Steven P. Clark, UNC Charlotte
David M. Marlett, Appalachian State University
Faith R. Neale, UNC Charlotte, Contact Author, frneale@uncc.edu
This is the online appendix that contains supplementary information for the article referenced above.
Article Abstract:
We examine workers’ compensation laws from 2003 to 2011 and their effect on insurer performance as measured by loss ratios and claim costs. We study different levels of caps on temporary total loss indemnity, penalties on employees who don’t comply with rehabilitation efforts, employer or employee choice of physician, and limits on attorney fees. We find differential effects among these reforms with the most robust being limits on temporary total indemnity and penalties for workers who do not comply with rehabilitation efforts. We measure one effect of the political environment and find that appointing authority over the workers’ compensation board or committee significantly affects loss costs. Lastly, we find evidence of regulatory capture in workers’ compensation.