

Bondholder Wealth Effects in Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances

Around the World

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Abstract

This paper examines foreign bondholder wealth effects in international collaborations in the form of joint ventures and strategic alliances. Based on a sample of 1,875 Joint venture and strategic alliance event-firm observations from 2009 to 2015, we find positive and significant abnormal returns for bondholders. The average three-month abnormal return is 0.191% for bondholders and 0.354% for stockholders. We focus on the wealth effects for the bondholders and find that country level governance and national culture are dominant drivers of bondholder gain. Results of various robustness tests and subsample analyses confirm the main findings. Additionally, we find little evidence for a wealth transfer between stockholders and bondholders of the foreign participants.

Keywords: Joint Ventures, Strategic Alliances, Bondholders, National Culture, Governance

JEL Classification: G34, M14, M16

1. Introduction

Literature suggests that ownership restructuring activities, such as mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, or privatizations, play an important role in business operations. A growing line of research focuses on another type of organizational restructuring, namely joint ventures (JV) and strategic alliances (SA), which have been recognized to exert substantial impacts on firm performance and create significant value. Joint ventures are established through formal arrangements involving equity ties (Amici et al., 2013), resulting a separate legal entity. On the other hand, strategic alliances are voluntary arrangements among firms involving exchanges, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services (Gulati, 1998). Both forms of collaboration allow firms to utilize resources from cooperative partners without giving up control of their own operations (Chan et al., 1997). The motivations for international JV and SA, similar to the motivations for capital flows between countries (Keown et al., 2015), are to obtain returns that are higher than those that could be obtained in the domestic markets and to reduce risk through international diversification. While past research has advanced the idea that national culture and country-level governance matter in corporate decisions on financing and operations (e.g., LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) and Stulz and Williamson (2003)), what remains unknown is whether and how these country-level mechanisms play a role in JV and SA for foreign participants. Particularly, in this paper we empirically examine how national culture and country-level governance affect the value creation of JV and SA activities around the world.

A substantial body of previous research focuses on shareholder wealth effects in domestic joint ventures and strategic alliances. Literature suggests that JVSA benefit

shareholders in domestic firms¹. In the studies of international JV and SA, Merchantt and Schendel (2000) examine the conditions under which the announcements of international joint ventures lead to increases in shareholder value of U.S. participants. They find that partner-venture business relatedness, the pursuit of R&D-oriented activity, greater equity ownership, and larger firm size, have a positive impact on value creation. However, no support is found for the hypothesized effect of cultural relatedness and political risk. On the contrary, Owen and Yawson (2013) find information costs and country familiarity drive international finance and business activities (others include Buch, 2005; Portes and Rey, 2005; Weitzel and Berns, 2006; Hwang, 2011). Chang et al. (2008) investigate the wealth impacts for Japanese and US firms in strategic alliances and find that on average, both Japanese and U.S. shareholders benefit from the formation of international alliances. They also find that shareholders earn larger abnormal returns when the partnering firms are smaller in size, have higher growth opportunities, or are less profitable. Chiou and White (2005) examine the shareholder wealth effects of financial institutions' strategic alliances and present evidence of value creation, especially for smaller partners. However, they do not find a significant difference in abnormal return between domestic-foreign and domestic-domestic alliances. Interestingly, Amici et al. (2013) find that

¹ McConnell and Nantell (1985) and Johnson and Houston (2000) document positive stockholder wealth effects associated with joint venture announcements. Chan et al. (1997) find that strategic alliances create shareholder value at the announcement and that the participants experience an improvement in operating performance afterwards. Allen and Phillips (2000) demonstrate that strategic alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relationships, in conjunction with block ownership lead to a significant increase in stock price, profitability, and operating performance. Krishnaswami et al. (2012) show that strategic alliances alleviate the capital constraints of small, high-growth firms and that the partnership announcements lead to significantly positive market reactions. Ivanov and Lewis (2008) find that IPO firms with alliances that commence before the offering tend to obtain greater IPO valuations, invest more, and have higher growth than other IPO firms.

international strategic alliances tend to destroy shareholder value. Using a sample of European and US banks, they find that the abnormal stock returns associated with these joint ventures and strategic alliances vary: joint ventures involving non-financial partners or those allowing banks to expand abroad are able to create shareholder value.

Compared to the shareholders, study for the wealth effects of bondholders is also critical not only because bondholders represent one of the major claimholders, but also necessary in order to understand any value creation for shareholders. As a stark contrast, only two paper has focused on bondholder wealth associated with JV and SA deals. Chou et al. (2014) examine the relationship between strategic alliances and the cost of debt. They are first to show that corporate alliance activity is valued outside the equity market and creates additional benefits that result in lower cost of debt financing. Chen et al. (2015) focus on bondholder wealth effects and find positive and significant bond price reactions to JV and SA announcements, suggesting an increase in bondholder wealth. They find that bond abnormal returns can be explained by synergy, alleviation of financial constraints, and real option effects.

In this study, we examine the bondholder wealth effects for non-U.S. (foreign) companies in global collaborative activities of JV and SA. To our knowledge, very few studies have examined the wealth effects for foreign participants, and they are limited to shareholder reactions. To be specific, Amici et al (2013) use US and European banks, while Chiou and White (2005) use data from the Japanese financial sector. To our knowledge, we are the first to explore the bondholder wealth effects of foreign participating firms in JV and SA. With the inclusion of foreign-U.S. and foreign-foreign deals, we are able to conduct a comprehensive study of global business collaborations by examining their impacts on claimholder returns and

the channels of such value creation. In addition, we explore a sample of companies that span across various industries, rather than limited to financial institutions. This paper examines claimholder reactions to announcements of international JV and SA, with the emphasis on bondholder wealth effects. We aim to explore the following research questions: 1) Do international joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for investors, especially, bondholders? 2) If there are significant wealth effects, what are the determinants? We particularly focus on whether country-level cultural and governance dimensions are drivers of wealth effects, and 3) What role does wealth transfer effect play, if any, in value creation?

We first document significantly positive abnormal returns for bondholders and stockholders of foreign companies following the announcements of global JV and SA. For example, the average 2-month and 3-month abnormal return is 0.127% and 0.191% for bondholders and 0.455% and 0.354% for stockholders. Next, we focus on bondholder reaction and its determinants. We test two main determinants: country-level governance using the world governance index and investor protection indices, and national culture using the Hofstede's cultural dimension and trust. We find that a country's cultural and governance dimensions explain a significant portion of the bondholders gain. More specifically, bondholders benefit more from JV and SA if they are from countries with poorer institutional governance (proxied by World Governance Index) and greater regulatory governance in creditor protection (higher creditor rights and lower shareholder rights). In addition, bondholders gain more when they are from countries with a culture characterized with a higher level of trust, greater individualism, more short-term orientation, more masculinity, less uncertainty avoidance, and less power distant. We further conduct three subsample analyses

accounting for different features on deal, firm, and bond characteristics. We found country-level governance has stronger effects in firms who come from same nation JVSA (participants and host are all from same country), participant less frequent, and have lower credit rating for bond issuing, while trust has stronger effects in firms who come from multi-nation JVSA, participant more frequent, and have higher credit rating for bond issuing. Lastly, we test for potential wealth transfer between bondholders and stockholders. We find a positive significant correlation between bondholder and stockholder abnormal returns, indicating little support for a wealth redistribution effect from shareholders to bondholders.

We contribute to the finance literature in the following ways. First, this paper is the one of first studies to employ a large sample of JV and SA activities spanning across 24 countries and multiple industries to examine the bondholder wealth effects, especially for the foreign participants. Second, domestic firms now look beyond country borders in the search of profits. With a rising globalization of international portfolio and direct investment, two unanswered, urgent questions need to be addressed: study for foreign participants in JV and SA activities, and study of how bondholders behave in the cooperative activities. Both are essential to the matter of globalization. With the focus on bondholder wealth for foreign participants, our paper tries to provide answers to the questions and explores them in depth. Third, our paper adds evidence that institutional environment, i.e., culture and country-level governance matter in corporate restructuring, in particular, JV and SA activities.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we propose the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample collection process, model specification, and the construction of main variables of interest. Section 4 presents the multivariate results.

Section 5 concludes.

2. Hypotheses development

In this section, we first discuss our two main hypotheses: country-level governance and national culture. We then briefly introduce some important control variables: other drivers of bondholder wealth effects in JV and SA that have been studied in previous literature. Lastly, we discuss the possible wealth transfer effect between bondholders and shareholders.

2.1. Main hypotheses

In the seminal paper by Williamson (2000) about institutional environment, he discusses four levels of social analysis. Top level is informal institutions and change very slowly -about centuries or millennia. National culture, which relates to social customs, traditions, norms, etc, belongs to this level. The next level is formal institutions. This includes the executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government, and occur about decades or centuries. Our first proxy for country-level governance (World governance index, thereby WGI) belongs to this level. The third level in social analysis is regulatory governance, especially contracts. This directly affect investor wealth. Our last two proxies for country-level governance (creditor protection and shareholder protection) belongs to this level.

H1. Corporate governance at the country level:

Corporate governance consists of both country-level and firm-level mechanisms. Firm-level or internal governance mechanisms are those that operate within the firm. Country-level governance mechanisms include a country's laws and the institutions that enforce the laws. In the literature on institutional environment. Williamson (2000) argues that institutions matter.

LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) show that countries with poorer investor protection have smaller and limited capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. Bris and Cabolis (2008) study cross-border mergers and find that the better the shareholder protection in the acquirer's country, the higher the merger premium in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic acquisitions. Following the literature, we adopt three measures for country level governance: the World Governance Index (WGI) published by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2010)), the Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI) from the World Bank, and the corrected Anti-director Rights Index (ADRI) introduced by Spamann (2010)². We hypothesize as follows.

A lower WGI indicates poorer institutional governance, implying a riskier business environment. Firms operating in riskier countries are more vulnerable to the negative effects of government-induced costs, which consumes managerial resource (Child and Markoczy, 1993). Since JV and SA are anticipated by investors to reduce firm risk³, on an aggregate participants' level, we expect bondholders of firms from a low-WGI nation benefit more from JVSA activities than those from a high-WGI countries. Because firms in low-WGI countries can share more operation risk through participating in JVSA, therefore, bondholders of the firm will gain more.

H1.1 Bondholders abnormal return around JVSA will be higher for JVSA participants that are in lower WGI countries.

² Detailed information for our three measures of country-level governance (WGI, SLRI, and ADRI) is introduced in Appendix B.

³ A fundamental motivation for cooperative alliances is the reduction of risk through risk sharing (Harrigan 1988; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992; Pan and Tse 1996). Kogut and Singh (1988) shows that when culture difference is large, firms tend to choose JVSA over mergers.

For a JVSA host country (where the JVSA entity resides) different from where the participant is, we expect the difference in WGI between the host country and participant country matters. To be specific, a firm in a lower WGI nation enters into a JVSA which resides in a higher WGI nation, it allows the firm to transfer some of the risk of doing business to the host country and consequently, increases bondholder wealth. Therefore, we hypothesize that bondholders' gain should be positively related to the difference in WGI between the participant's nation and the host nation in which the JV or SA is set up.

