.46	1.69	-0.63	-2.66	-2.11
RD11: Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing	0.23	0.65	1.68	4.70	6.63	5.22
SU40: Gas	2.70	1.89	1.66	-1.66	-1.72	0.35
SC04: Food and beverage establishments	1.19	1.51	1.58	1.47	0.84	-0.51
SB10: Religious	2.11	1.57	1.51	-0.70	-0.73	-0.82
EI30: Metalworking machinery	2.32	2.10	1.49	0.46	-1.25	-3.31
ET11: Light trucks (including utility vehicles)	0.93	1.05	1.42	0.45	2.48	-2.56
RDOM: Other manufacturing	1.47	1.50	1.19	0.00	0.04	-1.13
ET20: Autos	1.80	1.67	1.14	-1.79	-0.33	-4.27
ET12: Other trucks, buses and truck trailers	1.59	1.46	1.02	0.54	-1.43	-3.04
SU11: Other railroad	4.14	1.86	0.97	-4.62	-3.94	-3.77
SU12: Track replacement	2.66	1.39	0.97	-4.22	-2.69	-1.34
SOO2: Medical buildings	0.57	0.83	0.95	1.55	1.90	0.25
EO40: Other construction machinery	1.16	1.02	0.94	1.79	-2.11	1.37
AE10: Theatrical movies	0.97	0.67	0.86	-4.28	2.37	0.00
AE20: Long-lived television programs	0.69	0.79	0.86	0.39	1.91	-0.55
EO60: Service industry machinery	1.14	0.94	0.85	-1.61	-0.49	0.00
EI12: Other fabricated metals	1.42	1.20	0.75	0.83	-3.88	-0.19
RD80: All other nonmanufacturing, n.e.c.	0.09	0.75	0.72	3.04	8.28	-3.34
SB32: Special care	0.41	0.62	0.71	3.70	1.59	-0.74
ET50: Railroad equipment	2.12	1.09	0.66	-1.97	-4.52	-0.75
EO30: Other agricultural machinery	1.58	1.11	0.63	0.61	-4.71	-0.74
EI21: Steam engines	0.75	0.57	0.46	0.16	-3.01	0.43
SU50: Petroleum pipelines	0.95	0.57	0.45	-2.76	-3.29	1.69
AE30: Books	0.40	0.42	0.43	-0.37	1.02	-0.54
ET40: Ships and boats	0.92	0.68	0.40	-0.91	-3.72	-1.18
RD92: Other nonprofit institutions	0.22	0.35	0.38	3.94	2.25	0.23
RD31: Motor vehicles and parts manufacturing	0.40	0.44	0.36	0.45	0.79	-4.90
SM02: Mining	0.31	0.40	0.35	2.12	-1.30	1.93
RD12: Chemical manufacturing, ex. pharma and med	0.59	0.47	0.34	0.04	-0.98	-1.58
EO50: Mining and oilfield machinery	0.54	0.39	0.31	0.73	-5.74	7.21
SO01: Water supply	0.23	0.28	0.28	0.22	1.25	-0.60
EO21: Farm tractors	0.69	0.44	0.28	-0.08	-4.65	-0.28
SO02: Sewage and waste disposal	0.24	0.29	0.28	0.26	1.16	-1.21
RD32: Aerospace products and parts manufacturing	0.33	0.41	0.25	2.09	-0.28	-2.54
AE40: Music	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.14	1.37	-4.21
RD70: Scientific research and development services	0.00	0.06	0.19		11.29	4.20
SO04: Highway and conservation and development	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.27	1.20	-0.44
SB43: Air transportation	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.74	1.03	-0.69
AE50: Other entertainment originals	0.18	0.17	0.17	-1.71	1.53	-2.58
SU60: Wind and solar	0.00	0.01	0.16		12.44	25.22
EO72: Other electrical	0.12	0.19	0.14	2.74	-0.20	-1.74
SO03: Public safety	0.14	0.10	0.11	-0.96	0.17	-0.55
RD60: Computer systems design and related services	0.00	0.03	0.11		22.31	2.68
EO11: Household furniture	0.16	0.13	0.10	0.19	-2.30	-1.38
EO22: Construction tractors	0.28	0.18	0.09	0.39	-5.15	-3.98
EI22: Internal combustion engines	0.09	0.08	0.08	-0.80	-1.19	0.43
SB44: Local transit structures	0.51	0.17	0.07	-6.06	-5.15	-4.84
EI11: Nuclear fuel	0.03	0.10	0.06	27.52	-3.93	-1.86
RD91: Private universities and colleges	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.95	2.71	3.68
SOMO: Mobile structures	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.35	1.29	-3.77
SB46: Other land transportation	0.04	0.03	0.05	-0.72	1.04	2.80
RD50: Financial and real estate services	0.00	0.02	0.05		22.33	-0.88
EO71: Household appliances	0.09	0.05	0.03	-2.09	-4.08	-2.35
SB45: Other transportation	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.70	0.56	-0.71

