

The Structure that Defined Today's UNC
(The 1971 Restructuring of Higher Education in North Carolina)

Personal Recollections

W. Douglas Cooper

Professor of Operations and Supply Chain Management, UNC Charlotte

Purpose

I am a scholar and an observer of history in the making. We at North Carolina's Public University are about to welcome a new President, Margaret Spellings, who is being advertised as an agent of "change." As a student of Supply Chain Management one understands that efficient and effective supply chains require on-going change. One should not be afraid of "change." In the past 85 years North Carolina's Public University has undergone only one profound, global change. Aside from the Consolidation of the University in 1931 the most profound change to higher education occurred over a ten-year period spanning 1961 to 1971. What does history tell our new President, Margaret Spellings, about change in higher education in North Carolina?

It was the spring semester of 1971. I was in my office at NC State University's School of Textiles. I was a young Assistant Professor sitting in the Textile School but holding associate faculty status in the Economics Department and on the Operations Research Graduate Faculty. I had been hired as the Textile Schools' representative to a campus-wide movement into business management programs. Via the 1931 Consolidation of the University, programs of the type we were developing had been, for almost 40 years, restricted by the UNC Board of Trustees to be the sole province of the Chapel Hill campus. Not anticipating any meetings for the day, I was greatly under-dressed. But when I got a call from my Department Head saying "Doug we've got a lunch meeting," I hoped it was with people who didn't care how I looked. The meeting was with the Governor of North Carolina, Bob Scott. In addition to the Governor my department head, Dame Hamby, who was an important player in the North Carolina Textile Manufacture's Association, a member of our faculty, Ken Lynch, who was a boyhood friend of the Governor and myself were in attendance. I had made, via consulting, a good number of contacts with important North Carolina textile people which, I think, qualified me as an attendee at the meeting. Governor Scott's mission for the meeting was to make sure the Textile School was on board with his overtures to the North Carolina Textile Industry re the current status of his initiative to restructure higher education in North Carolina. Coming from a long-term populist North Carolina family who greatly respected his father Kerr Scott, I strongly supported the governor's initiative. However, I found myself in a particularly interesting position relative to Scott's initiatives. At the time of our meeting at the NCSU faculty club and during the period of university restructuring resolution, I was employed by the Greensboro law firm of McNeill Smith Jr. doing a patent litigation study for him re a given type of textile technology. Mac Smith was one of the powerful political opponents to Governor Scott's initiative. But during this period Smith was often in my office, and I in his legislative office in downtown Raleigh, to give my consulting reports. On two occasions I had the privilege to listen-in as Mac and Bill Friday plotted strategy in defense of the UNC trustees' opposition position to Governor Scott's proposals. Together with my textile connections I believe I obtained some special insight into the events of the time. Now, given my current age, it comes to my attention that many of those that lived

through those times of the Bob Scott reorganization of North Carolina's Public University are no longer around. Thus, it might be of interest to some of today's leaders to revisit, through the eyes of someone who was there, those events as a bench-mark for future change within the University. During the past 50 years, as a student, tenured or tenure-track faculty at three of the resulting campuses, having taught at two additional UNC campuses, a Vice President of a major North Carolina company, a 10-year University Department Chair, and member of the organizing sessions of the Faculty Assembly that resulted from the University's reorganization, while history is often in the eye, or the agenda, of the beholder, I offer my recollection of the events of the times to anyone interested. Although Link in his chapter *Restructuring the University System* in his book *William Friday: Power, Purpose and American Higher Education* is dealing with personalities, and telling a story about Bill Friday (some of his conclusions I don't exactly agree with), I believe the basics of the reorganization's activities, Chapter (pg.159), are as I remember them.