H1.2 Bondholders abnormal return around JVSA is positively associated with the difference of WGI between participant's country and host's country.

SLRI measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. We use SLRI as a proxy for country-level bondholder protection. Qian and Strahan (2007) show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. They show foreign banks appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment. Ongena and Penas (2009) suggest that bondholders experience higher abnormal returns when the country of the partner bank has stricter rules in relation to the forbearance of prudential regulations than its own country using a sample of bank mergers. Djakov et al. (2007) find creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product. Similar to a put option, creditor rights protect bondholders' downside risk. Since entering a JVSA is nonetheless an investment with risk, bondholders from a country with stronger creditor rights (higher SLRI) will be better protected

than those from a country with poorer creditor rights. Therefore, we expect bondholders to act more favorable in country with higher creditor rights index.

H1.3 Bondholders abnormal return around JVSA is positively associated with country-level creditor rights index.

For the effects of shareholder protection on bondholder wealth, U.S.-based evidence suggests that strong shareholder rights can harm bondholders by increasing the likelihood of wealth transfers to shareholders. Klock et al. (2005) find that strong shareholders rights at the firm level are associated with higher the cost of debt. Cremers et al. (2007) and Li and Wang (2016) investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on bond returns and find that without bond covenants shareholder and bondholder interests diverge. As a result, contrary to creditor rights, we expect stronger shareholder protection (higher ADRI) be associated with lower bondholder returns.

H1.4 Bondholders abnormal return around JVSA is negatively associated with country-level shareholder rights index.

H2. National Culture:

A growing body of research shows that culture has a strong impact on corporate decisions and exhibits a causal link to economic outcomes of such decisions⁴. In JVSA literature,

⁴E.g., Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, language, income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors to a lesser extent than protestant countries. Zheng et al. (2012) investigate the influence of national culture on the structure of corporate debt maturity and find robust evidence that firms located in countries with high levels of uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, power distance, or masculinity tend to use more short-term debt. In other words, they show that national culture helps explain the cross-country variation in debt maturity structure. Bryan et al. (2015) focus on

Kogut and Singh (1988) is the first to find that national culture influences a firm's decision on the type of cross-border partnerships: The greater the cultural differences, the more likely a firm chooses JV or SA than merger. Another aspect of the cultural dimension is trust. Guiso et al. (2008) indicate that lack of trust is an important factor in explaining the puzzle of limited participation in cross-country collaborations. Duarte et al. (2012) find that borrowers appearing more trustworthy have a higher probability of having their loans funded, better credit scores, and lower default risk. They suggest that the impression of trustworthiness matters in financial transactions as they predict borrower behaviors.

Following the literature (e.g. Ferris et al. 2013, Bryan et al. 2015, Ahern et al. 2015, Pevzner et al. 2015, and Li et al. 2013), we adopt two sets of proxies to measure the cultural dimension: Hofstede's culture dimensions and Trust from World Values Survey. According to Hofstede (2001), Power Distance (PDI) is defined as the extent to which the less powerful institutions and organizations within a society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Individualism (IDV) stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose. Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) is defined as the extent to which the members of institutions and organizations within a society feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations. Long Term Orientation stands for a society that fosters virtue orientation towards future rewards, in particular, adaptation, perseverance and thrift.

how national culture can be linked to the cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. They suggest that culture is a significant determinant of the structure of executive compensation. Fauver and McDonald (2015) show that a higher level of individualism is associated with greater use of debt and a lower cost of capital.

Masculinity (MAS) stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are assumed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.

Collectivist (as opposed to Individualism) societies emphasize strong informal ties among in-groups and rely on informal networks and relationships rather than formal institutions to protect against opportunism (Li and Zahra (2012)). Li et al. (2013) find that Individualism has a positive and significant impact on corporate risk-taking. Zheng et al. (2012) suggest that firms located in countries with high collectivism tend to use more short-term debt. In other words, firms from an individualistic culture prefer risk while those from a collectivistic culture dislike risks. Joint ventures and strategic alliances as a relatively temporary strategy may be more attractive to firms that are from a short-term orientated or individualistic culture. We follow the culture literature and have the following predictions for the measures of culture. We expect a culture of less power distance, stronger individualism, more masculinity, less uncertainty avoidance, and less long-term orientation (or short-term orientation) is associated with more risk. As entering JVSA is risk-sharing activity, we hypothesize that bondholders of firms that are from risk-liking culture will react more favorably at the announcement of JVSA.

That is,

H2.1 Bondholders abnormal return during announcement of JVSA will be larger if they are from less power distant, individualistic, less uncertainty avoidance, short-term orientated and masculine culture benefit more in JV and SA activities.

As to Trust, Pevzner et al. (2015) find that investor reaction to earnings announcements is significantly higher in more trusting countries. Similar to Pevzner et al. (2015), we posit that

announcements of JVSA are perceived as more credible by investor in more trusting societies and, therefore, produce stronger investor reactions.

H2.2 Participants from more trusting countries will achieve greater bondholder gains in JVSA activities.

2.2. Other drivers of bondholder wealth effects in JV and SA

In addition to our main two hypotheses relevant to the international deals, we include other explanations for bondholder wealth effects in JV and SA as documented in prior literature: synergy effect, alleviation of financial constraints, and real option.

Synergy effect: Previous literature has documented that synergy is attributable to positive shareholder value (McConnell and Nantell (1985), Johnson and Houston (2000), and Chan et al. (1997)). On the bondholders' side, Chen et al. (2015) find that financial synergy is a main driver of bondholder wealth effects in joint ventures, while operating synergy is a dominant factor in strategic alliances. To test whether synergy influences bondholders gain in international JV and SA activities. Following the literature, we adopt two measure of synergy: business proximity and geographical distance. We posit that the synergy effect from JV and SA should create value for bondholders. To be specific, greater business proximity or shorter geographic distance should lead to larger abnormal bond returns.

Alleviation of financial constraints: Literature indicates that financial constraints are one of the major reasons for corporate restructuring activities. Boone and Ivanov (2012) suggest that one of the benefits of JV and SA is the alleviation of financial constraints. Through such activities, partner firms share resources and have a lighter burden in raising external financing,

resulting in an alleviation of financial constraints. The financial flexibility embedded in JV and SA is valuable to bondholders because participating firms can refrain from issuing additional debt to finance investments, which is especially valuable for financially constrained companies. In this study, we use low dividend payout as a proxy for financial constraints, and we posit that the abnormal bond returns due to joint venture and strategic alliances are positively related to the extent of financial constraints.

Real option effect: Chen et al. (2015) identified JV and SA as real options as they offer firms with the opportunity to explore potential investments involving high uncertainty with no upfront cost and low termination cost. Such managerial flexibility embedded in the cooperative activities “grants the participating firms a real option to delay, expand, contract, or abandon their investments in an efficient way,” therefore the real option feature of JV and SA creates value for bondholders of US participating firms. With such real option, JV and SA participants can take part in risky investments without increasing its downside risk. Mansi and Reeb (2002) suggest that a reduction in downside risk decreases the shareholder’s option value and thereby increases the bondholder value. We test the real options hypothesis using two measures that are positively related to risk and the value of real options: uncertainty of investment and industry concentration. We expect the real option effect create bondholder value for firms in global JV and SA.

2.3. Wealth Transfer Effect

Although several papers have studied shareholders’ gain around JV and SA, very few studies (Chen et al., 2015) examine both shareholder and bondholder reactions and the potential

wealth transfer between these claimholders. Despite the lack of empirical support in the literature on JV and SA activities, wealth transfer (wealth redistribution) effect has been vastly tested in other corporate events. Billett et al. (2004) examine the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions on target and acquiring bondholders in the 1980s and 1990s. They find no evidence of wealth transfers between stocks and bonds of either target or acquiring firms, and only a faint trace of a wealth transfer between the combined (target and acquirer) stocks and bonds. Chow (1983) studies the impact of accounting regulations on bondholder and stockholder wealth. He finds that the '33 Act enhances bondholder wealth. However, this effect does not appear to be attributed to a wealth transfer from shareholders. Maxwell and Rao (2003) find evidence consistent with the wealth expropriation hypothesis regarding shareholders' gain on the announcements of spin-offs. Maxwell and Stephens (2003) explore the bondholder wealth effects associated with share repurchases, and suggest that the positive abnormal stock returns are attributable to a signaling effect and wealth redistribution from bondholders to stockholders. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) examine the information content and wealth redistribution explanations for the shareholder gains around dividend announcements. They present evidence consistent with the information content hypothesis, and that the gain from positive information is mainly captured by shareholders while the loss associated with negative information is shared with bondholders. Given the extensive literature on wealth redistribution between shareholders and bondholders in major corporate events, we explore the possibility of wealth redistribution from stockholders to bondholders in our study of international collaborations.

3. Sample construction, model specification, and univariate analysis

3.1. Sample selection

We employ multiple databases in this research. Joint venture and strategic alliance announcements, deal information, and deal characteristics are from SDC platinum. For foreign firms, bond prices, bond characteristics, benchmark indices, and equity prices are collected from Datastream; financial information is collected from Bloomberg. We retrieve all JV and SA deals for the period from 2009 to 2015 to arrive at the initial sample of 21,113 JV and SA deals. To be specific, 30,668 event-firm observations for joint ventures from 176 countries, and 14,502 event-firm observations for strategic alliances from 131 countries. Panel 1 in Appendix A shows the distribution at the event level by announcement year, and Panels 2 and 3 show the distribution of event-firm observations of JV and SA by country. By requiring valid 3-month (91-day) bond abnormal returns around announcement, valid information on total assets, market to book, leverage, and credit rating, we arrive at 1,639 JV and SA deals of 1,875 event-firm observations associated with 602 unique firms from 22 countries⁵. Table 1 shows the distribution of the cooperative activities in our sample. Panel A reports the number of events by year, and Panel B shows the number of event-firms by country.

⁵ Since the bond data are not readily available and needs to be hand-collected, we choose a sample of countries that is representative of the whole participating countries around the world. We start with a pilot study using year 2012 data. We first screen out countries with less than 50 JVSA announcements. Then using the participants' company names, we hand search in Thompson Reuters Datastream to collect corresponding foreign firms' bond prices and bond characteristics. If there's no bond information of the deal participants, we search if its parent company has bond information. We next screen out countries with low ratio of available bond information to number of event firms observations

3.2. Model specification

We apply the event study methodology to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns around the cooperative announcements for foreign firms. Abnormal bond returns we define the risk-adjusted abnormal return for bond i as:

$$AR_i = R_i - R_{bm}$$

And cumulative abnormal return for n days is:

$$CAR_n = \sum_{i=1}^n AR_i$$

where AR_i is the risk-adjusted abnormal return of bond i , R_i is the raw bond return, and R_{bm} is the return of a bond index matched by country. We estimate R_i as follows:

$$R_i = \frac{P_i - P_{i-1} + I}{P_{i-1}}$$

where P_i and P_{i-1} are bond prices at day i and day $i-1$ ⁶; I is the accrued interest with coupon considered. Similarly, we calculate the bond index return, R_{bm} , using the returns of Barclays' global corporate aggregate bond indices reported in Datastream. For firms with multiple bonds outstanding, AR at the firm level is the weighted average of AR s of individual bonds by amount outstanding. Eight event windows are used: (0, 0), (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), (-15, +15), (-30, +30), and (-45, +45) where date 0 is the announcement date. For comparison purpose, we also calculate abnormal stock returns for the same windows. For stocks, abnormal returns are

⁶ According to Securities & Economics manual in Datastream, eighty percent of bond pricing data reported in DataStream are market prices and the remainder are filled with prices from the automated processes. We consider data with equal prices in any two consecutive days as extrapolated and delete them. Our results remain robust if otherwise.

calculated using the market model estimated from 210 to 11 days prior to the announcement date. The MSCI country-level market indices from Datastream are used to calculate ARs for foreign firms.