Notes: The data are drawn from the BEA's detailed fixed asset accounts. Assets are ranked by their average share in aggregate capital during 2000-2013. The share of aggregate capital is the value of each individual asset, as estimated by the BEA at current cost, as a fraction of the value of all assets in Tables A.7 and A.8. Panel A reports averages of these shares for three time periods. Panel B reports the average annual growth in these shares over same three time periods.

## Appendix B. Construction of Capital Income Shares

This appendix outlines our approach to measure income shares directly from the BEA's nominal current cost values of detailed asset categories. As discussed in Section 2, our measurement exercise relies on two assumptions: First, no-arbitrage in capital markets requires the *return net of depreciation* (2) to be equalized across all types of capital, which can be written more compactly as

$$(1 + \pi_{i,t}) \frac{R_{i,t}}{P_{i,t}} + CG_{i,t} = 1 + r_t \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where  $(1 + \pi_{i,t}) \equiv P_{i,t+1}/P_{i,t}$  captures price inflation and  $CG_{i,t} = (1 + \pi_{i,t})(1 - \delta_t)$  are capital gains (net of depreciation) for capital of type  $i$ .

Second, we impose constant returns to scale in aggregate production (equation (1)), and thus the following condition must hold:

$$s_{K,t} P_t Y_t = \sum_{i \in I} R_{i,t} K_{i,t} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

where  $s_{K,t}$  is a measure of the income share paid to reproducible capital. Equations (B.1) and (B.2) imply the following expressions for the relative price adjusted rental rates for each capital type  $i = \{c, n\}$ :

$$PR_{c,t} = \frac{R_{c,t}}{P_{c,t}} = \frac{P_{n,t} K_{n,t}}{\tilde{P}_t \tilde{K}_t} (CG_{n,t} - CG_{c,t}) + (1 + \pi_{n,t}) s_{K,t} \frac{P_t Y_t}{\tilde{P}_t \tilde{K}_t} \quad (\text{B.3})$$

$$PR_{n,t} = \frac{R_{n,t}}{P_{n,t}} = \frac{P_{c,t} K_{c,t}}{\tilde{P}_t \tilde{K}_t} (CG_{c,t} - CG_{n,t}) + (1 + \pi_{c,t}) s_{K,t} \frac{P_t Y_t}{\tilde{P}_t \tilde{K}_t} \quad (\text{B.4})$$


where  $\tilde{P}_t \tilde{K}_t \equiv (1 + \pi_{n,t}) P_{c,t} K_{c,t} + (1 + \pi_{c,t}) P_{n,t} K_{n,t}$ . Based on (B.3) and (B.4) we then compute the income shares for each type of capital as

$$s_{c,t} = PR_{c,t} \frac{P_{c,t} K_{c,t}}{P_t Y_t} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

$$s_{n,t} = PR_{n,t} \frac{P_{n,t} K_{n,t}}{P_t Y_t} \quad (\text{B.6})$$


# Appendix C. The Income of Different Types of Capital

Figure C.12: Relative Prices & Depreciation



Notes: Panels A.1 and B.1 graph implicit price deflators by capital type relative to the GDP deflator, which were constructed directly from the BEA's detailed fixed-asset accounts. The BEA GDP deflator is taken from FRED. Panels A.2 and B.2 depict asset-specific depreciation rates constructed directly from the BEA's fixed asset accounts.

Figure C.13: Capital's Income Share



Notes: Panel A decomposes the NICT share into equipment and structures. Panel B decomposes the NICT share into residential and non-residential capital. The computations are based on the methodology described in Section 2 and the underlying data are nominal gross capital stocks and depreciation rates, drawn from the BEA's detailed fixed asset accounts. The vertical dashed line indicates the year 2001.