Background and the Evolution of the Restructuring Process

In 1971 the structure of higher education in North Carolina, established by Josephus Daniels and the ruling "progressive" Democrats in 1931, remained intact. For the forty year period the campus at Chapel Hill was called a "university" and the two campuses at Raleigh and Greensboro were called "colleges." The three institutions were administered by a single Board of Trustees who, in the main, protected the primacy of the Chapel Hill campus in matters of funding and public perceived relative prestige at the expense of the two "college" campuses. Frank Porter Graham had given up the Presidency of the Consolidated University in 1949 to try his hand at politics where he failed with much notoriety. Graham's departure left a void and much uncertainty about the future existence, structure and leadership of The Consolidated University. It is fair to say that the campuses at Raleigh and Greensboro were not entirely happy with the primacy of the Chapel Hill campus within the existing structure. Thus, time and political maneuvering were required before the supporters of the Chapel Hill campus reasserted their primacy of control and in 1956 selected a young William Friday to assume the role of his former mentor, Frank Porter Graham. The 1956-1971 period was filled with challenges for the University. The politics and economic policies of Josephus Daniels and the ultra-conservative, so called, "progressive" Democrats that had ruled North Carolina during the first half of the 20th century were in harm's way and about to be impacted by a breeze of potential liberalism across the state. From the viewpoint of these "progressive" powers-that-be (PTB) action was required re this breeze. For most of the 1960s the leadership of the UNC Board of Trustees' Executive Committee remained unchanged. The Board's dominant figures had continuous service on the Board from the 1950s. Here, one can think of an "aristocracy" of control over North Carolina's public university. These old white males saw no need to change the 1931 structure of the university and, in general, were hostile to anyone suggesting change. The young president Friday was responsible to the UNC Board of Trustees.

The Consolidated University crafted by Josephus Daniels and his fellow "progressive" Democrats in 1930-31 was one of white supremacy and one designed to support the "progressive" Democrats' policy of "cheap labor" in North Carolina. The post-Civil War landowners needed "cheap labor" tenants and croppers to fuel their business development. The mills needed "cheap labor" workers for their mill villages. All of this was to be accomplished within a Jeffersonian style tax base. In the 1960s only about one-half of North Carolina's children completed high school. Only about 10% received a college degree. North Carolina's higher education facilities were grossly inadequate to meet the future the state was about to face. One could argue that in the 1960s North Carolina had not outgrown its reputation as the "Rip Van Winkle State." As the Josephus Daniels Consolidated University of 1931 was based in the race politics of North Carolina's "progressive" Democrats and "white supremacy" the University of the 1960s was woefully in harm's way re its preparation for the national liberalization of civil rights. Meanwhile the old white males representing the aristocracy of political

and economic control of the UNC Board of Trustees saw no need for - and were hostile to change of - higher education structure in North Carolina.

By the latter half of the 1960s, UNC's control over higher education in North Carolina was being challenged by powerful forces. There was a general understanding that the demand for public higher education in North Carolina was expected to double between the years 1961 and 1981. Riding a wave of populist liberalism in North Carolina the new governor, Terry Sanford, was intent in taking on state public higher education needs, consistent with movements in the national economy. In 1960 Sanford was elected governor. One of his first actions was to appoint a commission to study higher education in North Carolina and make recommendations re their findings. In 1961 he chose Irving Carlyle to head the body to be known as the Carlyle Commission. The Carlyle Commission called for an expansion of higher education in North Carolina and the development of a comprehensive system of community colleges. Sanford considered a "comprehensive" system of community colleges to meet the state's technical needs, as it advanced beyond the low-skilled, "cheap labor" stage of development, as one of the cornerstones of his administration. His goal was to have a school within commuting distance of every North Carolinian at an affordable cost. Here, the word "comprehensive" refers not only to job skills training but "comprehensive" general, education as well. Much was made of the word "comprehensive" by the PTB of higher education. The concern was re the potential impact a policy of "general" higher education at the community college level would have on the existing colleges across the state re program duplication. The Carlyle Commission's call for a general expansion of public higher education in North Carolina brought into question; "What to do about the non-Consolidated University institutions within the State?". Here, the state's "teachers colleges" were demanding the right to offer more comprehensive curriculums for their regional population clients. The state's metropolitan areas of Charlotte, Wilmington and Asheville, only serviced by junior colleges, were seeking university status as magnets for economic development. Then there was the question of how the existing Consolidated University fit within the parameters of the state's total higher education network. One did not have to be an expert in Supply Chain Management to understand the State was about to have a supply chain development and flow-control problem if it wished to protect the state's tax payers with a system of maximum efficiency and effectiveness re higher education. Within the Sanford Administration was the desire to develop a *unified, rationalized system* of public higher education, one that was both efficient and effective and, in particular, was not a politically-based aggregation of locally optimized, independent institutions. The view within the Sanford Administration was that a unified system would include the elements of the present Consolidated University of North Carolina, the higher education institutions not included in the Consolidated University, and a state-wide group of new comprehensive community colleges. How to globally optimize a system of this magnitude was a primary question! How would the strategic questions of where, who, how and how much be developed? Who would have flow control of the network once developed? North Carolina was about to greatly alter its supply chain network of higher education. Developing a network that was both efficient and effective through a political process represented a major challenge for the state. North Carolina was about to do battle for control of higher education in the state. Governor Sanford, and his successors Moore and Scott understood that the UNC Board of Trustees would not part with their monopoly of power over higher education in North Carolina without a significant fight.