In the multivariate regressions, we focus on abnormal bond returns for foreign participants and include hypotheses variables, deal characteristics, firm characteristics, bond characteristics, and other control variables. The model is formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 CAR_{i,t} = & b_0 + b_1 * (governance)_{i,t} + b_2 * (culture)_{i,t} + b_3 * (synergy)_{i,t} + b_4 \\
 & * (allievation\ of\ financial\ constraints)_{i,t} + b_5 * (real\ option)_{i,t} + d \\
 & * DealChar + f * FirmChar + b * BondChar + c * Controls + e_{i,t}
 \end{aligned}$$

where $CAR_{i,t}$ is the 3-month cumulative abnormal bond return of firm i at time t .

3.3. Abnormal bond and stock returns for foreign and U.S. participants

Table 2 reports the cumulative abnormal returns of claimholders at the announcements of JV and SA deals. Panels A and B present the results for firm level and bond level respectively. At firm level, CARs for bondholders are significantly positive across the three monthly event windows (31-day, 61-day, and 91-day), and significantly positive across all eight event windows at bond level. For example, the average three-month CAR is 0.191% at firm level and 0.428% at bond level. For stockholder returns, we have significantly positive abnormal returns for six out of eight event windows. For instance, the 2-day and 3-day CAR is 0.133% and 0.177% respectively, the 2-month and 3-month CAR is 0.455% and 0.354% respectively. Our findings are generally consistent with those documented in prior literature on JV and SA. Amici et al. (2013) report that the mean stock CAR over the 31-day window of (-15, 15) for the U.S. and European

banks is 0.36%, which is comparable to 0.41% in our study. Their 2-day window CAR is 0.13%, same as what we found.

4. Multivariate analyses

4.1. Baseline regressions

For multivariate regressions, we require firms to have valid information on total assets, market to book, leverage, and credit rating. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the regression variables for our final sample. Details on variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. We see that difference in WGI is in average positive, meaning that our sample consist more firms entering JVSA in a host country with poorer institutional governance. A closer look at JV and SA samples separately reveals that high technology firms tend to choose strategic alliances over joint ventures. SA activities have longer geographic distance between participants than that of JV activities. In addition, firms in SA have a higher market-to-book ratio than those in JV, which are consistent with the literature.

We focus on the foreign participants in our multivariate regressions since our main hypotheses refer to country-level governance and cultural dimensions. We exclude the U.S. participants from the analysis for two reasons. First, daily abnormal returns, as the dependent variable, cannot be calculated for US participants due to data limitation⁷. Second, we want to minimize the possible bias that could be introduced by including a large sample of U.S. firms with the same country-level governance and cultural measures. Considering the hypothesis

⁷ Since the bond pricing information for U.S. firms is based on the transaction data from Mergent FISD.

measures, especially those for the governance and culture hypotheses, we are cautious of the potential concern for multicollinearity. Table 4 reports the correlation matrix for all hypothesis and control variables. The results show that the country-level governance measures and some of culture proxies have relatively high correlations, which is consistent with LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998). For example, SLRI is highly correlated with 4 out of 5 culture measures. Thus, we orthogonalize SLRI by regressing SLRI on each of the 4 culture measures, and use the residual of SLRI in the regressions. In addition, we employ six regression models with each model containing a different set of proxies.

Table 5 reports the results of the baseline regressions of abnormal bond returns for foreign participants in JV and SA activities. The dependent variable is the three-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Model 1 through 5 each adopts one of the five culture measures along with SLRI, while Model 6 uses ADRI. For the country-level governance hypothesis, we find strong evidence supporting our predications. In particular, we find a significant and negative coefficient on the World Governance Index (WGI3), a significant and positive coefficient on SLRI across Model 1 through 5, and a significantly negative coefficient on ADRI in Model 6. Bondholders of participants from countries with poorer institutional governance (WGI) and greater regulatory governance in creditor protection (higher SLRI and lower ADRI) benefit more in JV or SA deals. This is consistent with our hypotheses H1.1, H1.3, and H1.4. The coefficient on WGI_diff is insignificant, suggesting that the difference in governance strength between the participant country and the host country (where JVSA resides) does not matter. One possible reason is that the benefit of institutional risk reduction

is offset by information costs of having to collaborate with different countries. In general, governance strength of the participant country itself matters in a significant manner.

For the culture hypothesis, we first observe positive and significant coefficients on Trust across all regression models, indicating that bondholders from more trusting countries gain more in JV and SA, which is consistent with our prediction H2.2. For culture proxies, we find significant coefficients on five out of six models. More specifically, bond abnormal returns are negatively related to power distance, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and masculinity, and positively related to individualism. These findings are consistent with our culture hypothesis that bondholders of firms from a more risk-loving culture are likely to enjoy greater gains in international collaborative activities. For the remaining hypotheses of synergy effect, alleviation of financial constraint, and real option, we find little evidence suggesting that any of these factors help explain the abnormal bond returns of foreign participants after we consider the country-level governance and culture measures. The results suggest that for foreign firms in JV and SA deals, bondholder wealth effects are mainly driven by country-level governance and national culture.

4.2. Subsample analyses

In this section, we divide the foreign sample into different sets of subgroups based on certain deal, firm, and bond characteristics. In particular, we perform the following subsample analyses: same- versus multiple-nation deals, frequent versus infrequent participants, and speculative- versus investment-grade bonds.

Same- versus multiple-nation deals: Same-nation deals are those in which all participants and are from the same country so as in the host country, whereas multiple-nations deals are the remainder. The aforementioned results on the country-level governance measures suggest that bondholder wealth effects are mainly driven by the governance strength of the participant's country rather than the difference in governance strength between the participant country and the host country. Therefore, we expect that country-level governance should have more pronounced impacts on bondholder wealth in the same-nation deals than in the multiple-nations deals. In addition, we expect trust to play an important role in the multiple-nation deals, but not in the same-nation deals because trust is expected to be an important factor in facilitating collaboration between different countries. Table 6 reports the regression results for the same-nation deals and multiple-nation deals separately. Consistent with our conjectures, the results suggest that the drivers of the abnormal bond returns differ between the two subgroups. Country-level governance proxies are more prominent in the same-nation deals and Trust is more prominent in the multiple-nation deals. Interestingly, we observe that the culture measures are more pronounced in the same-nation deals than in the multiple-nation deals. One possible explanation is that the culture of the participant's country is a more influential driver of bondholder wealth effects than the difference in culture among JV or SA participants –similar to what we found of that in country governance.

Frequent versus infrequent participants: A common phenomenon in the joint venture and strategic alliance activities is that some firms are frequent players that participate in cooperative activities multiple times. The median number of times a firm participates in either JV or SA is 6 in our sample. Merchant and Schendel (2000) argue that previous JV experience

will reflect favorably in the next JV performance. We therefore conjecture that the firm characteristics or motives of the frequent participants may be different from those of the infrequent participants. As a result, the determinants for bondholder wealth effects could vary between the two subsamples. We define the frequent participants as the firms that appear in more than six deals during our sample period, and the remaining firms are regarded as the infrequent participants. For frequent participants, its country governance may not matter as much as for the infrequent participants who are novice in the JV and SA markets. On the other hand, trust may exert a strong influence on frequent participants as reputation has been established from past participation. Therefore, we expect that country-level governance measures have a more pronounced impact for infrequent participants, while Trust is more prominent for frequent participants. Table 7 presents results that are mostly consistent with our predictions. In particular, all three measures for country-level governance are important for infrequent participants but not for frequent participants. Trust plays a significant role in determining bondholder gain in frequent participants but not in infrequent participants.

Speculative- versus investment-grade: Bond rating has been well documented to have influence on bond value (e.g., Kliger and Sarig (2000) and Elliott et al. (2009)). It serves as an important measure of credit quality. We hypothesize that country-level governance matters more in speculative grade than investment grade firms because speculative grade bondholders benefit more from the additional protection that the country-level governance provides, and trust should be associated with much stronger effect in investment grade because the better rated firm are perceived more credible to investors. Table 8 reports the results for the speculative-grade bonds and investment-grade bonds separately. We see that WGI3 is

significant at the 1% or 5% level across 5 models in the speculative-grade subsample with larger magnitude, but only significant at 10% level in 3 models for investment-grade subsample. Trust is significant in investment grade but have no effect in speculative grade. These findings are consistent with our predictions stated above. However, SLRI and ADRI show significance in investment grade instead.

4.3. Robustness tests

We conduct several robustness tests on the baseline regressions of bondholder wealth effects around the announcements of JV and SA. First, in the baseline regression, we use the bond information of the parent company if the participant bond(s) has missing return data. Panel A of Table 9 reports the baseline regressions after excluding the observations using parent companies, which comprise about 25% of our full sample. We find that the results on the two main hypotheses remain robust. Second, in the above analysis we employ the governance measure WGI3, which consists of three out of six estimates in the World Governance Index (WGI) reported by the World Bank. These three estimates (Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law) are chosen as we conjecture them to be most relevant to bondholder wealth effects. As a robustness check, we extract the first principal component (Prin1) of the six estimates of WGI and replace WGI3 with Prin1.⁸ Panel B report the results, which are very similar to those of the baseline regressions reported in Table 5. Third, when constructing the final sample, we delete all bonds with missing credit ratings. As

⁸ We also use the average of the six estimates as an alternative measure and results remain robust. Results using WGI6 is reported in Appendix C.

a robustness check, we replace the missing credit ratings with “Not Rated” and include these observations in the regressions reported in Panel C. Results remain generally robust across models. Lastly, since 50% of the firms participate in more than one JV or SA deal during the sample period, we test to see if the results remain robust if we include each participant only once. Results are robust and reported in Appendix C.

