Microeconomic Theory II (PhD)<\/p>\n
These notes are meant as a supplement to the text, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1994). \u00a0I will also draw from Fudenberg and Tirole (1992). Next to the set of notes I have them abbreviated MWG and FT with the chapters from which I am drawing the information listed. \u00a0Gibbons (1992) may be a useful reference for some of the material earlier in the semester.<\/p>\n
Syllabus<\/a><\/p>\n Project Guidelines<\/a><\/p>\n Recent papers in top finance journals that use game theoretic models<\/a><\/p>\n 1\/12 – Introduction, PSNE, Simultaneous move games of complete information Methods of Proof<\/a>: Background notes<\/p>\n Simultaneous move games of complete information<\/a>: MWG 7-8; FT 1-2 Bargaining<\/a>\u00a0MWG 22.E, 9 Appendix A<\/p>\n Problem set 1<\/a>; Answers<\/a> Test1 Answers<\/a><\/p>\n Test 2 Answers<\/a><\/p>\n Fellingham, John C. and D. Paul Newman (1985). Strategic Considerations in Auditing<\/a>. The Accounting Review<\/em> 60:4, 634-650.<\/p>\n Maksimovic, Vojislav (1990). Product Market Imperfections and Loan Commitments<\/a>. Journal of Finance<\/em> 45:5, 1641-1653.<\/p>\n Bruce, M. and G. Llobet (2014). Preventing Zombie Lending<\/a>. Review of Financial Studies<\/em> 27:3, 923-956.<\/p>\nSchedule:<\/h3>\n
\n1\/19 – MSNE, Sequential move games of complete information, SPNE
\n1\/26 – Fellingham and Newman paper, Repeated games
\n2\/2 – Games with a continuum of strategies
\n2\/9 – Maksimovic paper, likely begin Bayes-Nash equilibria
\n2\/16 – Test 1
\n2\/23 – Individual meetings about paper
\n3\/2 – Spring Break<\/span>
\n3\/9 – Bayes-Nash equilibria, Begin Sequential move games of incomplete information
\n3\/16 – No class meeting
\n3\/23 – Sequential move games of incomplete information
\n3\/30 – Mechanism Design
\n4\/6 – Principal Agent problems
\n4\/13 – Bruce and Llobet paper; brief discussion on bargaining; Easley and O’hara discussion
\n4\/20 – Test 2
\n4\/27 – Individual meetings about paper
\n5\/11 – Paper due<\/p>\nNotes:<\/h3>\n
\nSequential move games of complete information<\/a>: MWG 7,9; FT 3-4
\nGames with a continuum of strategies<\/a>: MWG 12; FT 3
\nBayes-Nash equilibria<\/a>: MWG 8, 23; FT 6
\nSequential move games of incomplete information<\/a>: MWG 9; FT 8
\nMechanism Design<\/a>: MWG 23, FT 7
\nPrincipal-Agent problems<\/a>: MWG 14<\/p>\nProblem Sets:<\/h3>\n
\nProblem set 2<\/a>; Answers<\/a>
\nProblem set 3;<\/a> Answers<\/a>
\nProblem set 4<\/a>; Answers<\/a><\/p>\nReadings:<\/h3>\n