To deal with some nascent noise within higher education in the period between Frank Graham and Bill Friday (1949-1956), a Bryant Commission study in 1955 had called for one university and reiterated that it should be the existing one centered in Chapel Hill. However, the politically-based Commission did call for a new agency to plan and control funding for higher education in North Carolina. The new agency was called the State Board of Higher Education (BHE). The new BHE, at first, acted as a protector of the three campus UNC system by preventing expansion of the state's teachers colleges and limiting potential competition with existing UNC programs. However, in the 1957-58 period the BHE came in conflict with UNC by refusing to approve funding projects for UNC campuses at both Raleigh and Chapel Hill. In response to this opposition the UNC

Board of Trustees, using its political power base within the General Assembly, obtained legislation to limit the mission of BHE to only planning and advising the UNC Board of Trustees on higher education funding. This left actual decision making to the UNC Board. While this was a defeat for the BHE the political process led to, in effect, BHE becoming the titular board of trustees for the state's non-Consolidated colleges in concert with the UNC trustees for the UNC system. Here, a battle between the two bodies would rage for more than an additional decade. One can argue that the impending political battle, which would be described as "political chaos" started with the question of what to do about the three junior colleges in Charlotte, Wilmington and Asheville. These junior colleges desired entry into the Consolidated University, with university status. At the same time action was being taken in support of the development of a state-wide "comprehensive" community college system. How were these junior colleges different from the proposed "comprehensive" community college?

Of the Carlyle recommendations the one that was most contentious re the trustees of the Consolidated University was the 1962 call to restructure the rival State Board of Higher Education (BHE). In 1963 Governor Sanford accepted the recommendations of the Carlyle Commission re the community college system and expansion of UNC under the umbrella of the UNC Board. However, Sanford purposely did not consider the recommendation to restructure the BHE in anticipation of losing support for his community college program with powerful supporters of the Consolidated University. Expanding the powers of the BHE could wait for another day! Concurrent with the community college initiative the Sanford Administration dealt with the question of bringing the junior colleges in Charlotte, Wilmington and Asheville into the existing Consolidated University structure. While Charlotte was acceptable to some UNC trustees and President Friday, Wilmington and Asheville were problematical. A number of UNC trustees opposed any expansion of the UNC system. However, the politics of East and West North Carolina meant that Charlotte would have to act in concert with the other two cities. Thus, the three campuses designated as UNC Charlotte, UNC Wilmington and UNC Asheville came under the control of the UNC Board of Trustees and were active members of the Consolidated University by 1963. The decision to accept the junior colleges into the UNC system as universities opened Pandora's Box of political chaos. The arrival of the three junior colleges into the UNC system as UNC Charlotte, UNC Wilmington, and UNC Asheville raised the question as to what should be done with the colleges in Raleigh and Greensboro. State College had long held the stature of a separate university but for political reasons dating back to the Daniels Consolidation of 1931 was not allowed to carry the name. As part of governor Sanford's expansion of higher education the currently configured BHE had recommended an expanded mission for State College and a name change to its proper status as a university. In addition, it was recommended that the prestigious Woman's College at Greensboro be made coeducational. Speaking for his trustees, UNC President Friday advocated that the Raleigh and Greensboro campuses take on the names UNC Raleigh and UNC Greensboro respectively. The Chapel Hill campus would retain the prestigious "flagship" designation of UNC. Friday emphasized the "oneness" of this naming process. While the supporters of Woman's College opposed the changes in Greensboro, the backlash at State College was profound. State College was already recognized nationally as a peer, land-grant university, in fact if not in name. Those that remembered how State College was stripped of much of its mission and students by the Daniel's Consolidation in 1931 and relegated to 2nd class status were not about to allow the blatant attempt of the UNC Board to relegate their institution to the same name status as the junior colleges being accepted into the family. After much contentious enmity was generated via the use of political power re forces of State College and those of the Chapel Hill campus, by 1965, a final name change for the former State College to North Carolina State University at Raleigh was approved. President Friday went on record in considering the name change a mistake. Two years later in 1967, in connection with the entrants of Charlotte, Wilmington and Asheville under the umbrella of the UNC Board of Trustees, Leo Jenkins at East Carolina reasserted his efforts to improve the position of that institution when he proposed to the Legislature that East Carolina be given independent university status from UNC. This maneuver, with the aid of then-governor Moore, a supporter of the Western