4.4. Stockholder wealth effects

In order to test for wealth transfer effect, we run a baseline regression analysis for stockholders and present the results in Table 10. We see the country-level governance measures do not seem to be important drivers on shareholder wealth. This is actually consistent with what Merchant and Schendel (2000) find. For the culture measures, Trust is the only measure which matters in determining shareholders’ abnormal returns. Stockholders of firms from more trusting countries experience larger abnormal returns. To test the possible wealth transfer effect, we run correlations between the cumulative abnormal bond returns and cumulative abnormal stock returns for each of the event windows. The correlations between bond CARs and stock CARS are positive and significant across all event windows and samples, indicating that wealth redistribution is not likely to be a factor for bondholder gains in JV and SA deals.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we empirically examine the bondholder wealth effects associated with international business collaborations in the form of joint ventures and strategic alliances. We

investigate the determinants of value creation for bondholders, and examine them in further sub groups. Based on a comprehensive sample of international JV and SA deals over the period of 2009-2015, we show that the cooperative agreements create significant value for bondholders. We find that joint ventures and strategic alliances lead to positive and significant bondholder wealth effects, which are mainly driven by the country level governance and culture dimensions. Bondholders gain more in poorer institutional governance and stronger regulatory governance in creditor protection and less shareholder protection. In addition, bondholder wealth effects are larger for participants from a risk-loving culture that is more individualistic, masculine, short-term oriented, and less power distant. We perform a variety of robustness checks and subsample analyses and our main findings remain robust. We find little evidence for wealth redistribution between stockholders and bondholders.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the one of first studies to employ a large sample of international JV and SA activities spanning across 22 countries and multiple industries to examine the bondholder wealth effects, especially for the foreign participants. Our findings contribute to the literature on international cooperative agreements, country-level governance, and national culture. This study provides new and important insights into the impacts of joint ventures and strategic alliances on claimholders and the determinants of value creation in global joint ventures and strategic alliances.

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Appendix A

Panel 1: Distribution of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances by Year

This table shows the distribution for joint ventures and strategic alliances deals around the world from 2009 to 2015 by alliance announcement year.

Year	Full Sample		Joint Ventures		Strategic Alliances	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
2009	2,492	11.8	1,472	10.41	1,020	14.62
2010	1,542	7.3	1,153	8.16	389	5.58
2011	3,353	15.88	2,431	17.19	922	13.22
2012	4,233	20.05	2,591	18.33	1,642	23.54
2013	3,723	17.63	2,264	16.01	1,459	20.92
2014	3,686	17.46	2,462	17.41	1,224	17.55
2015	2,084	9.87	1,765	12.48	319	4.57
Total	21,113	100	14,138	100	6,975	100

Appendix A, continued

Panel 2: Distribution of All Joint Ventures Participants by Nation

This table shows the distribution of joint venture events around the world from 2009 to 2015 across 176 countries where the participating firms operate.

Joint Ventures											
Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%
Afghanistan	1	0	Dominican Rep	3	0.01	Laos	15	0.05	Romania	18	0.06
Albania	2	0.01	Ecuador	12	0.04	Latvia	10	0.03	Russian Fed	804	2.62
Algeria	24	0.08	Egypt	181	0.59	Lebanon	9	0.03	Rwanda	2	0.01
Andorra	2	0.01	El Salvador	2	0.01	Lesotho	1	0	Saudi Arabia	444	1.45
Angola	16	0.05	Equator Guinea	1	0	Libya	6	0.02	Senegal	2	0.01
Argentina	55	0.18	Eritrea	6	0.02	Liechtenstein	1	0	Serbia	15	0.05
Armenia	5	0.02	Estonia	11	0.04	Lithuania	18	0.06	Seychelles	1	0
Australia	1,470	4.79	Ethiopia	5	0.02	Luxembourg	49	0.16	Sierra Leone	2	0.01
Austria	67	0.22	Fiji	4	0.01	Macau	2	0.01	Singapore	642	2.09
Azerbaijan	21	0.07	Finland	117	0.38	Macedonia	8	0.03	Slovak Rep	3	0.01
Bahamas	1	0	France	652	2.13	Malaysia	516	1.68	Slovenia	14	0.05
Bahrain	73	0.24	Gabon	2	0.01	Mali	3	0.01	Somalia	1	0
Bangladesh	30	0.1	Georgia	5	0.02	Malta	9	0.03	South Africa	181	0.59
Barbados	3	0.01	Germany	700	2.28	Marshall Is	2	0.01	South Korea	490	1.6
Belarus	29	0.09	Ghana	14	0.05	Mauritania	2	0.01	Soviet Union	1	0
Belgium	112	0.37	Gibraltar	7	0.02	Mauritius	14	0.05	Spain	281	0.92
Belize	1	0	Greece	46	0.15	Mexico	118	0.38	Sri Lanka	55	0.18
Benin	1	0	Greenland	2	0.01	Monaco	1	0	Sudan	7	0.02
Bermuda	19	0.06	Guatemala	2	0.01	Mongolia	19	0.06	Surinam	3	0.01
Bhutan	5	0.02	Guernsey	20	0.07	Morocco	15	0.05	Swaziland	2	0.01
Bolivia	6	0.02	Guinea	2	0.01	Mozambique	11	0.04	Sweden	181	0.59
Bosnia	1	0	Guinea-Bissau	1	0	Myanmar(Burma)	56	0.18	Switzerland	222	0.72
Botswana	10	0.03	Guyana	4	0.01	N. Mariana	1	0	Syria	1	0
Brazil	324	1.06	Haiti	1	0	Namibia	8	0.03	Taiwan	221	0.72
British Virgin	47	0.15	Honduras	1	0	Nepal	5	0.02	Tajikistan	2	0.01
Brunei	14	0.05	Hong Kong	703	2.29	Netherlands	307	1	Tanzania	22	0.07
Bulgaria	11	0.04	Hungary	30	0.1	New Caledonia	2	0.01	Thailand	362	1.18
Burkina Faso	1	0	Iceland	6	0.02	New Zealand	121	0.39	Timor-Leste	1	0
C. African Rep	1	0	India	1,761	5.74	Nicaragua	4	0.01	Trinidad&Tob	1	0
Cambodia	20	0.07	Indonesia	276	0.9	Nigeria	43	0.14	Tunisia	3	0.01
Cameroon	2	0.01	Iran	16	0.05	North Korea	3	0.01	Turkey	174	0.57
Canada	1,705	5.56	Iraq	15	0.05	Norway	157	0.51	Turkmenistan	1	0
Cayman Islands	8	0.03	Ireland-Rep	111	0.36	Oman	124	0.4	Ukraine	30	0.1
Chad	1	0	Isle of Man	9	0.03	Pakistan	34	0.11	United Kingdom	1,366	4.45
Chile	82	0.27	Israel	114	0.37	Palestine	4	0.01	United States	5,750	18.75
China	3,962	12.92	Italy	359	1.17	Panama	7	0.02	Unknown	843	2.75
Colombia	36	0.12	Ivory Coast	1	0	Papua N Guinea	17	0.06	Uruguay	4	0.01
Costa Rica	1	0	Japan	1,784	5.82	Peru	27	0.09	Utd Arab Em	390	1.27
Croatia	9	0.03	Jersey	20	0.07	Philippines	287	0.94	Uzbekistan	49	0.16
Cuba	7	0.02	Jordan	30	0.1	Poland	74	0.24	Venezuela	48	0.16
Cyprus	17	0.06	Kazakhstan	67	0.22	Portugal	25	0.08	Vietnam	164	0.53
Czech Republic	25	0.08	Kenya	10	0.03	Puerto Rico	3	0.01	Yemen	2	0.01
Dem Rep Congo	4	0.01	Kuwait	79	0.26	Qatar	176	0.57	Zambia	14	0.05
Denmark	87	0.28	Kyrgyzstan	8	0.03	Rep of Congo	5	0.02	Zimbabwe	12	0.04
Total										30,668	100

Appendix A, continued

Panel 3: Distribution of All Strategic Alliances Participants by Nation

This table shows the distribution of strategic alliance events around the world from 2009 to 2015 across 131 countries where the participating firms operate.

Strategic Alliances								
Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%
Afghanistan	3	0.02	Gibraltar	5	0.03	Panama	3	0.02
Algeria	5	0.03	Greece	94	0.65	Papua N Guinea	4	0.03
Angola	2	0.01	Guatemala	4	0.03	Paraguay	1	0.01
Argentina	13	0.09	Guyana	2	0.01	Peru	9	0.06
Armenia	1	0.01	Haiti	1	0.01	Philippines	35	0.24
Australia	322	2.22	Hong Kong	133	0.92	Poland	21	0.14
Austria	30	0.21	Hungary	12	0.08	Portugal	14	0.1
Azerbaijan	10	0.07	India	450	3.1	Puerto Rico	4	0.03
Bahamas	3	0.02	Indonesia	25	0.17	Qatar	112	0.77
Bahrain	73	0.5	Iran	6	0.04	Romania	8	0.06
Bangladesh	2	0.01	Iraq	9	0.06	Russian Fed	133	0.92
Barbados	2	0.01	Ireland-Rep	72	0.5	Saudi Arabia	217	1.5
Belarus	6	0.04	Isle of Man	4	0.03	Senegal	1	0.01
Belgium	45	0.31	Israel	133	0.92	Serbia	6	0.04
Bermuda	5	0.03	Italy	103	0.71	Seychelles	1	0.01
Bolivia	4	0.03	Japan	618	4.26	Singapore	71	0.49
Brazil	78	0.54	Jersey	1	0.01	Slovenia	4	0.03
British Virgin	1	0.01	Jordan	34	0.23	South Africa	36	0.25
Brunei	1	0.01	Kazakhstan	9	0.06	South Korea	180	1.24
Bulgaria	3	0.02	Kenya	2	0.01	Spain	96	0.66
Cambodia	2	0.01	Kuwait	58	0.4	Sri Lanka	10	0.07
Cameroon	2	0.01	Laos	2	0.01	St Kitts&Nevis	1	0.01
Canada	631	4.35	Latvia	1	0.01	Sudan	1	0.01
Cayman Islands	1	0.01	Lebanon	11	0.08	Supranational	1	0.01
Chile	36	0.25	Lithuania	1	0.01	Swaziland	1	0.01
China	771	5.32	Luxembourg	16	0.11	Sweden	142	0.98
Colombia	19	0.13	Malaysia	65	0.45	Switzerland	168	1.16
Costa Rica	3	0.02	Malta	3	0.02	Syria	1	0.01
Croatia	8	0.06	Mauritius	2	0.01	Taiwan	112	0.77
Cuba	4	0.03	Mexico	53	0.37	Thailand	37	0.26
Cyprus	9	0.06	Monaco	1	0.01	Tunisia	2	0.01
Czech Republic	2	0.01	Mongolia	4	0.03	Turkey	43	0.3
Dem Rep Congo	1	0.01	Montenegro	1	0.01	Ukraine	4	0.03
Denmark	113	0.78	Morocco	5	0.03	United Kingdom	757	5.22
Dominican Rep	2	0.01	Myanmar(Burma)	6	0.04	United States	6,620	45.65
Ecuador	5	0.03	Nepal	2	0.01	Unknown	90	0.62
Egypt	64	0.44	Netherlands	116	0.8	Uruguay	2	0.01
Falkland Is	1	0.01	New Zealand	46	0.32	Utd Arab Em	276	1.9
Fiji	1	0.01	Nigeria	9	0.06	Uzbekistan	2	0.01
Finland	83	0.57	North Korea	1	0.01	Venezuela	5	0.03
France	318	2.19	Norway	63	0.43	Vietnam	28	0.19
Georgia	1	0.01	Oman	42	0.29	Zambia	2	0.01
Germany	292	2.01	Pakistan	11	0.08	Zimbabwe	2	0.01
Ghana	5	0.03	Palestine	20	0.14			
Total							14,502	100