Table C.9: Within Industry Trends in Capital Income Shares

	ICT Share		Non-ICT Share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ann. Trend Growth (%)	3.873*** (0.327)	3.873*** (0.193)	0.0692 (0.205)	0.0692 (0.0601)
Industry FEs		yes		yes
Observations	1197	1197	1197	1197

Notes: The table shows regressions of 100 times the log ICT and NICT shares on a time trend for an annual panel of 19 broad sectors over the period 1949-2012. Columns 1 and 3 report pooled regressions while columns 2 and 4 condition on a complete set of fixed effects for 19 broad sectors. Sector specific income shares are based on the BEA fixed asset accounts and the BEA's estimates of sector specific value added and constructed as in [Eden and Gaggl \(2015\)](#). Standard errors are HAC robust and significance levels are indicated by \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## Appendix D. The Role of Industrial Composition

We construct industry-specific ICT and NICT shares as in [Eden and Gaggi \(2015\)](#) based on the BEA's detailed fixed asset accounts. We then estimate the average annual growth rates in these income shares both with and without industry fixed effects. Table [C.9](#) reports the results.

## Appendix E. Comparison with Other ICT Measures

While there are several data sources that provide ICT related statistics, we are not aware of any database other than the BEA fixed asset accounts, that reports quality adjusted *prices* and *stocks* of ICT capital for the US. However, we are able to construct measures for the ICT share from two alternative data sources, whose growth patterns are comparable.

First, a direct estimate for the ICT share is provided by the Conference Board's Total Economy Database (TED, <https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/>) for the period 1990-2016, defining ICT as "hardware, software and communication equipment".<sup>22</sup> Second, the Groningen Growth and Development Centre's (GGDC) industry growth accounting database (IGA, <http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/projects/iga>) defines ICT as "software, computers and communications equipment" and reports ICT's *share in total capital compensation* at the industry level.<sup>23</sup> These industry estimates are available for the period 1979-2003, and in order to make them comparable to our aggregate numbers, we use data on value added by sector from the BEA as well as the GGDC's estimates of industry level labor shares, in order to construct a value added weighted average of the ICT share across industries. While these two alternative sources do not report the exact list of tangible and intangible assets included in their definition of ICT hardware, software and communication equipment, the definitions appear broadly consistent with our list of ICT assets reported in Table [A.7](#). Panel A of Figure [E.14](#) plots the levels of our estimates for the ICT share in comparison to the the two alternatives.


Unfortunately, the levels of these three measures are difficult to compare directly for several reasons. First, the GGDC database does not report value added by industry. While the BEA does report value added

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<sup>22</sup>See [https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TED\\_SourcesMethods\\_nov20161.pdf&type=subsite](https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TED_SourcesMethods_nov20161.pdf&type=subsite) for details.

<sup>23</sup>See [http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/eu\\_productivity\\_and\\_competitiveness.pdf](http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/eu_productivity_and_competitiveness.pdf) for details.

Figure E.14: Alternative ICT Share Measures (TED, GGDC)  
 (A) ICT and NICT Shares (B) ICT Share (normalized)



Notes: Panel A displays our BEA based measure of the ICT share alongside two alternatives provided directly by the Conference Board's Total Economy Database (TED) and constructed from industry level estimates of ICT capital compensation by the Groningen Growth and Development Center's (GGDC) industry growth accounting database (IGA). Since all three datasources use a different measure of the labor share as a baseline to decompose factor compensation, panel B reports the ICT share for all three measures normalized to 100 in 2001.

by industry, the industry classification/aggregation is not the same and it is not possible to construct a one-for-one concordance in order to construct the appropriate industry weights. In part due to this problem, and in part because the GGDC does not cover all industries, the value added weighted average of the GGDC's industry level labor shares does not match the BLS's measure of the aggregate labor share used in our calculations. Likewise, the TED database also uses a different measure of the aggregate labor share as a baseline for their decomposition of factor compensation.

Thus, it is perhaps more meaningful to compare the growth trends of the ICT share. To facilitate this comparison, Panel B of Figure E.14 reports normalized versions of all three estimates for the ICT share. One can see that, while the levels in panel A do not match very well, the growth patterns appear very similar. Given that our analysis is mostly focused on trends, the similarity in growth trajectories is reassuring.