North Carolina non-Consolidated colleges, began the process of transforming East Carolina and the remaining former state teachers colleges, white, black, and Native American into “regional” universities. Moreover, in 1969 the state legislature granted the new regional universities the right under BHE supervision the right to establish doctoral programs beginning in 1972. In 1965 Governor Dan K. Moore had persuaded the legislature to reorganize the BHE with Watts Hill Jr. as chairman. The BHE reorganization was accomplished within the Legislature without consultation with UNC officials. Here, the monopoly power over higher education was in harm’s way for the UNC trustees and by 1969 battle lines had been drawn, sides had been chosen and the political games had begun. These games would become personal and bitter! In 1969 Hill Jr. was supplemented in the efforts of the reorganized BHE by an aggressive director Cameron West. Hill Jr. and West saw the weakness of the BHE and the lack of centralized direction for higher education as responsible for the chaos of the 1960s and saw the only solution was to give BHE greater centralized powers. To accomplish this Hill Jr. and West saw their best prospects lay in an alliance with the son of the state’s populist governor of the 1950s, Kerr Scott, the young governor Bob Scott. Governor Bob Scott was faced with rationalizing two competing governing bodies of higher education, the UNC Board of Trustees and the BHE, with a governing body for a nascent comprehensive community college system within a most contentious environment. Global optimization would require either rationalization, unity, cooperation among the parties or centralized control. The Bob Scott Administration understood that rationalization, unity and cooperation within a political environment was more than problematical.

With the establishment of the Warren Committee in late December 1970 the political infighting between the opposing forces of Governor Scott and those of the UNC “powers that be” reached a point of what appeared to be “cooperation.” The UNC forces were on their political heels (no pun intended) when, for whatever their strategic reasons, they agreed to join a committee headed by Lindsay C. Warren Jr. The Committee consisted of one trustee from each of the nine regional universities plus five representatives of the BHE for a total of 14. In addition, 5 members of the UNC Board of Trustees were included within the group. The UNC forces complained that the make-up of the Committee was stacked against them and, in general, spent their committee time defending UNC Board interest with an overt plan to derail the Scott proposals within the Committee. The five UNC trustees advocated for UNC Board interests while the BHE and regional university trustees exercised their fear of a UNC dominated system. At one point the strategy of the 5 UNC trustees appeared to be successful when the Committee was about to vote for no structural change in the current Consolidated University system. However, the efforts of the UNC trustees collapsed on April 24, 1971 when committee member Wallace Hyde proposed a new plan that unified the Scott forces on the Committee. The Hyde plan called for a single coordinating board along with single autonomous boards for each of 16 institutions as a means for governing higher education in North Carolina. A majority of the Committee favored the proposal and a majority report was issued with a favorable vote of 14 to 5. The vote of the Warren Committee and the prospect of what the UNC forces called “deconsolidation” created panic among UNC political forces as their minority position re governance of higher education in North Carolina was now known to the public. Governor Scott enthusiastically supported the majority report of the Warren Committee. In his enthusiasm he was so bold as to issue a blunt warning to UNC opposition threatening reprisal by his Administration if the majority report of the Warren Committee was defeated in the legislature by their political manipulations. On May 26, 1971 Governor Scott took the Warren Committee majority report to the legislature, endorsing its major points.

At this point the UNC forces considered their alternatives. They could try to defeat the Scott proposals in the legislature. If the votes to defeat were not available, delay tactics may eventually kill the proposals. On the other hand, they could lobby for a strong central coordinating board and over time gain control of that board. With insufficient votes to kill or delay the proposals in the legislature, the UNC forces choose to take the second route. Governor Scott and his supporters were on the verge of accomplishing significant “change” in the structure of higher education in North Carolina and were willing to compromise within the UNC trustees’ strategy. While there was general agreement with the concept of individual boards of trustees under a central

board, the end game was in the details of the relative powers of the central board and the individual boards. The end game for both the Scott forces and the UNC forces saw the development of a strong central board with significant power over resource allocation to the individual campuses. In addition the central board was granted explicit powers that limited the individual boards to only those powers that were expressly delegated by the central board. Here, the make-up of the central board would be critical to both the Scott and UNC forces. One can surmise that the Scott forces assumed that the central board would be able to maintain representative governance that would meet the needs of all the higher education institutions of North Carolina in an efficient and effective way. One can surmise that the Scott forces hoped in 1971 that the multi-year efforts to restructure and re-Consolidate higher education's governance would not evolve into a system dominated by any one single institution or multiple-institution power base at the expense of the individual units or the University as a whole.