Appendix B: Variable Definitions

Variable Names	Variable Definitions
Abnormal Return	
Abnormal Bond Return	For foreign bond, we obtained from Datastream daily prices and calculate raw return base on daily returns, then calculate country-adjusted abnormal returns, and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We use Barclay's global aggregate bond index for each country acquired from Datastream and match with each bond by country as benchmark. We include the accrued interest which considers coupon payments, and accordingly the return of bond index is calculated during the same time period. We report the results based on Three-month (-1, +1) window. At the deal-firm level, we use average abnormal bond returns, weighted by the amount outstanding of each bond divided by the total amount outstanding for all bonds for a given firm.
Abnormal Stock Return	We first estimate the parameters based in the window of (-210, -11) month prior to the event by following Adams and Mansi (2009), and then the cumulative abnormal monthly returns are calculated over a given event window. For foreign firms, We obtain daily stock prices from Datastream, and MSCI country indic as benchmark index. We report the results based on Three-month (-1, +1) window.
Country Level Governance	
World Governance Index (WGI3)	The World Governance Index consists of six estimates - Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability - each gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. We choose three (Government effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law) that we posit are closely related to bondholders interest. We average the three estimates for a given country and form variable WGI3. Detailed documentation of the WGI, interactive tools for exploring the data, and full access to the underlying source data available at www.govindicators.org .
WGI (residual on Trust) Difference in WGI (WGI_diff)	The residuals from regressing WGI on Trust. The difference in WGI between the participant firm nation and JVSA firm nation within a cooperative activity. If the JVSA nations have more than two countries, the difference will be WGI of each participant minus the average of WGI among the JVSA nations within a cooperative activity.
Antidirector Rights Index (ADRI)	The "antidirector rights index" was introduced by La Porta et al as a measure of shareholder protection ("Law and Finance." 1998, Journal of Political Economy 106:1113--55). The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders' vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6. We adopt the corrected ADRI (2005 values) published by Holger Spamann (2010).
ADRI (residual)	The residuals from regressing ADRI on the three Hofstede Culture dimensions -Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, Masculinity, and Power Distance, respectively.
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)	Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 12, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand access to credit. Data year available: 2013-2015. Since the data does not change much during 2013-2015, we adopt 2013 value as proxy for year 2009-2012. Data source: World Bank, Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org).
Difference in SLRI (SLRI_diff)	The difference in SLRI between the participant firm nation and JVSA firm nation within a cooperative activity. If the JVSA nations have more than two countries, the difference will be SLRI of each participant minus the average of SLRI among the JVSA nations within a cooperative activity.

Appendix B, continued

Variable Names	Variable Definitions
Culture	
Hofstede Culture Dimensions	<p>We adopt Hofstede's culture dimensions - Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, Masculinity, and Power Distance - each index ranges a score from 0-100.</p> <p>Individualism (IDV) is the opposite of Collectivism. Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: a person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.</p> <p>Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) is defined as the extent to which the members of institutions and organizations within a society feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations.</p> <p>Long Term Orientation (LTO) is the opposite of Short Term Orientation. Long Term Orientation stands for a society which fosters virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular adaptation, perseverance and thrift. Short Term orientation stands for a society which fosters virtues related to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, preservation of "face", and fulfilling social obligations.</p> <p>Masculinity (MAS) is the opposite of Femininity. Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.</p> <p>Power Distance (PDI) is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.</p>
Trust	World Values Survey (2005-2009), V23; World Values Survey (2010-2014), V24 - "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Following La Porta et al. (1997), the percentage of people answering "yes" is our measure of trust in a country.
Synergy Effect	
Geographical Distance	Calculated as the logarithm of geographical distance between headquarters of two partners within a cooperative activity (JV/SA). For foreign deals, we use capital cities of each participants as locations of headquarters. For a cooperative activity with more than two partners, we calculate the median value of distances between any of two combination of partners.
Business Proximity	Defined as an indicator variable which takes the value of one when a given participating firm has the same two-digit of SIC code as that of the cooperative activity.
Financial Constraint Effect	
Low Dividends Payout	Defined as an indicator variable, which takes the value of one if the firm's dividend yield is below the sample average, and zero otherwise. Because US firms and foreign firms have significantly different dividend pattern, we calculated the average dividend yield grouped by US dummy variable and alliance year.
Real Option effect	
Industry Concentration	Defined as an indicator variable which takes a value of one if the industry of cooperative activities has a HHI more than 0.25 (HHI above 0.25 is identified as a concentrated industry), and zero otherwise. HHI is calculated by event year, industry, and country.
Uncertainty of Industry Investment	This measure is estimated on industry and country basis. The first step of estimation is to sort all COMPUSTAT firms into different industries according to two-digit SIC codes and country according to country code, and then calculate each firm's R&D expenses/Total Assets. The second step is for a given year, industry and country, we calculate the standard deviation of the ratio for all the firms in the same industry and same country. Finally a mean value of standard deviations within three years prior to cooperative activities is used.

Appendix B, continued

Variable Names	Variable Definitions
<i>Deal Characteristics</i>	
Number of Participants	Calculated as the number of participating firms that join in a given cooperative activity.
Horizontal Dummy	Defined as an indicator variable which takes a value of one if all partners in a given cooperative activity have the same first two-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise.
Foreign Dummy	Defined as an indicator variable which takes a value of one if at least one partnering firm in a given cooperative activity is from foreign countries, and zero otherwise.
Equal Ownership	Defined as an indicator variable which takes a value of one if each participant in a given joint venture takes the same shares of stakes in the new entity, and zero otherwise.
High-Tech Dummy	Defined as an indicator variable which takes a value of one if a cooperative activity is involved in high-tech industries, and zero otherwise. We follow Carpenter and Petersen (2002) to identify hightech industries by using first three-digit SIC code of 283, 357, 361, 362, 366, 367, 382, 384, 386, and 387.
<i>Firm Characteristics</i>	
Total Assets	Book value of participating firm assets.
Leverage	Defined as total debt divided by total market value of assets, where market value of assets is the sum of total debt and market value of equity.
Market to Book	Defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.
<i>Bond Characteristics</i>	
Bond Size	Defined as the aggregate value of all individual bonds outstanding.
Credit Rating	To define deal-firm level bond credit rating, we utilize the following procedures (i) first use Moody's rating for each individual bond with the highest rating Aaa to the lowest rating D, (ii) then follow Klock et al. (2005) in converting each letter rating to a numerical rating with the corresponding number from 22 to 1, (i.e. Aaa converts to 22, Aa1 converts to 21, ..., and D converts to 1), (iii) use the amount outstanding of each individual bond as the weight to find firm-level bond rating.
Coupon	Refers to the annual interest rate on bond contract on individual bond level. For deal-firm level, it is defined as weighted average coupon of all bonds outstanding for a given firm, with the weight being the amount outstanding for each bond divided by total amount outstanding for all bonds of the firm.
Time to Maturity	Calculated as the length of time from the present to time when the bond matures on individual bond level. For deal-firm level, it is defined as the weighted average time to maturity of all bonds outstanding for a given firm, with the weight being the amount outstanding for each bond divided by the total amount outstanding for all bonds of the firm.
<i>Other control variables</i>	
Economy	Developed economies, and developing economies. Data source: Development Policy and Analysis Division (DPAD) of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN/DESA).
JV_dum	Indicator variable equal to one if the cooperative activity is joint venture, and zero if strategic alliance
Multi_dum	Indicator variable equal to one if the participating firm participates more than 6 times within our sample period, and zero otherwise.

Table 1: Distribution of Participants and Cooperative Activities

This table shows an overview of 1,639 announcements of cooperative activities initiated by 1,875 event-firm level participants in the period of 2009 through 2015. Data of cooperative activities are collected from SDC. Panel A reports event level number of deals by year. Panel B reports event-firm level number of firms by country.

Panel A: Event level distribution by announcement year								
Full Sample			Joint Ventures			Strategic Alliances		
Year	N	%	Year	N	%	Year	N	%
2009	161	9.76	2009	102	8.56	2009	59	12.91
2010	116	7.03	2010	87	7.30	2010	29	6.35
2011	297	18.01	2011	216	18.12	2011	81	17.72
2012	324	19.65	2012	222	18.62	2012	102	22.32
2013	361	21.89	2013	244	20.47	2013	117	25.60
2014	270	16.37	2014	213	17.87	2014	57	12.47
2015	120	7.28	2015	108	9.06	2015	12	2.63
Total	1,639	100	Total	1,184	100	Total	455	100

Panel B: Event-firm level distribution by country								
Full Sample			Joint Ventures			Strategic Alliances		
Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%	Nation	N	%
Australia	78	4.16	Australia	73	5.42	Australia	5	0.95
Belgium	18	0.96	Belgium	13	0.97	Belgium	5	0.95
Brazil	15	0.80	Brazil	12	0.89	Brazil	3	0.57
Canada	116	6.19	Canada	86	6.38	Canada	30	5.68
France	202	10.77	France	135	10.02	France	67	12.69
Germany	165	8.80	Germany	119	8.83	Germany	46	8.71
Hong Kong	15	0.80	Hong Kong	14	1.04	Hong Kong	1	0.19
Italy	67	3.57	Italy	50	3.71	Italy	17	3.22
Japan	752	40.11	Japan	567	42.09	Japan	185	35.04
Malaysia	4	0.21	Malaysia	4	0.30	Malaysia	-	-
Netherlands	50	2.67	Netherlands	34	2.52	Netherlands	16	3.03
Norway	43	2.29	Norway	32	2.38	Norway	11	2.08
Qatar	5	0.27	Qatar	2	0.15	Qatar	3	0.57
Russian Fed	11	0.59	Russian Fed	8	0.59	Russian Fed	3	0.57
Singapore	29	1.55	Singapore	26	1.93	Singapore	3	0.57
South Korea	8	0.43	South Korea	7	0.52	South Korea	1	0.19
Sweden	37	1.97	Sweden	20	1.48	Sweden	17	3.22
Switzerland	20	1.07	Switzerland	13	0.97	Switzerland	7	1.33
Thailand	21	1.12	Thailand	17	1.26	Thailand	4	0.76
Turkey	1	0.05	Turkey	1	0.07	Turkey	-	-
United Kingdom	208	11.09	United Kingdom	104	7.72	United Kingdom	104	19.70
Utd Arab Em	10	0.53	Utd Arab Em	10	0.74	Utd Arab Em	-	-
Total	1,875	100	Total	1,347	100	Total	528	100

Table 2: Abnormal Returns and Univariate Tests

This table shows summary statistics of abnormal returns of joint ventures and strategic alliances for foreign participants. Panel A shows the mean and median of CARs of different windows for firm level observations. Panel B shows the mean and median of CARs of different windows for bond level observations. We report CARs of bond and stock returns in the 1-day, 2-day, 3-day, 5-day, 11-day, 31-day (1-month), 61-day (2-month), and 91-day (3-month) event windows, where day 0 is the announcement day.