As another alternative, the OECD reports ICT *investment* as a fraction of total fixed capital formation, based on the following definition: "information technology equipment (computers and related hardware); communications equipment; and software. Software includes acquisition of pre-packaged software, customized software and software developed in-house" (<https://data.oecd.org/ict/ict-investment.htm>). Finally, while the EU KLEMS database reports ICT specific measures for many countries, it does not report ICT

and NICT separately for the US (<http://www.euklems.net/eukISIC4.shtml>).

## Appendix F. Alternative Composition Adjusted Labor Inputs

This appendix considers different measures of quality-adjusted routine and non-routine labor that account for changes in observed worker characteristics. We construct quantity indexes by estimating employment and wage bills within demographic cells based on the following characteristics:

1. **five major occupations groups:** Managerial, Professional, and Technical; Sales, and Administrative; Service; Precision Production, Craft, and Repair; Operatives and Laborers
2. **four age groups:** 16-19; 20-29; 30-49; 50-99
3. **gender:** male, female
4. **three racial groups:** White; Black; Other
5. **six education groups:** None or preschool; Grades 1-4; Grades 5-8; Grades 9-11/12; High school degree/some college; 2-Year College or more
6. **six major sectors:** Mining/Constr.; Manufacturing; Transp./Comm./Oth. Util.; Trade; Finance; Service


To construct chain indexes, we would ideally like a balanced panel of “demographic bins”, each with a total wage bill and a total employment count. However, since the CPS is a survey, we naturally end up with some empty cells, even if the demographic bins are fairly coarse. In order to deal with this problem we interpolate any “gaps” in the time series, and extrapolate/interpolate using polynomials at the beginning and end of the sample.<sup>24</sup> The demographic bins were chosen as a middle ground between narrow enough cells to pick up interesting variation in compositional changes, while at the same time limiting the amount of imputed values. Equipped with a panel of demographic cells, we then use Fisher’s “ideal” formula (and 1979 as the base year) to construct chained aggregates, analogously to our chain weighted quantity indexes for ICT and NICT capital.

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<sup>24</sup>Even though we are ultimately interested in long run trends, we require that at least 40% of each time series (for a demographic bin) are actual data points and at most 60% of the series is imputed with a log linear trend. We have checked the robustness of our results with respect to different cutoffs (including 100% data) and we do not notice much difference for the resulting trends in quantity indexes and implicit price deflators. The main benefit of keeping as many bins as possible is that the aggregate wage bill in the balanced panel is almost identical to the one measured in the raw, unrestricted data when we choose our 40% cutoff.




Figure F.15: Major Occupations: Employment and Real Wage Growth



Notes: Raw data are drawn from the CPS March supplement and shown as thin lines. Chain indexes are shown as thick lines and are constructed for the following demographic cells: 5 major occupations, gender, 3 race groups, 4 age groups, 5 education groups, and 6 industry groups. The base year for the chain indexes is 1979.

The resulting chain indexes for five major occupation groups and their associated implicit price deflators are displayed as thick lines in Figure F.15. As a reference, raw employment counts and average wages within each occupation group are illustrated as thin lines in the respective color/pattern. These figures indicate that part of the increase in both routine and non-routine wages is reflecting changes in the demographic characteristics of workers, suggesting that part of the measured wage increase should be interpreted as changes in quantities. This is reflected in upward adjustments of the quantity indexes relative to the raw employment counts. On the flip-side, the implicit price deflators are adjusted downward relative to average wages. Taken together, Figures F.15 (five major occupations) and F.16 (routine/non-routine) suggest that both non-routine wages and the quantity of non-routine labor inputs grew systematically faster than in the

Figure F.16: Routine/Non-Routine Occupations: Employment and Real Wages



Notes: Raw data are drawn from the CPS March supplement and shown as thin lines. Chain indexes are shown as thick lines and are constructed for the following demographic cells: 5 major occupations, gender, 3 race groups, 4 age groups, 5 education groups, and 6 industry groups. The base year for the chain indexes is 1979.


routine group.

