On this page there\u00a0are notes, problem sets, and other items for the Master’s Game Theory and Experiments\u00a0course. The textbook used was Gibbons. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton, 1992. Please be aware that there may be errors in the notes – it is not intentional, but they do happen.<\/p>\n
ECON 6206 Syllabus<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Methods of Proof<\/a> (from Epp)<\/p>\n Chapter 1<\/a>\u00a0Simultaneous games of complete information<\/p>\n Chapter 2<\/a> Sequential games of complete information<\/p>\n Chapter 1\/2<\/a>\u00a0Games with a continuum of strategies (Cournot and Bertrand)<\/p>\n Chapters 3<\/a>\u00a0Simultaneous games of incomplete information<\/p>\n Chapter 4<\/a>\u00a0Sequential games of complete information<\/p>\n Notes on Bayes Theorem<\/a><\/p>\n Monty Hall problem<\/a> (explanation of Bayes Theorem)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Summary and some comments on Smith’s 1982 AER paper<\/a><\/p>\n Experimental Design<\/a><\/p>\n Notes on data analysis and nonparametric statistics<\/a><\/p>\n Notes on field experiments<\/a><\/p>\n Notes on market experiments<\/a><\/p>\n Slides on designing War of Attrition experiment<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n There are many experimental economists who would argue that, and I am paraphrasing even though it is in quotes, “We are not requiring anything of subjects than we might in a typical classroom setting, so why should we have to deal with an IRB or Human Subjects Committee”.\u00a0 Here are some reasons why:<\/p>\n The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment<\/a> (1932-1972)<\/p>\n The Nazi Medical Experiments<\/a> (WWII)<\/p>\n Those first 2 experiments involve medical practices, so they have a somewhat questionable link to what an experimental economist does (though that is changing over time).\u00a0 This next set of experiments are a little closer to what an experimental economist might do, except that we might give the “teacher” incentives for each time he obeyed an order (though many didn’t need the additional incentives to obey the experimenter).<\/p>\n The Milgram Experiments<\/a> (1961-1985)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Human Subjects Website<\/a> Background readings on the experimental methodology and some early market experiments:<\/p>\n Note that these links are from JSTOR so you may need to log into the library’s system using your Novell account if you wish to access them from home.<\/p>\n Smith, V. \u201cMicroeconomic Systems as Experimental Science<\/a>\u201d American Economic Review<\/i> 72 (1982) 923-955 Siegel, S. and D.A. Goldstein “Decision-making Behavior in a Two-Choice Uncertain Outcome Situation<\/a>” Journal of Experimental Psychology 57:1 (1959) 37-42. Smith, V. \u201cAn Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior<\/a>\u201d Journal of Political Economy<\/i> 70 (1962) 111-137.\u00a0 Also, see Errata on pages 322-323<\/a> of the next issue of the journal. Plott, C. \u201cEconomics in 2090: The Views of an Experimentalist<\/a>\u201d Economic Journal<\/i> 101 (1991) 88-93. Smith, V. \u201cConstructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics<\/a>\u201d American Economic Review<\/i> 93 (2003) 465-508. Kahneman, D. \u201cMaps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics<\/a>\u201d American Economic Review<\/i> 93 (2003) 1449-1475. Chamberlain, E. \u201cAn Experimental Imperfect Market<\/a>\u201d Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948) 95-108. There are many more papers that a budding experimentalist can read.\u00a0 These are just to get you started and provide some background of where experimental economics has come from and where it has gone.\u00a0 Also, there is a long history of individual choice experiments (dating back to Thurstone before the Chamberlinian experiment) as well as some interesting early game theoretic experiments done in the 1950s and 1960s.<\/p>\n There are books on bargaining behavior by Fouraker and Siegel (one in 1960 and one in 1963 – I have read most of the 1963 book and enjoyed it) and there is a book containing game theoretic experiments edited by Thrall, Coombs, and Davis, Decision Processes, published in 1954 (I have not read this book so I do not know how useful one might find it).\u00a0 Also, for some of the introductory material I will draw from Chapter 1 of The Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by John Kagel and Al Roth, but you do not need to read that material.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Problem Set 1<\/a>; \u00a0 Answers<\/p>\n Problem Set 2<\/a>; \u00a0 Answers<\/p>\n Problem Set 3<\/a>; \u00a0 Answers<\/p>\nChapter Outlines for Gibbons:<\/h3>\n
Notes on Experiments<\/h3>\n
Some reasons why economic experiments with humans are reviewed<\/h3>\n
UNCC Human Subjects Information<\/h3>\n
\nHuman Subjects Tutorial<\/a> (can be taken as a guest, but must be passed as a non-guest before human subjects projects can begin)<\/p>\n
\nThis paper lays the groundwork tying experiments and microeconomics together as a science.\u00a0 It’s a more rigorous discussion that can be read along with chapters 3 and 4 of the Friedman and Cassar text.<\/p>\n
\nThis paper is in the psychology field but is one of the key reasons that monetary rewards are used in economics experiments.<\/p>\n
\nThis is Smith’s early experiment on the double auction institution that establishes that the economic institution is an important feature that can affect market outcomes.<\/p>\n
\nThis is just a quick read by Plott (basically the guy who got Smith to start doing experiments again) trying to predict the future of experiments in economics.<\/p>\n
\nThis is Smith’s revised Nobel lecture.<\/p>\n
\nThis is Kahneman’s revised Nobel lecture.<\/p>\n
\nThis is Chamberlain’s experiment on the “random meetings” institution.\u00a0 This is the experiment that spurred Smith to run the double auction experiments.<\/p>\nProblem Sets<\/h3>\n