The Elimination of Jim Crow Higher Education in North Carolina's University

The “white supremacy” attitudes of the UNC Board of Trustees Executive Committee held sway during the reign of the liberal icon President Frank Porter Graham and was the accepted “way of thinking” among North Carolina’s “powers-that-be.” During the first 10 years of the Friday presidency (1956 – 1966) little had been done about meaningful integration of the Daniels led 1931 Consolidated University. During the late 50s, University athletic teams were not allowed to compete with colleges or universities that were integrated. There were no black faculty within the 1931 Consolidated University as late as 1965. A special case had to be made to the UNC Board of Trustees to hire the first black faculty member in 1966. North Carolina’s brand of desegregation during the first 10 years of the Friday presidency could, at best, be described as “defiant tokenism.” However, North Carolina was being introduced to the more national issues of the time. The 1960s was a period of student activism for the 1931 Consolidated University as the civil rights movement had taken a turn toward “black power.” By 1969, aside from the Vietnam War, the primary issue of UNC student activists was racial equity. Larger numbers of black students to the Chapel Hill campus brought with them the Black Student Movement (BSM). In 1968 the BSM presented a list of twenty-three demands to the Chapel Hill administration. These demands included increasing the number of black students and improved treatment of black workers on the Chapel Hill campus. In February 1969 black cafeteria employees, with the support of the BSM, staged a walkout. In March, tensions lead to campus melee with Chapel Hill police that were dispatched to the scene with riot gear. This action resulted in the closing and locking of the cafeteria with guards posted around the building. These events did great damage to the carefully crafted national image of Chapel Hill liberalism. The cafeteria strike showed the “liberal” Chapel Hill institution to be a paternalistic employer that paid low wages to blacks and provided them with very poor working conditions. It was within this charged environment that the details of the 1971 restructuring of higher education in North Carolina were being carried out.

It was understood by many involved with the 1971 restructuring of higher education in North Carolina that the restructuring would bring with it a number of unresolved problems from the state’s white supremacy, “Jim Crow” past. In 1877 the state’s legislature authorized a normal school for blacks to be located in Fayetteville, North Carolina. In 1891 the legislature established a college of agriculture in Greensboro and a normal college for blacks in Elizabeth City. In 1892 a former private school was authorized as a normal college for blacks in what is now Winston-Salem. In 1909 a liberal arts college for blacks was established in Durham. These five institutions, Jim Crow colleges, became the subject of a major challenge for the new centralize Board of Governors that resulted from the 1971 reorganization of higher education in North Carolina. The concept of “separate but equal” was based in legislation in the American South. This legislation was at the core of a system of what was called the “Jim Crow” system of public schools. Here, white and black children early-on experienced the realities of racial segregation.

During post-Civil War Reconstruction one of the most contentious of issues to political leaders of the South and North Carolina was the call for land redistribution by elements of the U.S. Congress dominated by the *Radical Republican* wing of the national Republican Party. As a means of economic reform and as punishment for the Southern gentry, a number of these *Radical Republican* Congressional members advocated taking away gentry owned land, giving a portion to the freed slaves, and selling the remaining land at auction as debt payment for the War. The intent of this punitive policy was to provide economic opportunity for former slaves and to reduce the future economic and political power of the Southern gentry. As a metaphor, during the period 1974 to 1982 the University of North Carolina was involved in a struggle that seemed to some reminiscent of federal government dictates of the days of Reconstruction. At issue was the desegregation of the new multi-campus University of North Carolina.

After 1971 the new University of North Carolina contained as part of its new structure the State's former Jim Crow institutions of higher education. These institutions had been perpetuated in North Carolina since late in the 19th and early in the 20th century. Relative to their white counterparts, they had historically been neglected and under-funded by the legislature of North Carolina. With respect to these Jim Crow institutions, the U.S. federal government's Office of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) had as their goal in the 1970s the "reconstruction" of the University of North Carolina. Their general goals were to:

1. Enhance the Jim Crow, traditional black institutions (TBIs) in North Carolina,
2. Eliminate segregation within the new sixteen-campus University of North Carolina System.