An alternative way to decompose the routine and non-routine income shares into price and quantity components is based on cross sectional estimates of the non-routine wage premium (NRP). We estimate the following cross-sectional regression model separately for each year,  $t$ :

$$\ln w_{i,t} = \beta_{0,t} + \beta_{1,t}NR_{i,t} + \beta_{2,t}X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad \text{for } t \in \{1967, \dots, 2013\}, \quad (\text{F.1})$$

where  $NR_{i,t}$  is a dummy variable indicating that individual  $i$  works a non-routine job in year  $t$  and  $X_{i,t}$  includes a variety of control variables. In particular, we include gender, race, and full-time employment

Figure F.17: The Non-Routine Wage Premium



Notes: The figure plots the premium paid to non-routine work relative to routine work for three specifications: average wages in the raw data; implicit price deflators for chained quantity indexes; and  $100 \times [\exp(\hat{\beta}_{1,t}) - 1]$  from regression models (F.1) with  $X_{i,t}$  containing the following demographic control variables: gender, race, and full-time employment dummies, a control for the weeks worked, a full set of industry fixed effects (12 broad sectors), as well as forth order polynomials in age, education, and the interaction of education and age.


dummies, a control for the weeks worked, a full set of industry fixed effects (12 broad sectors), as well as forth order polynomials in age, education, and the interaction of education and age.

We estimate equation (F.1) based on individual level data from the annual CPS March supplements (using CPS sampling weights). Figure F.17 illustrates these estimates by plotting the time series of  $100 \times [\exp(\hat{\beta}_{1,t}) - 1]$  alongside alternative measures. These estimates highlight that the rising relative wage for non-routine labor is not entirely driven by the rising skill premium or by specific industries. Moreover, while the level of this premium depends slightly on the level of demographic aggregation—in narrower demographic groups (as in our regressions) we find a smaller level of the wage premium—we find that this premium unambiguously increased by at least 50% since the 1980s. In particular, our regression estimates (with the narrowest demographic controls) suggest that the non-routine wage premium rose from around 7% in the 1970s to around 20% in the 2000s.

Using this direct measure of the composition adjusted NRP, we can compute the relative non-routine labor inputs using the definition of the relative labor income share:

$$\frac{s_{nr}}{s_r} = \frac{w_{nr}L_{nr}}{w_rL_r} = (1 + NRP) \frac{L_{nr}}{L_r} \Rightarrow \frac{L_{nr}}{L_r} = \frac{1}{1 + NRP} \frac{s_{nr}}{s_r} \quad (\text{F.2})$$


Figure F.18: Aggregate Employment Indexes




Notes: The figure plots raw CPS MARCH employment counts alongside two versions of aggregate employment indexes: chain indexes that are constructed using the methodology in Appendix F; aggregate employment in units of “reference workers” is based on equation (F.1).

Figure F.19: Routine & Non-routine Labor (Relative Quantities & Prices)

(A) Relative Quantities



(B) NR Wage Premium



Notes: Panel A plots relative employment (expressed as percent of routine workers) based on four alternative measurement assumptions: the raw data; “effective” employment under the assumption of a homogeneous labor inputs; chain indexes; effective units assuming  $NRP > 0$  based on regression model (F.1). Panel B plots the corresponding non-routine wage premium (NRP), defined as  $100 \times (w_{nr}/w_r - 1)$ , where  $w_{nr}/w_r$  represents the relative non-routine wage for the four alternative measurement approaches: the ratio of average CPS wages; zero NRP by assumption; relative implicit price deflators for chain indexes;  $\exp(\hat{\beta}_{1,t})$  from regression model (F.1).

Quantity indexes for routine and non-routine labor can be obtained from this relation by constructing a quantity index for aggregate labor (Figure F.18). Figure F.19 compares all relative employment measures (panel A) and the corresponding non-routine wage premium (panel B).

## Appendix G. Alternative Specifications for the Composite Input $z$

In addition to equations (4)-(5), there are two alternative ways to specify a nested CES production function. The first is in the spirit of Autor and Dorn (2013), who consider the following setup:

$$\begin{aligned} x &= (\mu z^\varphi + (1 - \mu) \ell_{nr}^\varphi)^{\frac{1}{\varphi}} \\ z &= (\chi k_c^\xi + (1 - \chi) \ell_r^\xi)^{\frac{1}{\xi}} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{G.1})$$

where  $\mu, \chi \in [0, 1]$  and  $\xi, \varphi \leq 1$ . The interpretation is one in which non-routine labor interacts with “routine inputs” ( $x_r$ ), which can be produced by either routine labor or ICT capital.