Panel A: Firm-level												
Event Window	Full Sample				Joint Ventures				Strategic Alliances			
	Abnormal Return for Bondholders (%)											
Daily	N	Mean	Median	t Value	N	Mean	Median	t Value	N	Mean	Median	t Value
(0, 0)	1,875	0.001	0.006	0.19	1,347	0.004	0.008	0.59	528	-0.007	-0.001	-0.66
(-1, 0)	1,875	-0.008	0.007	-0.97	1,347	-0.006	0.009	-0.64	528	-0.013	-0.009	-0.81
(-1, +1)	1,875	-0.002	0.013	-0.22	1,347	0.001	0.018	0.08	528	-0.011	0.000	-0.55
(-2, +2)	1,875	0.000	0.016	-0.01	1,347	0.014	0.026	0.94	528	-0.037	-0.002	-1.43
(-5, +5)	1,875	0.034	0.032	1.68	1,347	0.066	0.048	2.8	528	-0.048	-0.003	-1.23
(-15, +15)	1,875	0.101	0.058	2.88	1,347	0.139	0.075	3.39	528	0.003	-0.002	0.05
(-30, +30)	1,875	0.127	0.050	2.55	1,347	0.149	0.075	2.64	528	0.073	-0.072	0.7
(-45, +45)	1,875	0.191	0.062	2.91	1,347	0.252	0.126	3.36	528	0.038	-0.143	0.28
Abnormal Return for Stockholders (%)												
Daily	N	Mean	Median	t Value	N	Mean	Median	t Value	N	Mean	Median	t Value
(0, 0)	1,833	0.092	0.044	2.53	1,314	0.107	0.037	2.42	519	0.054	0.064	0.860
(-1, 0)	1,833	0.133	0.067	2.68	1,314	0.132	0.012	2.26	519	0.135	0.256	1.440
(-1, +1)	1,833	0.177	0.042	2.87	1,314	0.188	0.035	2.62	519	0.149	0.076	1.230
(-2, +2)	1,833	0.270	0.069	3.48	1,314	0.265	0.039	2.91	519	0.282	0.107	1.920
(-5, +5)	1,833	0.175	0.139	1.59	1,314	0.159	0.129	1.21	519	0.218	0.139	1.070
(-15, +15)	1,833	0.412	0.494	2.38	1,314	0.514	0.494	2.45	519	0.152	0.453	0.510
(-30, +30)	1,833	0.455	0.280	1.85	1,314	0.448	0.421	1.52	519	0.474	-0.277	1.060
(-45, +45)	1,823	0.354	0.708	1.17	1,308	0.047	0.568	0.13	515	1.134	0.948	2.090
Panel B: Bond-level												
Event Window	Full Sample				Joint Ventures				Strategic Alliances			
	Abnormal Return for Bondholders (%)											
Daily	N	Mean	Median	t Value	N	Mean	Median	t Value	N	Mean	Median	t Value
(0, 0)	13,826	0.008	0.004	2.99	10,607	0.013	0.004	4.19	3,219	-0.007	-0.002	-1.07
(-1, 0)	13,826	0.017	0.019	4.37	10,607	0.023	0.023	5.48	3,219	-0.003	0.002	-0.35
(-1, +1)	13,826	0.028	0.036	5.60	10,607	0.037	0.040	6.70	3,219	-0.002	0.011	-0.15
(-2, +2)	13,826	0.039	0.054	6.08	10,607	0.055	0.060	7.97	3,219	-0.016	0.023	-1.07
(-5, +5)	13,826	0.074	0.094	7.74	10,607	0.104	0.099	9.81	3,219	-0.023	0.072	-1.03
(-15, +15)	13,826	0.208	0.191	13.17	10,607	0.266	0.205	15.17	3,219	0.020	0.146	0.55
(-30, +30)	13,826	0.317	0.248	14.95	10,607	0.394	0.309	17.01	3,219	0.065	0.062	1.30
(-45, +45)	13,826	0.428	0.308	16.10	10,607	0.536	0.372	18.32	3,219	0.073	0.016	1.20

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Hypotheses and Control Variables

This table presents the mean and median of the event-firm variables related to (i) hypotheses, (ii) Country, deal, firm, and bond characteristics for the 1,875 firms participated in JVSA for the period 2009-2015. We require 3-month bond CAR, Total Assets, Leverage, Market to Book, and Credit Rating not missing. The table reports full sample (JV and SA) firms, JV firms, and SA firms separately. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. At the event-firm level, we calculate the weighted average of bond rating, coupon rate, and time to maturity using amounts outstanding as the weights.

Variables	Full Sample				Joint Ventures				Strategic Alliances			
	N	Mean	Median	Std Dev	N	Mean	Median	Std Dev	N	Mean	Median	Std Dev
WGI3	1,875	1.41	1.37	0.37	1,347	1.40	1.37	0.38	540	1.43	1.42	0.35
WGI	1,875	1.28	1.26	0.36	1,347	1.28	1.26	0.37	540	1.30	1.31	0.33
Difference in WGI	1,862	0.73	0.35	0.86	1,340	0.73	0.28	0.88	534	0.72	0.52	0.79
ADRI	1,849	4.61	5.00	0.57	1,327	4.60	5.00	0.57	534	4.65	5.00	0.56
Strength of Legal Rights Index	1,875	5.15	4.00	2.09	1,347	5.15	4.00	2.19	540	5.15	4.00	1.84
Difference in SLRI	1,860	-0.19	0.00	2.60	1,340	-0.18	0.00	2.61	532	-0.20	0.00	2.55
Individualism	1,875	61.56	67.00	18.69	1,347	60.17	67.00	18.78	540	65.15	69.00	17.95
Uncertainty Avoidance	1,875	71.46	86.00	23.28	1,347	72.55	86.00	22.83	540	68.59	75.00	24.04
Long Term Orientation	1,875	69.06	81.86	21.05	1,347	69.33	82.87	21.83	540	68.24	67.00	19.09
Masculinity	1,875	68.94	66.00	25.57	1,347	69.72	66.00	25.44	540	66.83	66.00	25.72
Power Distance	1,875	49.70	54.00	12.81	1,347	50.34	54.00	12.71	540	47.93	54.00	12.91
Trust	1,847	36.58	35.90	11.61	1,324	36.90	35.90	11.49	535	35.88	35.90	11.89
log(Distance)	1,858	5.91	7.93	3.55	1,336	5.82	7.73	3.59	534	6.18	8.20	3.42
Business Proximity	1,875	0.47	0.00	0.50	1,347	0.49	0.00	0.50	540	0.44	0.00	0.50
Low Dividend Payout	1,852	0.48	0.00	0.50	1,329	0.50	0.00	0.50	535	0.45	0.00	0.50
Industry Concentration	1,806	0.48	0.00	0.50	1,297	0.47	0.00	0.50	519	0.50	0.00	0.50
Uncert. of Industry Investment	1,539	0.11	0.03	0.34	1,091	0.10	0.02	0.37	456	0.14	0.04	0.26
Number of Participants	1,875	2.33	2.00	0.79	1,347	2.39	2.00	0.85	540	2.17	2.00	0.61
Horizontal Dummy	1,875	0.36	0.00	0.48	1,347	0.34	0.00	0.47	540	0.41	0.00	0.49
Equal Ownership	1,300	0.53	1.00	0.50	1,300	0.53	1.00	0.50
High Tech Dummy	1,875	0.12	0.00	0.33	1,347	0.09	0.00	0.29	540	0.20	0.00	0.40
log (Total Assets)	1,875	10.67	10.84	1.21	1,347	10.63	10.75	1.23	540	10.73	11.04	1.19
Leverage	1,875	0.29	0.26	0.13	1,347	0.30	0.27	0.13	540	0.27	0.25	0.12
Market to book	1,875	1.83	1.31	1.47	1,347	1.70	1.28	1.31	540	2.16	1.46	1.79
log (Bond Size)	1,875	15.04	15.09	1.21	1,347	14.99	15.00	1.20	540	15.11	15.28	1.24
Credit Rating	1,875	15.11	15.00	2.97	1,347	14.99	15.00	3.00	540	15.37	16.00	2.95
Coupon	1,875	3.36	3.28	2.04	1,347	3.32	3.15	2.04	540	3.46	3.46	2.05
Time to Maturity (year)	1,868	6.66	5.44	4.27	1,345	6.53	5.50	4.00	532	6.94	5.03	4.86
Economy	1,875	0.94	1.00	0.24	1,347	0.93	1.00	0.26	540	0.96	1.00	0.18
Alliances in Same Nation	1,875	0.21	0.00	0.41	1,347	0.22	0.00	0.42	540	0.19	0.00	0.39

multiple participation 1,875 0.59 1.00 0.49 1,347 0.57 1.00 0.49 540 0.61 1.00 0.49

Table 4: Correlation Matrix

This table shows the correlation matrix for main variables including bond abnormal returns, measures of country level governance, measures of culture, synergy measures, measures of alleviation of financial constraints, and measures of real option benefits in multivariate regressions. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 3-month CAR -bond	1															
2 WGI3	0.02	1.00														
3 Difference in WGI	0.02	0.24	1.00													
4 ADRI	-0.07	-0.22	0.03	1.00												
5 Strength of Legal Rights Index	0.06	0.42	0.00	-0.84	1.00											
6 Individualism	0.04	0.40	0.02	-0.68	0.73	1.00										
7 Uncertainty Avoidance	-0.01	-0.51	-0.09	0.60	-0.75	-0.58	1.00									
8 Long Term Orientation	-0.06	-0.25	0.04	0.78	-0.84	-0.78	0.74	1.00								
9 Masculinity	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.30	-0.21	-0.31	0.50	0.47	1.00							
10 Power Distance	-0.06	-0.67	-0.11	0.46	-0.53	-0.69	0.51	0.44	0.01	1.00						
11 Trust	0.09	0.48	0.12	-0.16	0.15	0.10	-0.28	-0.08	-0.18	-0.54	1.00					
12 log(Distance)	0.00	-0.02	0.36	0.16	-0.18	-0.12	0.06	0.17	-0.06	0.08	0.00	1.00				
13 Business Proximity	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.11	-0.10	-0.10	-0.14	-0.07	0.05	0.03	1.00			
14 Low Dividend Payout	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.16	0.15	0.12	0.22	0.08	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	1.00		
15 Industry Concentration	-0.05	0.07	-0.03	-0.25	0.28	0.13	0.03	-0.13	0.40	-0.15	-0.11	-0.15	-0.08	0.15	1.00	
16 Uncert. of Industry Investment	-0.01	0.09	0.01	-0.43	0.40	0.36	-0.29	-0.38	-0.12	-0.23	0.00	-0.02	0.09	-0.08	0.20	1.00

Table 5: Baseline Cross-sectional Regressions of Bondholder Wealth Effects for JVSA