To accomplish these goals HEW and OCR officials advocated for policies that would require a number of academic programs, currently existing at traditional white institutions (TWIs), be moved to traditional black institutions (TBIs) within the multi-campus University. Greatly expanded professional and graduate programs were required for the former Jim Crow schools. In addition, HEW and OCR advocated that greater access to all TWIs be made available to all black students in North Carolina. In order to provide incentive for the process, the power of the federal government, including the threat of loss of federal funding, was to be used to direct the new University of North Carolina actions toward results that were acceptable to HEW and OCR. This power was to be used in determining the distribution of academic programs among the various TBI campuses, the quantity of resources allocated to these campuses, and the racial ratios of white versus black students among all the various branches of the University of North Carolina. In his book *William Friday: Power, Purpose and American Higher Education*, Link, devotes multiple chapters to the specific events and personalities associated with bitter battles between the contesting state and federal forces.

UNC officials and political leaders of the State believed that a desegregation agreement for North Carolina's higher education had been completed with officials of the U.S. Government in 1974. However, with the 1976 election of President Carter, staff members of the Office of Civil Rights, significantly inactive during the Nixon/Ford years, were excited about their possible new accomplishments under the new Carter administration. One of HEW/OCR's desired priority accomplishments was the desegregation of higher education across Southern Jim Crow systems of higher education. In 1977 the Federal Court of Judge Pratt ruled that the historical mission of Southern TBIs was to increase access to higher education for black students. Judge Pratt's brief warned that the closings of TBIs could do damage to Blacks by decreasing educational opportunities for black students. Pratt reasoned that HEW criteria for desegregation should seek the contradictory goals of both desegregation and preservation of the TBIs. The process of meeting these contradictory goals was left as an open question that would form the basis of much contention between HEW, OCR re officials of both state administration and University of North Carolina. By February of 1978 a war mentality prevailed among UNC and HEW/OCR forces. UNC officials felt that the University was a potential

victim of an Office of Civil Rights' campaign to force the University to participate in an experimental test of a model for desegregation of higher education in the South. It was understood that HEW/OCR hard-liners saw North Carolina as a key to the desegregation of Jim Crow higher education across the South. Within this context as a "test case," University officials argued that the University's participation in this desegregation experiment in North Carolina would inflict long lasting damage on all higher education in the State. University officials feared that the details of its 1974 plans were to be put at the bidding of ever-changing national political forces whose agenda was more concerned with racial politics than with education. UNC officials feared HEW's potential for demanding policies that the University considered unreasonable and antithetical to the proper desegregation of their Jim Crow institutions. Within this atmosphere UNC officials agreed that they would independently determine how to pursue desegregation for North Carolina's higher education.

Representatives of HEW focused on program duplication issues re three TBIs. In the Greensboro/Winston-Salem area, HEW perceived there to be duplication of programs among the TWI campus, UNC Greensboro and the TBI campuses in Greensboro, North Carolina A&T, and Winston-Salem State in Winston-Salem. Also, HEW perceived duplication in the Raleigh, Durham and Chapel Hill area among the TWI campuses, NC State and Chapel Hill re the TBI, North Carolina Central in Durham. HEW pushed for certain "unique" programs to be moved or added to existing programs at TBI campuses as a means to draw white students to the TBI campuses. HEW wanted black enrollment at TWI campuses increased by a target value of 150% over a 5-year period. In addition HEW advocated for significant expenditure and enrollment increases in undergraduate, professional and graduate programs at all TBI campuses. In their desire to independently pursue the desegregation of North Carolina's University, and do so within the Pratt Court's brief, University officials faced a number of serious dilemmas. Among these was the problem of how to both increase black enrollment at the TWIs and maintain quality programs at the TBIs. It was understood that if the TWIs were to drain off top black students from the TBIs, serious damage to program quality at TBIs would likely result. It was understood that the potential condition where qualified black students might chose to attend TWI campuses while black students, not qualified for admittance to a white campus, might be relegated to lower quality TBI programs, needed to be addressed. It was understood that UNC officials needed to consider the dilemma of how to, truly, avoid the situation where there existed significant quality differences between future TWI and TBI campuses of the University. HEW/OCR's solution to the above dilemma was to move quality programs from the TWIs to the TBIs, giving individual TBIs program monopoly over a few quality programs on each of the TBI campuses. It was argued that white students would come to the TBIs for these programs thus accomplishing desegregation of the TBIs while enhancing their total quality of output. As in the days of Reconstruction when federal government officials argued that land redistribution was apt payment to former slaves for their years of slavery, a number of federal government officials and supporters now argued that higher education program redistribution was apt payment to North Carolina's black citizens for almost one hundred years of Jim Crow higher education in North Carolina.