For example, a (non-routine) applied economist is more productive if there is more data available; it is immaterial whether the data is collected by (routine) human surveyors or by an online survey. ICT affects the productivity of non-routine labor only through increasing the supply of routine inputs, while routine labor is directly substitutable with ICT.

Table G.10 reports the calibration results based on the specification (G.1). The calibration generates a value of  $\varphi > 1$  for all versions of labor measurement, inconsistent with the CES framework (which requires  $\varphi \leq 1$ ). Specification (G.1) is therefore inconsistent with the the observed trends in relative prices and quantities within our fixed CES demand structure.

The second alternative is one in which ICT capital is combined with a CES composite of routine and non-routine labor. In this setup, the “inner” composite input  $z$  is simply a two-factor CES production function in routine and non-routine labor. Under the assumption of time-invariant parameters, this specification is only consistent with the assumption of homogeneous labor inputs (NRP=0). To see this, notice that step one in our calibration procedure for this case can be written as

$$\ln \left( \frac{s_{nr}}{s_r} \right) = const + \theta \ln \left( \frac{\ell_{nr}}{\ell_r} \right) \quad (\text{G.2})$$

Table G.10: Calibration of Production Parameters

	B. Segmented Labor Markets							
	A. Homogeneous Labor		Data		Chain Indexes		Regressions	
	(A.1)	(A.2)	(B.1)	(B.2)	(B.3)	(B.4)	(B.5)	(B.6)
	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_{nr}}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_{nr}}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_{nr}}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_r}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_{nr}}{s_r}\right)$
$\ln(k_c/\ell_r)$	0.484*** (0.007)		0.483*** (0.007)		0.503*** (0.007)		0.500*** (0.007)	
$\ln(z/\ell_{nr})$		1.242*** (0.009)		1.944*** (0.025)		2.037*** (0.027)		1.656*** (0.017)
Constant	-6.866*** (0.064)	-0.135*** (0.002)	-6.813*** (0.063)	-0.819*** (0.011)	-6.966*** (0.068)	-0.894*** (0.012)	-6.976*** (0.068)	-0.413*** (0.005)
Obs.	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
<i>Estimated Parameters &amp; Implied Elasticities</i>								
$\chi$	0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001	
$\xi$	0.484		0.483		0.503		0.500	
$\text{EOS}(k_c, \ell_r)$	1.940		1.935		2.013		2.001	
$\mu$		0.466		0.306		0.290		0.398
$\varphi$		1.242		1.944		2.037		1.656
$\text{EOS}(z, \ell_{nr})$								

Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of the parameters in specification (G.1) using the two-step procedure described in the text. In analogy to Table G.11, estimates in panel A are based on the assumption of homogenous labor inputs, while those in panel B assume segmented labor markets. HAC robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis below estimated coefficients in panels A and B. Significance levels are indicated by \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Under the assumption of homogeneous labor inputs we have that  $\ell_{nr}/\ell_r = s_{nr}/s_r$  and this equation immediately implies that  $\theta = 1$ . Alternatively, if the non-routine premium is positive, then the equation can be written as

$$\ln(1 + NRP) + \ln\left(\frac{\ell_{nr}}{\ell_r}\right) = \text{const} + \theta \ln\left(\frac{\ell_{nr}}{\ell_r}\right) \quad (\text{G.3})$$

where the non-routine premium is defined as  $NRP = \frac{w_{nr}}{w_r} - 1$  and  $\theta$  governs the elasticity of substitution between routine and non-routine labor. This further implies that

$$\ln(1 + NRP) = \text{const} + (\theta - 1) \ln\left(\frac{\ell_{nr}}{\ell_r}\right) \quad (\text{G.4})$$

Since the different specifications of differentiated labor inputs all imply positive trends in both  $\ln(1 + NRP)$  and  $\ln(\ell_{nr}/\ell_r)$  (see Figure F.19), we must obtain  $(\theta - 1) > 0$  or  $\theta > 1$ . Thus, the only case consistent with