This table provides the results of baseline cross-sectional OLS regressions for bondholder wealth effects around the announcements of joint ventures and strategic alliances. Six regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level 3-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Clustered standard errors at firm level are used to estimate statistical significance and p-values are reported in brackets. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance						
WGI3	-1.778*** (0.001)	-1.721*** (0.001)	-1.385** (0.015)	-1.485*** (0.005)	-2.259*** (0.000)	-0.469 (0.297)
WGI_diff	0.030 (0.749)	0.028 (0.768)	0.038 (0.691)	0.026 (0.787)	0.033 (0.730)	0.001 (0.995)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	0.300*** (0.000)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		0.255*** (0.002)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			0.316*** (0.000)			
SLRI (residual on LTO)				0.198** (0.021)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					0.369*** (0.000)	
ADRI						-0.792*** (0.005)
Culture						
Trust	0.035*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.025** (0.013)	0.021** (0.049)	0.001 (0.950)
Power Distance	-0.024* (0.074)					
Individualism		0.034*** (0.005)				
Uncertainty Avoidance			-0.017* (0.090)			
Long Term Orientation				-0.035*** (0.000)		
Masculinity					-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.409)
Synergy						
Business Proximity	0.154 (0.365)	0.136 (0.422)	0.158 (0.351)	0.132 (0.429)	0.115 (0.487)	0.142 (0.387)
Geographic Distance	0.011 (0.617)	0.008 (0.702)	0.013 (0.551)	0.007 (0.737)	0.004 (0.849)	0.005 (0.799)
Alleviation of Financial Constraints						
Low Dividends Payout	0.065 (0.741)	0.107 (0.582)	0.014 (0.944)	0.119 (0.548)	0.159 (0.415)	0.142 (0.468)

Continued

Real Option

Uncertainty of Industry Investment -0.147 -0.174 -0.100 -0.193 -0.216 -0.075
(0.621) (0.552) (0.741) (0.505) (0.440) (0.778)

Industry Concentration -0.041 -0.017 -0.061 0.001 0.188 0.227
(0.814) (0.924) (0.730) (0.998) (0.325) (0.279)

Deal Charateristics

Number of Participants -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.010 -0.005 -0.018
(0.799) (0.799) (0.799) (0.890) (0.942) (0.805)

Horizontal Dummy 0.146 0.146 0.160 0.150 0.140 0.125
(0.408) (0.417) (0.370) (0.397) (0.427) (0.477)

High Tech Dummy 0.188 0.185 0.179 0.186 0.186 0.114
(0.497) (0.503) (0.517) (0.502) (0.502) (0.680)

Firm Charateristics

Total Asset -0.058 -0.091 -0.049 -0.055 -0.048 -0.052
(0.536) (0.337) (0.593) (0.576) (0.620) (0.590)

Leverage -0.175 -0.157 -0.274 -0.007 0.317 0.461
(0.858) (0.870) (0.779) (0.994) (0.738) (0.641)

Market to Book -0.079 -0.089 -0.065 -0.090 -0.103 -0.081
(0.337) (0.292) (0.432) (0.285) (0.216) (0.352)

Bond charateristics

Bond Size 0.128 0.155 0.128 0.128 0.118 0.119
(0.195) (0.119) (0.187) (0.200) (0.227) (0.233)

Credit Rating 0.078* 0.084** 0.074* 0.083** 0.087** 0.079*
(0.057) (0.043) (0.074) (0.045) (0.036) (0.056)

Coupon -0.027 -0.069 0.012 -0.102 -0.154* -0.086
(0.730) (0.475) (0.888) (0.214) (0.084) (0.327)

Time to Maturity 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.007
(0.841) (0.960) (0.735) (0.952) (0.796) (0.810)

Other Control Variables

Economy 0.324 -0.321 -0.427 -0.111 0.472 0.096
(0.592) (0.676) (0.437) (0.808) (0.324) (0.855)

Multi Dummy 0.004 0.011 -0.046 0.026 0.030 -0.054
(0.984) (0.954) (0.806) (0.889) (0.870) (0.772)

JV Dummy 0.104 0.141 0.079 0.133 0.150 0.144
(0.545) (0.417) (0.644) (0.445) (0.384) (0.399)

Industry and Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Intercept 0.199 -2.533* 0.091 1.536 -0.964 2.170
(0.920) (0.062) (0.960) (0.348) (0.497) (0.301)

Number of observations 1,477 1,477 1,477 1,477 1,477 1,475

Adjusted R2 0.045 0.045 0.047 0.047 0.051 0.040

Table 6: Determinants of Abnormal Bond Returns for Same Nation Deals and Different Nation Deals

This table provides the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions for bondholder wealth effects for same nation deals and different nation deals around the announcements of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances. Six different regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level three-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Cluster standard errors at firm level are used to estimate statistical significance and p-values are reported in parenthesis. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. For each regression, synergy, alleviation of financial constraints, real option effect, deal, firm, and bond characteristics are included but for abbreviation, coefficients are not reported.

	Same Nation						Different Nation					
	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance												
WGI3	-5.262*** (0.003)	-5.144*** (0.004)	-4.350** (0.013)	-4.556** (0.013)	-5.593*** (0.002)	-1.034 (0.545)	-0.980* (0.096)	-0.948 (0.107)	-0.744 (0.244)	-0.773 (0.190)	-1.404** (0.023)	-0.237 (0.651)
WGI_diff							0.004 (0.971)	0.001 (0.994)	0.010 (0.928)	-0.000 (1.000)	0.006 (0.958)	-0.012 (0.912)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	1.006*** (0.000)						0.155* (0.091)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		0.941*** (0.000)						0.130 (0.147)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			1.053*** (0.000)						0.168* (0.062)			
SLRI (residual on LTO)				0.821*** (0.000)						0.082 (0.384)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					1.045*** (0.000)						0.227** (0.010)	
ADRI						-2.407*** (0.004)						-0.498* (0.090)

Culture												
Trust	0.008	-0.012	0.007	-0.022	-0.029	-0.074**	0.032**	0.030**	0.031**	0.026**	0.023*	0.009
	(0.836)	(0.664)	(0.831)	(0.462)	(0.285)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.059)	(0.549)
Power Distance	-0.083*						-0.013					
	(0.066)						(0.344)					
Individualism		0.102***						0.018				
		(0.002)						(0.136)				
Uncertainty Avoidance			-0.053*						-0.008			
			(0.082)						(0.428)			
Long Term Orientation				-0.104***						-0.021**		
				(0.000)						(0.033)		
Masculinity					-0.026*	0.005					-0.015**	-0.007
					(0.096)	(0.768)					(0.027)	(0.292)
Intercept	4.979	-4.127	4.360	8.806*	-1.798	6.306	-0.441	-1.635	-0.685	0.212	-0.670	1.263
	(0.406)	(0.269)	(0.390)	(0.058)	(0.674)	(0.317)	(0.848)	(0.335)	(0.743)	(0.914)	(0.697)	(0.592)
Number of observations	346	346	346	346	346	346	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,131	1,129
Adjusted R2	0.100	0.096	0.116	0.097	0.101	0.040	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.017	0.014

Table 7: Determinants of Abnormal Bond Returns for Frequent Participants and Less-Frequent Participants

This table provides the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions for bondholder wealth effects for frequent participants and less-frequent participants around the announcements of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances. Six different regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level three-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Cluster standard errors at firm level are used to estimate statistical significance and p-values are reported in parenthesis. The symbols (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. For each regression, synergy, alleviation of financial constraints, real option effect, deal, firm, and bond characteristics are included but for abbreviation, coefficients are not reported.

	Frequent Participants						Less-Frequent Participants					
	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance												
WGI3	0.169 (0.868)	0.133 (0.886)	0.523 (0.602)	0.178 (0.867)	-0.904 (0.383)	0.217 (0.806)	-2.156*** (0.001)	-2.081*** (0.001)	-1.928*** (0.006)	-1.958*** (0.002)	-2.374*** (0.000)	-0.091 (0.897)
WGI_diff	0.027 (0.816)	0.024 (0.834)	0.031 (0.793)	0.022 (0.851)	0.027 (0.812)	0.026 (0.817)	-0.072 (0.650)	-0.072 (0.654)	-0.067 (0.674)	-0.068 (0.670)	-0.062 (0.700)	-0.157 (0.343)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	0.092 (0.364)						0.429*** (0.000)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		0.051 (0.593)						0.384*** (0.002)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			0.086 (0.367)						0.446*** (0.000)			
SLRI (residual on LTO)				0.016 (0.882)						0.345** (0.010)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					0.192* (0.090)						0.450*** (0.000)	
ADRI						-0.625 (0.125)						-0.970** (0.031)

Culture												
Trust	0.047***	0.036***	0.042***	0.034**	0.032**	0.019	0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.006	-0.035*
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.330)	(0.902)	(0.928)	(0.938)	(0.944)	(0.688)	(0.071)
Power Distance	0.008						-0.046**					
	(0.689)						(0.012)					
Individualism		-0.001						0.049***				
		(0.978)						(0.001)				
Uncertainty Avoidance			0.010						-0.036***			
			(0.499)						(0.004)			
Long Term Orientation				-0.011						-0.045***		
				(0.318)						(0.000)		
Masculinity					-0.019**	-0.009					-0.013	-0.002
					(0.049)	(0.292)					(0.144)	(0.800)
Intercept	-3.603	-3.162*	-4.195*	-1.863	-1.891	0.447	2.446	-2.500	2.541	2.974	-1.144	3.347
	(0.166)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.396)	(0.351)	(0.884)	(0.391)	(0.250)	(0.320)	(0.217)	(0.620)	(0.297)
Number of observations	906	906	906	906	906	906	571	571	571	571	571	569
Adjusted R2	0.083	0.082	0.085	0.082	0.086	0.087	0.051	0.051	0.052	0.052	0.055	0.028

Table 8: Determinants of Abnormal Bond Returns for Speculative-grade and Investment-grade

This table provides the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions for bondholder wealth effects for speculative-grade and investment-grade bonds around the announcements of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances. Six different regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level three-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Robust standard errors are used to estimate statistical significance and P-values are reported in parenthesis. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. For each regression, synergy, alleviation of financial constraints, real option effect, deal, firm, and bond characteristics are included but for abbreviation, coefficients are not reported.

	Speculative-grade						Investment-grade					
	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance												
WGI3	-4.713***	-4.260**	-4.603**	-4.298**	-4.752***	-2.960	-1.092*	-1.067*	-0.595	-0.988*	-1.498**	-0.282
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.252)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.310)	(0.072)	(0.012)	(0.592)
WGI_diff	0.217	0.198	0.234	0.227	0.243	0.253	0.042	0.040	0.048	0.041	0.044	0.023
	(0.528)	(0.564)	(0.496)	(0.495)	(0.471)	(0.471)	(0.655)	(0.670)	(0.604)	(0.665)	(0.632)	(0.800)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	0.410						0.222**					
	(0.256)						(0.016)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		0.250						0.218**				
		(0.448)						(0.012)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			0.480						0.261***			
			(0.192)						(0.004)			
SLRI (residual on LTO)				0.361						0.169*		
				(0.378)						(0.071)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					0.530						0.267***	
					(0.142)						(0.001)	
ADRI						-0.025						-0.826***
						(0.988)						(0.006)

Culture													
Trust	-0.082 (0.181)	-0.025 (0.640)	-0.047 (0.415)	-0.035 (0.539)	-0.047 (0.397)	-0.023 (0.806)	0.031** (0.036)	0.025** (0.030)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.026)	0.021* (0.075)	0.001 (0.930)	
Power Distance								-0.017 (0.234)					
Individualism		0.108** (0.047)							0.016 (0.204)				
Uncertainty Avoidance										-0.006 (0.522)			
Long Term Orientation												-0.022** (0.013)	
Masculinity												-0.013** (0.032)	-0.004 (0.567)
Intercept	10.023 (0.175)	-2.227 (0.622)	5.594 (0.406)	4.903 (0.387)	0.349 (0.937)	-0.165 (0.988)	-0.601 (0.803)	-2.507 (0.126)	-1.031 (0.613)	0.266 (0.885)	-1.305 (0.455)	2.388 (0.339)	
Number of observations	219	219	219	219	219	218	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,257	
Adjusted R2	0.117	0.122	0.111	0.112	0.116	0.098	0.055	0.055	0.060	0.055	0.059	0.056	

Table 9: Robustness Tests

This table provides the results of robustness tests on bondholder wealth effects. Panel A adopts a sample with participants' information only. Panel B uses principal component method on WGI. Panel C treats missing credit rating information as Not Rated. Six different regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level three-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Cluster standard errors at firm level are used to estimate statistical significance and P-values are reported in parenthesis. The symbols (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. For each regression, synergy, alleviation of financial constraints, real option effects, deal, firm, and bond characteristics are included but for abbreviation, not reported.

	Panel A						Panel B						Panel C					
	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance																		
WGI3/Prin1	-1.546*	-1.590**	-1.446*	-0.988	-2.534***	-0.577	-0.607***	-0.550**	-0.445*	-0.435*	-0.757***	-0.138	-1.080***	-1.140***	-0.788*	-1.077***	-1.338***	-0.494
	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.097)	(0.223)	(0.004)	(0.383)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.002)	(0.533)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.096)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.204)
WGI_diff	0.032	0.034	0.033	0.027	0.040	0.015	0.005	0.001	0.023	0.000	0.002	-0.007	0.143*	0.144*	0.149*	0.142	0.146*	0.106
	(0.764)	(0.752)	(0.757)	(0.799)	(0.703)	(0.887)	(0.957)	(0.994)	(0.807)	(0.997)	(0.984)	(0.942)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.086)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.219)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	0.231**						0.246***						0.229***					
	(0.016)						(0.002)						(0.002)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		0.198**						0.200**						0.191**				
		(0.034)						(0.011)						(0.024)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			0.240***						0.289***						0.226***			
			(0.010)						(0.000)					(0.003)				
SLRI (residual on LTO)				0.119						0.129						0.124		
				(0.246)						(0.101)						(0.128)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					0.412***						0.286***							0.229***
					(0.000)						(0.000)							(0.002)
ADRI						-0.685**						-0.804***						-0.356
						(0.046)						(0.005)						(0.117)
Culture																		
Trust	0.030*	0.032**	0.031**	0.020	0.019	0.005	0.036***	0.028**	0.034***	0.023**	0.023*	-0.001	0.036***	0.025**	0.027***	0.025***	0.022**	0.015
	(0.068)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.132)	(0.177)	(0.785)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.966)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.028)	(0.195)
Power Distance	-0.028						-0.016						-0.006					
	(0.114)						(0.238)						(0.671)					
Individualism		0.040**						0.025**						0.020*				
		(0.029)						(0.027)						(0.058)				
Uncertainty Avoidance			-0.020						-0.009						-0.010			
			(0.130)						(0.284)						(0.234)			
Long Term Orientation				-0.039***						-0.031***						-0.026***		
				(0.001)						(0.000)						(0.001)		
Masculinity					-0.028***	-0.011					-0.015**	-0.005						-0.009 -0.004
					(0.001)	(0.162)					(0.015)	(0.428)						(0.117) (0.460)
Intercept	-0.718	-3.583**	-0.915	0.586	-1.124	1.084	-2.412	-4.095***	-2.022	-0.329	-3.314**	1.757	0.525	-0.074	1.575	3.031**	0.685	2.030
	(0.766)	(0.036)	(0.704)	(0.789)	(0.547)	(0.702)	(0.229)	(0.009)	(0.203)	(0.834)	(0.031)	(0.411)	(0.766)	(0.947)	(0.296)	(0.031)	(0.571)	(0.224)
Number of observations	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,093	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,475	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,951	1,924
Adjusted R2	0.053	0.055	0.053	0.059	0.067	0.052	0.040	0.040	0.045	0.043	0.044	0.039	0.052	0.050	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.043

Table 10: Stockholders Wealth Effects for JVSA

This table provides the results of baseline cross-sectional OLS regressions for stockholder wealth effects around the announcements of JVSA. Six different regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level 3-month cumulative abnormal stock return. Cluster standard errors at firm level are used to estimate statistical significance and P-values are reported in parenthesis. The symbols (*), (**) and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance						
WGI3	0.288 (0.863)	0.233 (0.888)	0.179 (0.916)	0.132 (0.937)	0.736 (0.665)	-1.650 (0.203)
WGI_diff	0.145 (0.725)	0.148 (0.719)	0.140 (0.733)	0.146 (0.722)	0.157 (0.702)	0.254 (0.536)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	-0.418 (0.193)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		-0.381 (0.227)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			-0.441 (0.156)			
SLRI (residual on LTO)				-0.350 (0.265)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					-0.487 (0.108)	
ADRI						-0.374 (0.712)
Culture						
Trust	0.056 (0.218)	0.056* (0.099)	0.054 (0.126)	0.059* (0.095)	0.068* (0.059)	0.058 (0.206)
Power Distance	0.036 (0.417)					
Individualism		-0.033 (0.305)				
Uncertainty Avoidance			0.022 (0.425)			
Long Term Orientation				0.035 (0.196)		
Masculinity					0.023 (0.233)	0.015 (0.438)

Synergy						
Business Proximity	1.104	1.130	1.090	1.134	1.197	1.146
	(0.157)	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.142)	(0.121)	(0.142)
Geographic Distance	0.162	0.165	0.160	0.165	0.173*	0.172*
	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.107)	(0.090)	(0.096)
Deal Characteristics						
Number of Participants	0.285	0.275	0.289	0.265	0.243	0.210
	(0.439)	(0.460)	(0.433)	(0.483)	(0.517)	(0.576)
Horizontal Dummy	-0.835	-0.822	-0.841	-0.841	-0.816	-0.990
	(0.323)	(0.333)	(0.321)	(0.318)	(0.334)	(0.246)
High Tech Dummy	0.262	0.234	0.276	0.231	0.157	0.242
	(0.805)	(0.827)	(0.795)	(0.828)	(0.884)	(0.824)
Firm Characteristics						
Total Asset	-0.350	-0.351	-0.355	-0.372	-0.423	-0.450
	(0.371)	(0.353)	(0.350)	(0.324)	(0.264)	(0.244)
Leverage	1.844	1.581	1.956	1.513	0.635	1.162
	(0.640)	(0.700)	(0.625)	(0.709)	(0.878)	(0.779)
Market to Book	-0.219	-0.195	-0.234	-0.198	-0.145	-0.295
	(0.493)	(0.548)	(0.468)	(0.533)	(0.651)	(0.366)
Other Control Variables						
Economy	-2.774	-2.330	-2.583	-2.780	-3.552*	-3.384*
	(0.199)	(0.330)	(0.201)	(0.117)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Multi Dummy	-1.124	-1.134	-1.105	-1.153	-1.138	-1.089
	(0.190)	(0.187)	(0.199)	(0.179)	(0.185)	(0.214)
JV Dummy	-0.635	-0.656	-0.617	-0.658	-0.695	-0.716
	(0.443)	(0.423)	(0.454)	(0.418)	(0.393)	(0.385)
Industry Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Intercept	2.203	5.742	2.524	2.034	5.559	9.497
	(0.776)	(0.287)	(0.689)	(0.732)	(0.313)	(0.223)
Number of observations	1,773	1,773	1,773	1,773	1,773	1,757
Adjusted R2	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.034

Appendix C: Additional robustness Tests

This table provides the results of robustness tests on bondholder wealth effects. Panel A reports results with average of all six measures of WGI. Panel B reports results with each firm appears only once. Six different regressions for foreign firms using different proxies are reported. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B. The dependent variable is the firm-level three-month cumulative abnormal bond return. Cluster standard errors at firm level are used to estimate statistical significance and P-values are reported in parenthesis. The symbols (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. For each regression, synergy, alleviation of financial constraints, and real option effects, deal, firm, and bond characteristics are included but for abbreviation, not reported.

	Panel A						Panel B					
	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6	Reg 1	Reg 2	Reg 3	Reg 4	Reg 5	Reg 6
Country Level Governance												
WGI6/WGI3	-1.583*** (0.006)	-1.444** (0.012)	-1.167** (0.048)	-1.155** (0.043)	-1.972*** (0.001)	-0.396 (0.475)	-2.472*** (0.002)	-2.392*** (0.004)	-2.296*** (0.009)	-2.194*** (0.005)	-2.553*** (0.002)	-0.095 (0.914)
WGI_diff	0.007 (0.943)	0.003 (0.979)	0.024 (0.799)	0.002 (0.983)	0.004 (0.969)	-0.006 (0.953)	0.243 (0.330)	0.241 (0.337)	0.246 (0.323)	0.238 (0.340)	0.245 (0.327)	0.160 (0.537)
SLRI (residual on PDI)	0.251*** (0.001)						0.525*** (0.000)					
SLRI (residual on IDV)		0.205*** (0.009)						0.485*** (0.001)				
SLRI (residual on UAI)			0.291*** (0.000)						0.542*** (0.000)			
SLRI (residual on LTO)				0.134* (0.089)						0.416*** (0.006)		
Strength of Legal Rights Index (SLRI)					0.292*** (0.000)						0.537*** (0.000)	
ADRI						-0.806*** (0.005)						-0.828 (0.166)
Culture												
Trust	0.037*** (0.008)	0.029** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.024** (0.031)	0.024** (0.044)	0.000 (0.999)	0.001 (0.980)	0.002 (0.905)	0.001 (0.948)	-0.001 (0.965)	-0.002 (0.929)	-0.018 (0.478)
Power Distance	-0.016 (0.224)						-0.049* (0.069)					

Individualism		0.026**						0.051**				
		(0.025)						(0.012)				
Uncertainty Avoidance			-0.010						-0.040**			
			(0.261)						(0.019)			
Long Term Orientation				-0.032***						-0.055***		
				(0.000)						(0.000)		
Masculinity					-0.016**	-0.005					-0.005	0.009
					(0.013)	(0.421)					(0.687)	(0.474)
Intercept	-0.881	-2.758**	-0.878	0.774	-1.457	2.122	2.741	-2.672	2.732	3.363	-2.740	0.853
	(0.658)	(0.048)	(0.601)	(0.626)	(0.315)	(0.314)	(0.467)	(0.318)	(0.383)	(0.243)	(0.337)	(0.848)
Number of observations	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,475	394	394	394	394	394	392
Adjusted R2	0.041	0.040	0.045	0.043	0.045	0.039	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.016	0.014	-0.030