As the potential for federally enforced land redistribution rallied the ruling white political forces of North Carolina during Reconstruction, the potential loss of important quality programs at TWI campuses of the University of North Carolina to TBI campuses was considered a thing not to be tolerated across the state's dominant white political forces. The State's new Board of Governors led by UNC Chapel Hill advocate William Johnson, in coalition with members who advocated for N.C. State, UNC Greensboro and other TWI UNC campuses, joined forces on the Board to hold firm against their TBI colleagues and HEW/OCR pressure for a total period of about eight years. This coalition of TWI campus advocates on the University Board of Governors was strengthened by a common bond; each of the TWI campuses were currently operating important academic programs that were subject to potential loss to one or more of the TBIs. For example, while Chapel Hill partisans may have been willing to advocate that the College of Veterinary Medicine at rival N.C. State be moved to the TBI North Carolina A&T campus, when these same partisans speculated that the College of Business Administration might be moved away from Chapel Hill to the Durham campus of North Carolina

Central, they better understood the value of cooperation among the TWIs. [The cynic might think to him/herself that the Chapel Hill forces had worked too hard to move State College's Business program to Chapel Hill in the O. Max Gardner - Josephus Daniels' Consolidation of the 1930s to allow themselves to lose it to a federal desegregation mandate in the 1970s!] However, the University's Board of Governors ruling majority agreed that the Board would not tolerate a condition where HEW/OCR had the power to choose which programs would be moved from the University's TWI campuses to its TBI campuses. The University Board of Governors defined their independent plan to desegregate Jim Crow higher education in North Carolina in terms that they perceived to be a win-win position for all of higher education in North Carolina. The University Board of Governors defined their goals as that of racial integration, educational equity and greater opportunity for black students of higher education in North Carolina. The UNC policy position was to increase the number of programs at TBIs and increase the amount of funding to those campuses, without damaging existing programs at TWI campuses. In addition, the Board advocated for the increase of black enrollment percentages at each of the TWI campuses. UNC officials saw their desegregation plan as maintaining and enhancing the TBI's past opportunities for black students. In addition the plan was for generating new opportunities for black students through the development of new programs at the TBIs. At the same time, the plan allowed qualified black students access to all of the existing programs within the TWIs. However, it was given that in meeting these goals the Board and other UNC officials demanded they be allowed to accomplish the goals without federal government dictate. Thus the battle lines for determining how the University of North Carolina was to be desegregated were drawn between UNC officials and the HEW/OCR representatives of the federal government.

Within the battle lines of higher education desegregation policy, North Carolina Governor Jim Hunt was caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Governor Hunt was from the "populist" wing of the North Carolina Democratic Party and was a strong political supporter of the Carter Administration that was being represented by the HEW/OCR forces in North Carolina. It was understood that Governor Hunt depended on substantial black voter support for his present and past political power in North Carolina. In addition, Governor Hunt was believed to have future national political aspirations for himself. In this context Governor Hunt understood that the HEW/OCR behavior towards the State's University had the potential to do much damage to the national Democratic Party in North Carolina re the 1980 elections. Thus Governor Jim Hunt, a strong supporter of his TWI Alma mater, N.C. State University, was placed in the position of having to participate in a process of "damage control" during the fierce battles that were waged between HEW/OCR and the William Johnson controlled Board of Governors. Although Hunt desperately wished to avoid litigation with the federal government, by the spring of 1979 it was agreed that litigation was the only alternative for both of the warring parties. Governor Hunt's views created significant internal disputes within the University Board of Governors and threatened the coalition of TWI campus forces within the Board. However, the powerful forces of William Johnson carried the day and the Board stuck to its policy of standing firm against any compromise of the University's stand against the HEW forces. Thus, on April 24, 1979 the University in U.S. district court for the eastern district of North Carolina filed suit. Presiding Judge Dupree was a UNC Chapel Hill Law School graduate and his views were acceptable to the Board as a person who should try its case. Between 1979 and 1981 litigation of the University's case continued. The case was likened by some to a long running movie with a surreal plot and no end in sight. Behind the scenes negotiations by Governor Hunt and others to minimize political damage caused by the litigation in North Carolina was not fruitful.

After the Republican sweep of November 1980, North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms forecast the impact that sweep would have on the UNC-HEW/OCR controversy. Senator Helms on election night indicated to a number of interested parties that the resolution of the UNC-HEW/OCR dispute was now just a phone call away from resolution. Senator Helms and Senator East, former ECU Professor, made the desegregation matter a high priority with new President Reagan. Under new Secretary of Education, William Bennett, a settlement of the long-standing battle between the HEW and UNC forces was resolved in June of 1981. The consent decree

issued represented a major victory for the William Johnson led UNC Board of Governors. In general the federal government accepted the UNC plan for desegregation of higher education in North Carolina. Thus, the federal government abandoned the concept of moving programs from TWIs to TBIs as a means of carrying out desegregation in North Carolina higher education. In addition, it was agreed that the settlement could not be repudiated by new presidential administrations in the future. For its part, the University of North Carolina agreed to attract more black students to its TWI campuses. It set as a goal 10.6% black students at each of its TWIs and a goal of 15% white students at each of its TBIs. In addition the University of North Carolina agreed to establish new programs and enhance facilities at the TBIs under the control of the UNC Board of Governors.

Some Thoughts

Within the 1971 structure North Carolina's Public University has accomplished some wonderful things. However, a student of Supply Chain Management understands the relationship between supply chain capacity and product-mix. As the product mix changes optimality requires a rebalancing of bottle-neck and excess capacities. As technology grows at a near exponential rate any supply chain left to its own local optimization will, by the very nature of the process, become unbalanced. Over the past 40 years, as a keen, observer, I have, in my opinion, watched this capacity imbalance occur among and within the various elements of the University. In periods of economic growth and/or "cheap money" this atrophy may go unnoticed as multiple states compete for regional economic development. Too many leaders still believe that more money for resources solves a good number of the world's problems. They don't understand that it is the on-going strategic expansion of bottlenecks and elimination of excess capacities that brings both efficiency and effectiveness of purpose. It is fair to say that one can get agreement that the state's optimal product mix of teaching, research and service has been changed dramatically by the profound growth in technology. Thus, it is time to rebalance, restructure North Carolina's Public University network flow. However, my learning from the 1971 reorganization is that the political back-biting and local agendas of individuals makes what needs to be done for future optimal change very problematic. How can the State learn from modern supply chain management the synergy of partnerships across University campus network nodes rather than adversarial, zero-sum, policies? How can the state put these synergistic approaches into instituting change within North Carolina's Public University? For a start the new President Spellings must convey an attitude of "*we*" rather than an attitude of "*me*" across all university players. Though change may be a daunting task, change represents an opportunity for continuing the process of doing wonderful things for the citizens of North Carolina.

Dr. W. Douglas Cooper, Professor

BISOM Dept. Belk College of Business, UNC Charlotte

wdcooper@uncc.edu

References:

William Friday: Power, Purpose and American Higher Education, William Link, UNC Press, Chapel Hill, 1995.

Terry Sanford: Politics, Progress and Outrageous Ambitions, Howard E. Covington Jr., Marion A. Ellis, Duke University Press, 1999.

Josephus Daniels: His Life and Times, Lee A. Craig, UNC Press, 2013.

The Political Career of W. Kerr Scott: The Squire from Haw River, Julian M. Pleasants, University Press of Kentucky, 2014.

Dr. Frank by John Ehle, Franklin Street Books, Chapel Hill, 1933.

The Consolidation of the University of North Carolina by David A. Lockmiller, University of North Carolina, 1942.

Frank Porter Graham, a Southern Liberal by Warren Ashby, J.F. Blair, 1980.

Southern Capitalism; The Political Economy of North Carolina, 1880-1980, by Phillip J. Wood, Duke University Press, 1986.

History of the North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering by David Lockmiller, Edwards and Broughton, 1939.

Agrarian Unrest and Urban Remedies: the Progressive Solution in North Carolina by Glenda E. Gilmore Unpublished Thesis UNC Charlotte, 1985.

Multiple Personal Conversations with Involved Parties.