Table G.11: Calibration of Production Parameters

	B. Segmented Labor Markets							
	A. Homogeneous Labor		Data		Chain Indexes		Regressions	
	(A.1)	(A.2)	(B.1)	(B.2)	(B.3)	(B.4)	(B.5)	(B.6)
	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_{nr}}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_r}{s_z}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_{nr}}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_r}{s_z}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_{nr}}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_r}{s_z}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_c}{s_{nr}}\right)$	$\ln\left(\frac{s_r}{s_z}\right)$
$\ln(k_c/\ell_{nr})$	0.299*** (0.006)		0.275*** (0.005)		0.286*** (0.005)		0.293*** (0.006)	
$\ln(\ell_r/z)$		0.876*** (0.003)		1.071*** (0.004)		1.119*** (0.004)		1.022*** (0.004)
Constant	-5.201*** (0.053)	0.138*** (0.001)	-5.037*** (0.046)	-0.100*** (0.001)	-5.130*** (0.049)	-0.135*** (0.001)	-5.166*** (0.051)	0.049*** (0.001)
Obs.	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
<i>Estimated Parameters &amp; Implied Elasticities</i>								
$\gamma$	0.005		0.006		0.006		0.006	
$\sigma$	0.299		0.275		0.286		0.293	
$\text{EOS}(k_c, \ell_{nr})$	1.427		1.379		1.400		1.415	
$\eta$		0.535		0.475		0.466		0.512
$\theta$		0.876		1.071		1.119		1.022
$\text{EOS}(z, \ell_r)$		8.039						

Notes: The table shows OLS estimates for the parameters in equations (6) and (7) based on the two-step procedure described in the text: in step one, we estimate (6); in step two, we estimate (7) conditional on the results from step one. All regressions use fitted log-linear trends as data inputs, in order to eliminate the influence of cyclical fluctuations. Panel A assumes labor inputs are homogeneous and relative labor inputs therefore equal relative labor income shares; panel B uses employment counts and average wages as well as chained quantity indexes from Section Appendix F based on CPS MARCH data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Significance levels are indicated by \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

the observed trends in the data is  $\theta = 1$ , making routine and non-routine labor perfect substitutes.

## Appendix H. Alternative Calibration Specifications

Table G.11 reproduces the results from Section 4, adding results based on alternative labor measurements. Table H.12 reports joint GMM estimates for equations (6) and (7). Table H.13 uses the same GMM approach, instrumenting labor inputs using the aggregate birthrate 15 years lagged, as in Jaimovich et al. (2013). Unsurprisingly, the estimates are extremely similar, given identification based on long run trends.

Tables G.11 through H.13 illustrate that the observed trends in relative prices and quantities are inconsistent with a fixed CES demand system when labor quantities are measured under the assumption of segmented markets, even if we adjust for observed changes in demographic composition.

Table H.12: Calibration of Production Parameters: GMM Estimates

	B. Segmented Labor Markets			
	A. Homogeneous Labor (1)	Data (2)	Chain Indexes (3)	Regressions (4)
$\sigma$	0.323*** (0.008)	0.300*** (0.007)	0.312*** (0.007)	0.319*** (0.008)
$\gamma$	0.004*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
$\theta$	0.875*** (0.002)	1.072*** (0.003)	1.120*** (0.003)	1.022*** (0.003)
$\eta$	0.531*** (0.001)	0.469*** (0.001)	0.460*** (0.002)	0.507*** (0.001)
Obs.	47	47	47	47

*Notes:* The table shows joint GMM estimates for the parameters in equations (6) and (7). All GMM estimates use fitted log-linear trends as data inputs, in order to eliminate the influence of cyclical fluctuations. Panel A assumes labor inputs are homogeneous and relative labor inputs therefore equal relative labor income shares; panel B uses employment counts and average wages, chained quantity indexes and associated implicit price deflators based, and labor indexes based on regression estimates for the NRP using CPS MARCH data. HAC robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Significance levels are indicated by \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table H.13: Calibration: GMM Estimates Instrumenting with Lagged Birthrate

	B. Segmented Labor Markets			
	A. Homogeneous Labor (1)	Data (2)	Chain Indexes (3)	Regressions (4)
$\sigma$	0.323*** (0.009)	0.302*** (0.008)	0.315*** (0.008)	0.321*** (0.009)
$\gamma$	0.004*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
$\theta$	0.875*** (0.003)	1.074*** (0.003)	1.122*** (0.004)	1.024*** (0.003)
$\eta$	0.531*** (0.001)	0.469*** (0.002)	0.460*** (0.002)	0.507*** (0.001)
Obs.	47	47	47	47

*Notes:* The table shows joint GMM estimates constructed analogously to Table H.12. The only difference is that we now instrument all labor inputs with the birthrate 15 years lagged. HAC robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Significance levels are indicated by \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .